

'

NEELAKESI


THE ORIGINAL TEXT AND THE
COMMENTARY OF SAMAYA-
DIVAKARA-VAMANA-MUNI.

EDITED AND PUBLISHED

BY

PROF. A. CHAKRAVARTI, M.A., I.E.S.

Principal, Government College, Kumbakonam.



COPYRIGHT
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

24939

**DEDICATED
TO
MY MOTHER.**

PREFACE.

The work that is now offered to the public is a well-known Tamil Classic. Why I have undertaken to edit this, instead of leaving it to more competent Tamil scholars, is due to two facts. One, scholars who have had the manuscript with them for several decades have not made up their minds to publish the work for some reason or other; and secondly the knowledge that there were only three or four manuscripts extant, naturally implied that if these few manuscripts were lost or destroyed, the work itself would be lost to the world like the celebrated classics, Kundalakêsi and Valayâpathi. Hence I have ventured to publish this work so that it might be available to the Tamil public. The original as well as the commentary are of such literary merit that the Tamil public would gladly welcome this work. It is mainly intended to expound the doctrine of Ahimsa, in all its aspects and from the same point of view it critically examines other systems of Indian Thought. It is hoped that this work will be of great use in Modern India in as much as it emphasises the doctrine of Non-violence in general and its corollary in special that the social organisation is to be based upon character and merit and not upon birth. Such an appeal to Modern India is certainly of great importance to leaders of thought in their attempt to reorganise the Indian Society and rebuild the Indian Nation.

I am greatly indebted to the following persons for lending their manuscripts to me which were of great use in bringing out this present edition.

1. His Holiness Sri Lakshmisena Bhattaraka
Bhattacharya Swamigal of Mel-Chittamur,
Jain Mutt.
2. Mr. Samantabhadra Nainar of Perumandur.
3. Dakshinatya Kalanidhi Maha Mahopadhyaya
Dr. V. Swaminatha Iyer of Madras.
4. Mr. C. S. Mallinath, Editor, Jain Gazette,
Madras.

The manuscripts 3 and 4 were probably copies made from the other two and hence it must be confessed that only two independent manuscripts were available for consultation. Hence it must be admitted that the present edition is not quite satisfactory. Probably it contains number of mistakes and imperfections which could not be rectified as there were no other manuscripts available. No one is more conscious of these mistakes and imperfections than the editor himself. One great defect which deserves to be mentioned specially is the absence of eight stanzas (22 to 29) in the Chapter on Veda Vada. Since these stanzas are absent in all the available manuscripts, the present edition does not contain them with their corresponding commentaries. The editor will feel highly grateful, if any scholar would be good enough to furnish the omitted stanzas.

I have to thank Dr. V. Swaminatha Iyer, Pandit R. Raghava Iyengar and Mr. S. Vaiyapuri Pillai, Editor, Tamil Lexicon for the valuable suggestions they have given me in editing this work. I very much regret to

record the death of Pandit Arumuham Servai who was very helpful to me in preparing the manuscript for the press.

In order to make the contents of the work available to a wider public the Introduction to the work is written in English containing the general purport of the Tamil work. In this connection, I must thank Mr. C. S. Mallinath for getting the manuscript of the Introduction through the press. An index is added to the book and it contains as far as possible all the difficult words and intricate doctrines explained in short. It is not claimed to be exhaustive and such an exhaustive index is not necessary in as much as the original commentary contains all the necessary information.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

SECTION I.

	PAGES.
THE EXACT TITLE OF THIS BOOK ...	1
THE AUTHOR ...	5
THE COMMENTATOR OF NEELAKESI ...	11
THE NAME NEELAKESI ...	11
NEELAKESI—THE BOOK ...	20

SECTION II.

BODHISATVA ...	37
THE TEN PARAMITHAS ...	39
SARIPUTTA AND MOGGALANA ...	47
DHARMA PREACHED BY BUDDHA ...	53
THE DOCTRINE OF DEPENDENT ORIGINATION ...	56
NAME AND FORM ...	59
THE DOCTRINE OF PANCHASKANDAS ...	61
THUTHANGAS ...	64
THE EIGHTFOLD PATH ...	69
THE DOCTRINE OF NIRVANA ...	70
THE STORY OF KUNDALAKESI ...	75

SECTION III.

VATTAKA JATAKA ...	85
MATSYA JATAKA ...	86
SASA JATAKA ...	87

MAHAKAPI JATAKA	88
SIBI JATAKA	90
SANKAPALA JATAKA	92
VYAGRI JATAKA	94
MAITRIBALA JATAKA	100
VISWANTARA JATAKA	116
THE BUDDHIST SCRIPTURE	127
AHIMSA AND BUDDHISM	128

SECTION IV.

CHAPTER	I.	DHARMA URAI	136
"	II.	KUNDALAKESI VADA	141
"	III.	ARKACHANDRA VADA	146
"	IV.	MOKKALAVADA	150
"	V.	BUDDHA VADA	194
"	VI.	AJIVAKA VADA	231
"	VII.	SANKHYA VADA	262
"	VIII.	VAISESHIKA VADA	282
"	IX.	VEDA VADA	306
"	X.	BHUTA VADA	320
BIBLIOGRAPHY	;

NEELAKESI.

SECTION I.

THE book that is now placed before the public is a matter of heated controversy among the Tamil scholars as to its exact title.

The Exact Title of this Book. This controversy is unfortunately due to the occurrence of a certain word in the closing sentence of each section. At the close of every chapter there occurs the Tamil word “சுருட்டு.” All the manuscripts available to me contain the same word. The term “சுருட்டு” in Tamil means summary or compendium. On account of this significance of the word, which is uniformly used at the close of every chapter, some Tamil scholars have formed the opinion that the present work is a sort of summary of a larger work now completely lost to the world. But this suggestion probably is not quite accurate. The work Neelakesi does not present the appearance of being a summary from a larger work. It possesses completeness and unity, characteristic of any original composition. Hence, the suggestion that it is but a summary of a larger work is to be rejected. It will not be quite accurate to tack on this word “சுருட்டு” in the title of the work and make it Neelakesi சுருட்டு. Some eminent scholars belonging to the opposite camp naturally reject this title for the work, and suggest as an alternative, the word “தெருட்டு” which means enlightenment or dispelling ignorance. This is an ingenious and extremely plausible suggestion.

The term “தெருட்டு” occurs in the text in very many places. Neelakesi's ignorance was dispelled when she met the Jaina yogi Munichandra and when she was instructed by the master to go about the land propounding Jina dharma and dispelling erroneous knowledge. In all such contexts, the term “தெருட்டு” is used in the text; and probably the term “தெருட்டு” may be accepted as preferable to the rival term “திரட்டு.” But when the first sheets were sent to the press in order to steer clear of the controversial matter, the title of the work was left simply as Neelakesi, without either of the qualifying words “திரட்டு” or “தெருட்டு.” What was done as a matter of avoiding controversial matter turns out to be not only the safe course but also the only correct one. Wherever a reference is made to this work in Tamil literature, the work is always mentioned by the single word ‘Neelakesi’ without any qualifying attribute. Even in the two commendatory stanzas added on to the end of this work relating to the commentary, the work is referred to as mere Neelakesi. In the Tamil treatise on prosody named Yâpparungala Vritti, this work is referred to in two places. Speaking about books on philosophical controversy we find the following passage in page 540 of Bavanandam's edition. “தருக்கமாவன :—ஏகாந்தவாதமும் அநேகாந்தவாதமும் என்பன. அவை, குண்டலம், நீலம், பிங்களம், அஞ்சனம், தத்வதரிசனம், காலகேசி முதலிய செய்யுட்களுள்ளும், ஸாங்கிய முதலிய ஆறு தரிசனங்களுள்ளும் காண்க.

In another place in the same, on page 487 “சிந்தாமணி, குளாமணி, குண்டலகேசி, நீலகேசி, அமிருதபதி என்பவற்றின் முதற்பாட்டு வண்ணத்தான் வருவன etc.

From these two quotations it is clear that the author of Yâpparungala Vritti knew the work only by the

name Neelakesi, and that scholars about his time knew only this title. Further, the very fact that it is mentioned in association with a number of other works whose names end with “Kesi” such as Kundalakesi, Pingalakesi, Kâlakesi, Anjanakesi etc., makes it quite clear that this work also has been known among the scholars, only as Neelakesi. This is further strengthened by the fact that Neelakesi was intended by its author as a refutation of the Buddhist work Kundalakesi. Hence he coined a title Neelakesi after the model of the work which was controverted by him. Again in the commentary on the work on Saiva philosophy, called Sivagnâna Siddhi, Gnânaprakâsa one of the commentators, quotes copious extracts from Neelakesi both from the commentary as well as the text. He always closes the quotations in these words—Thus says Neelakesi, Thus is found in Neelakesi—and so on. From all these quotations it is quite clear that the work has been known in the literary world only as Neelakesi and the occurrence of the word “தீரட்டு” in the manuscript must be explained by some other reason. The title of the work must be the single word Neelakesi to be in conformity with the other names with the similar termination Kesi.

Having dragged the title away from the field of controversy, we need not trouble ourselves as to the explanation how the word “தீரட்டு” crept into the closing sentence of each chapter. It must entirely be a matter of conjecture trying to account for its occurrence. The commentary is generally known as Samaya Divâkara which phrase means “the sun that dispels the darkness in religion.” May we not conjecture that the new word added on to the closing sentence probably refers to the

commentary Samaya Divākara? Whether the commentator himself introduced this word or some later disciple of his, it is not possible for us to decide at this moment. If it is agreed that the new term is introduced with reference to the commentary, then we may find justification for both the words. The word “தெருட்டு” will directly bring out the significance of the phrase Samaya Divākara. But, except in one case, in all the other places, the term that is used is not “தெருட்டு” but “திரட்டு.” Can we find any justification for adopting the word “திரட்டு” in preference to “தெருட்டு” by the scholars who prepared the manuscript? I think it is possible to justify even this word and it need not be discarded as the error of the scribe, perpetuated in literature. At the time of the commentator, there must have been a number of works of a similar type, devoted to the examination and criticism of several metaphysical systems, such as Sarvadarsana Sangraha by Sâyana Madhava, Shad Darsana Samuchchaya by Haribadra Suri, and Sarva Siddhânta Sangraha by Sankaracharya. All these works are devoted to the examination of the different darsanas and establishing one system as the siddhânta of the author. Most probably, a similar attitude was taken by the early scholars, even with regard to Neelakesi. It is exactly of the same type as the above mentioned philosophical works. Various rival darsanas are examined and criticised and the darsana accepted by the author is established as the siddhânta. Most probably, some disciple of the commentator added on this word “திரட்டு” with this significance of Sangraha or Samuchchaya. If the term “திரட்டு” is taken to signify sangraha or samuchchaya as used by Sanskrit

writers there is every justification for retaining the word as it is without any alteration, as suggested by some Tamil scholars. Anyhow, here the term is retained as it is found in the closing sentence of each chapter in the manuscripts. As to its exact significance and the cause of its occurrence in the manuscripts it may be left to the Tamil scholars to decide. It is enough to state that the publication before us strictly follows the manuscript.

WE know practically nothing of the author of Neelakesi. There is no mention of his

The Author. name or place or time in the text. The commentator is also perfectly silent in the matter. Probably about his time the author's identity was completely forgotten. Under these circumstances we have to depend entirely on mere conjecture. There is not even enough circumstantial evidence leading us to a safe conclusion. The only thing that we can be certain of is that the author of Neelakesi must belong to a later period than the composition of the great grammatical work "Tholkappiam" and the two ethical works "Nâladīyâr" and "Kural." The commentator says that "Kural" is his scripture. There is reason to believe that these three were written by Jaina Teachers. The other Jaina works were not in existence. These three works are quoted by the author of "Neelakesi." Hence it follows that he must be acquainted with these works and hence he must be of a later period. Tamil scholars are not quite unanimous about the date of these works. The work on grammar 'Tholkappiam' is certainly the oldest of the three. Chronologically probably Nâladīyâr comes next and then Kural. If we accept the general theory that the

stanzas included in Nâladiyâr were composed by the several Jaina ascetics who migrated to the South under the leadership of Bhadrabâhu on account of a severe famine in the North, then we are bound to assign Nâladiyâr to the 3rd century B.C. about the time of Chandra Gupta Maurya. For Chandra Gupta Maurya was a disciple of Bhadrabâhu and he was one of the congregation that migrated. If the Jaina tradition about Kural is recognised to be valid, then we have to accept its age to be the first half of the first century A.D. Elacharya is supposed to be the author of Kural. Elâchârya is another name of Sri Kunda-Kundâchârya who lived partly in the first century B.C. and partly in the first century A.D. Apart from the Jaina tradition even from the study of the extant Tamil classics, we are bound to assign Kural somewhere about the first century A.D. Hence we can safely assert that the author of Neelakesi must have lived after the composition of Kural. Thus the first century A.D. forms the upper limit of the age of Neelakesi. What about the lower limit? Here we have to depend upon purely negative evidence. Evidently the author is not acquainted with the later Vedânta schools of Sankara, Râmânûja, and Madhwa. Only the earlier schools are mentioned and criticised in the work. The several schools of Indian thought mentioned in Sarvadarsana Sangraha and works of similar type are not alluded to at all in Neelakesi. Probably they were not in existence to be noted by the author of Neelakesi. The important school of Ajivakâs, whose system is elaborately treated in a separate chapter devoted to them was not known to the later writers. The singers of Thevaram hymns mention the

Buddhists and the Jainas constantly as their opponents: Evidently they were not aware of the school of Ajivakâs; for, there is no mention at all about them. But at the time of the composition of Neelakesi the Ajivaka school must have been a prominent one. For the author takes up the examination of that school immediately after Buddhism. We know from ancient records, especially from Buddhist literature, that the Ajivakâs belonged to one of the rival schools of thought, and lived side by side with the Buddhists and the Jains even during the life time of Gautama Buddha and Mahâvîra. This school of Ajivakâs is also mentioned in Asoka's inscriptions. This school of Ajivakâs was flourishing in the South side by side with Jainism and Buddhism; this is quite evident from the importance given to that in Neelakesi. This sect must have continued its existence even in the time of the composition of Manimegala; because that school with its philosophy is referred to in the chapter which reviews the various philosophical systems. The system which was so prominent in the South and which competed with Jainism and Buddhism in the race for intellectual contests was completely forgotten about the time of the Thevara hymns. Sambandar and Appar—the two earlier and prominent Thevara singers—do not show any evidence of their acquaintance with the Ajivakâ school. The author of Neelakesi locates the Ajivakâ teacher and his congregation in a suburban village called Samadhandam—somewhere near Kukutanagar which is another name for Worayur—a town in Trichinopoly—which was famous as the capital of a kingdom in the early centuries of the Christian era. That a prominent school of thought which had its centre of activity in the

very heart of the Tamil land should not have been known to the Saiva revivalists of the Thevaram period could be explained only by the supposition that the system was completely forgotten, without leaving any trace at least a couple of centuries prior to the Saivite reformation. Probably this school of Ajivakâs continued its existence in the north long after its disappearance in the South. In Harshacharitra of Bâna there is a reference to the several religious schools at that time. King Harsha, when he goes out in search of his sister, enters into a forest Asrama of Divâkaramitra, where he meets the several congregations belonging to the several religious orders, such as, the Banddhas, the Jainas, the Bhagavathars, the Vedantins, etc. In this group he finds the Maskarins. Maskari was the founder of the Ajivakâ school and the followers of Maskari are the people referred to in Harshacharitra. In fact the Maskarins are mentioned first in the enumeration of the various religious schools. This proves clearly that the Maskarin school or Ajivakâ sect was a living faith about the time of Sri Harsha in the early part of the 7th century A.D. From these facts we have to conclude that in the South the Ajivakâs were flourishing only in the early centuries of the Christian Era and disappeared afterwards. This will put the lower limit for the composition of Neelakesi somewhere about the 5th century A.D.

In this connection we have to notice a reference to Ajivakâs contained in Sivagnâna Siddhiâr. This work on Saiva philosophy is much later than the Thevara hymns. Here is a chapter devoted to Ajivakâs in the section called Parapakshavâda. This fact will apparently be in conflict with our above conclusion, that

the Thevâram singers were not acquainted with the Ajivakas ; for the latter must have been extinct long before the composition of the Thevaram hymns. This later mention of the Ajivakas need not disturb our conclusion. Both the text and the commentaries on the Parapaksha of Sivagnâna Siddhiâr clearly exhibit the fact that the knowledge of Ajivaka was based on mere hearsay, and was certainly inaccurate. They are quite right as far as their general classification goes. Both the Ajivakas and the Nirgrantha Jainas were ascetics who discarded their clothes. Hence both are referred to by the common appellation Amanas ; but when the author of Sivagnâna Siddhiâr proceeds to examine the systems, he creates evidently the impression that these two are subsects of the same school. The commentators also make the mistake of assuming that the Ajivaka sect is identical with that school of Jainas who did not discard clothes. There are only two sects of Jainas known to history—Digambaras and Swêtâmbaras. The Digambaras are generally referred to as the Nirgranthas throughout the Tamil literature. The author of Sivagnâna Siddhiâr and its commentators rightly use the word Nigandavâdi when they refer to the Digambaras. But they identify Ajivakâs with the Swêtâmbaras as they refer to them as the sect of the Jaina ascetics who wear clothes. This indentification is entirely erroneous. Gnânaprakâsa clearly points out that the Ajivaka sect is different from the Nirgrantha sect. He even quotes Neelakesi and says that the Ajivakâs are Ekantavâdis whereas the Nirgranthas are un-ekantavâdis. This philosophical distinction is fundamental in as much as the term Ekantavâdi is used by the Jaina thinkers to denote all the rivals.

Though Gnânaprakâsa is thus correctly informed as to the difference between the Ajivakâs and Nirgranthâs, he too succumbs to the mistake of maintaining that the former belonged to a sect of the Jaina ascetics who did not discard their clothes. From these facts it is quite clear that the knowledge of the Ajivakâs exhibited in the philosophical work of Sivagnâna Siddhiâr and the commentaries is not quite accurate and is probably based upon pure book knowledge and that too imperfect. Hence our reasoning as to the date of Neelakesi based upon the disappearance of the Ajivakâs remains unaffected.

There is one other point worth mentioning. In the 5th stanza in Neelakesi, the author refers to the fact that he had the benefit of learning the doctrines from Thevar which doctrines he accepted as Pramânîkam—correct. It is a pertinent question to consider who this Thevar is, who figures as the Teacher of our author. It is almost an accepted tradition in Tamil literature that the term Thevar without any qualification always refers to the author of Tirukkural. If the reference in the 5th stanza is accepted to be a reference to the author of Kural, then it may be inferred that the author of Neelakesi was a direct student of the author of Kural, from whom he learnt the several philosophical systems included in this work. It would also follow that the author of Neelakesi was a convert to Jainism and that he learnt the fundamentals of Jaina philosophy from his Guru—the Thevar—the author of Kural. This inference we are constrained to have from the information given in the 3rd stanza of Neelakesi where the author confesses that his story is not based upon accepted religious Agamas of old.

If the conjecture that the term Thevar in the 5th

stanza has a reference to the author of Kural then we have to assign Neelakesi and its author to the 1st century A. D. We have to frankly admit that the whole thing is based upon conjecture, and hence we cannot afford to dogmatically assert anything about the age of the author of Neelakesi.

We are on a surer ground when we begin to talk about the commentator of Neelakesi, who is referred to in the laudatory verses as Samayadivākara-vāmanamuni.

The commenta-
tor of Neelakesi.

In the introduction to Merumandarapurānam, the author of Merumandara is identified with Vāmanāchārya—the commentator of Neelakesi. Since Tamil scholars have accepted this identification to be correct, it is enough here to mention only the relevant facts. This Vāmanāchārya had also another name Malli-senāchārya. His disciple was one Pushpasēnāchārya. Irugappa, the commander-in-chief of Bukkarāya, had as his Guru this Pushpasēnamuni. According to Dr. Hultsch, this Irugappa and his father Chaichappa were ministers under Harihara, the King of Vijayanagar. On epigraphical evidence these are assigned to the 14th century A. D. The complimentary epithet Ubaya-bhāshā Kavi Chakravarti is fully justified by the scholarship and elegance of style exhibited by the beautiful and the sublime *manipravāla* commentary to Neelakesi, which we owe to this Samayadivākara Vāmanamuni. The commentary is known as Samayadivākara Vritti.

The title of the work Neelakesi according to the author is borrowed from the Kāli-Neelakesi of Pazhayanur. This village

The name Neelakesi.

Pazhayanur is referred to as Thenpazhayanur. It no doubt refers to that Pazhayanur adjacent to Tiruvâlangâdu of Thevaram fame. All the Thevara singers have referred to this Pazhayanur in their hymns relating to Thiruvâlangâdu—a village in the North Arcot District. That this Pazhayanur in the outskirts of Thiruvâlangâdu had a famous Kâli temple is evident from the book called Tiruvâlangâdu Sthalamâhâtmyam. According to this work the Kâli of Pazhayanur sorrounded by her large army of smaller devatâs was a terror all round since she created a havoc among men and animals in the sorrounding area. Even the gods found it intolerable. They all appealed to Vishnu for protection; but Vishnu told the Devas that they must go to Siva for help. For, this Kâli of Pazhayanur had the favour and patronage of Pârvati, Siva's wife. According to Vishnu's advice, they all went to Siva and appealed to him to protect them from the intolerable cruelty of Kâli. Siva instead of waging an open war against Kâli decided upon a stratagem to vanquish her. He challenged her to a contest of dancing to which she readily consented. In the presence of Devas who acted as umpires, the dancing contest was begun. In the beginning Kâli showed herself to be quite equal to Siva and sometimes even excelled Him and the umpires were not in a position to decide in favour of Siva. Finally, Siva had recourse to the Chanda dance. In this dance the dancer had to lift up his leg and whirl round. Kâli being a female Goddess could not follow Siva in this chanda dance by lifting up her leg in the presence of Devas. Hence she had to admit her defeat and recognise Siva as the victor

of the dance—Natarâja. The author of this Sthala-mâhâtmya in his introduction calls this Kâli as Neeli. From this it is clear that the Kâli of Pazhayanur was also known by the name Neeli.

There is also a reference to Pazhayanur Neeli in Gnâna Sambandâ's Thevara. This story of Neeli of Pazhayanur is also referred to by Sekkizhar in his Purana. The story is as follows:—

There was a Brahmin living with his wife happily for sometime. Then he fell into the snare of a prostitute. He lived with the latter and lost practically all his property. The deserted wife went and lived with her parents. The Brahmin having lost all his wealth wanted to get hold of the jewels belonging to his wife. Therefore he went to his wife and coaxed her to accompany him to his village to live with him in peace. But on the way he forcibly took all her jewels and pushed her with her child into a well where she was drowned. In the next birth this Brahmin was born as a Vysya and amassed great wealth as a merchant. He had an advice from a great sage that he should avoid going north in connection with his commercial transactions. For, there was a Fate dogging his footsteps—that was the result of the past. The sage gave a sword which would protect the merchant from any calamity. In the course of his commercial tour this merchant had to go to Pazhayanur one day. This Pazhayanur was the haunt of the pisâcha Neeli which was the form taken by his wife in his pre-birth and who was murdered by him. This Neeli in the form of a woman with her child appeared before the Assembly of the 70 Velâlâs who constituted the Court of Justice. There she appealed to them

thus :—" Oh ! Noblemen, this merchant is my husband. This child is born to him. He has discarded me, has been living with prostitutes ever since. Pray restore him to me." Then they questioned the merchant. He denied everything. He suspected that this woman was the assumed form of an evil spirit and it had been scheming to kill him. The members constituting the Court of Justice had also suspected the motive of the woman ; but she narrated in detail the whole family history of the merchant and cried piteously for restitution. Hence the Court consoled her and assured the merchant that if anything happened to his life, they would be responsible for the calamity. When he was assured of his life, he consented to take back Neeli. Neeli and the merchant had their lodgings separately in a house. Neeli perceiving the magic sword with the merchant, complained to the noblemen of the place that he would murder her. Hence he was asked to deposit the sword with them. The moment the sword was taken away from him, he lost the magic protection given to him by the sage. Neeli had free access and the result was one night the merchant's body was torn open and he was left dead in the house by Neeli who after taking revenge disappeared from the scene. Next morning when the deadbody of the merchant was noticed by the Velâlâs, all the 70 of them true to their word sacrificed their lives by casting themselves in fire. This is the story of the deceitful Neeli, mentioned in Sambandar's Thevara and elaborated by Sekhizshar.

The object of this story evidently is to praise the nobility and honour of the Velâlâs who forfeited their lives in order to keep the honour of their word. It is

quite evident that this Neeli, though an evil spirit, has nothing to do with the Kâli-Neelakesi.

There is an earlier story of Neeli found in Jaina literature. Swami Samanthabhadra in his *Ratnakarandaka Srâvakâchâra*—a book dealing with *Grahasadharmas* according to the Jainas refers to one Neeli as an example of a person who became famous by faithfully observing the *vrata* of *Brahmacharya* characteristic of the house-holder's life. The story of Neeli as narrated by the commentator *Prabhâchandrâchârya* is as follows :—

The city of *Brigukacha* was the capital of *Lâtadesa* ruled over by the King *Vasupala*. In that city there lived a merchant by name *Jinadatta*. He had a daughter named *Neeli* who was extremely beautiful. In the same city there lived another Chetty by name *Samudradatta* and whose wife was *Sagaradatta*. He had a son named *Sagaradatta*. One day when the people of the city were celebrating the *vasanta* festival, this boy *Sagaradatta* happened to come across the beautiful *Neeli*. He fell in love with her and wanted to marry her. *Neeli* belonged to a Jaina family while *Sagaradatta* was a member of a *Bauddha* family. The father knew the boy's intention to marry *Neeli*. But he had his own misgivings. For the Jaina merchant would not consent to it. The boy insisted on marrying *Neeli*. In order to marry the daughter of a Jaina merchant, the boy's father *Samudradatta* had to dissemble that he was also a follower of the Jaina faith. Thus by deceit he had the girl married to his son. *Neeli* went to her father-in-law's house. She found to her great surprise and disgust that she was married to a *Bauddha* youth.

But there was no escape from matrimonial tie. She lived with her husband, herself remaining a devotee of the Jaina faith. This the father-in-law and her husband did not very much relish. They wanted to convert her to Buddhism. One day the father-in-law invited a Buddhist Bikshu for dinner, and instructed the daughter-in-law Neeli to prepare meals sumptuously for him. The Buddhists were generally meat-eaters and Neeli being a Jaina by faith could not have any meat preparation. But the father-in-law insisted upon having adequate meat preparation. As a compromise she decided upon the following device.

The Buddhist Bikshus always went about with leather sandals. The Bikshu who was invited as a guest left his sandals in the verandah. Neeli took hold of one of the leather sandals and skilfully prepared a curry which was served to the Bikshu at the time of the meals. The Buddhist ascetic relished it very much and the father-in-law and the husband of Neeli felt very glad that she was willing to prepare meat for the guest. Everything was over. The Bikshu was taking leave of the household. But he could not find one of his sandals ; while all the people were busy searching for the lost sandal, Neeli had to confess that she made use of it in preparing meat-curry for the Bikshu. This enraged the Bikshu as well as her father-in-law. Certainly this was an inexcusable insult offered to the Buddhist Bikshu by a mischievous member of the Jaina school. The father-in-law and the husband of Neeli felt quite aggrieved and as a revenge they accused her of unchastity. When she heard this charge of unfaithfulness to her husband, she in her turn fell into grief. When she was thus

suffering at heart for the false accusation, she heard the consoling voice of a Devata who promised to free her from this false accusation. The device adopted by the friendly Devata was this :—

The gates of the city would be shut up and no one could open it. The people of the city would be thus shut up within the city and no one could enter from outside the city. The people of the city would thus be put to great convenience. The Devata would appear in a dream before the king and inform him that the gates could be opened only when a chaste woman of the city would come and open the gate. The Devata arranged everything accordingly. The city gates were closed tight. The people were put to great distress. The King had the dream as promised. The next morning the King ordered that all the woman in the city should assemble and they should try to open the gate one by one ; yet there was no success. Neeli who was condemned for unchastity was the only woman who had not had the turn. At last she was called upon and asked to open the gate. When she just touched the gate, the gates were flung open. The King and the whole city were delighted. They all praised her openly for her chastity though she was unjustly accused by her father-in-law and her husband. These had to hide their heads in shame and had to confess that the charge was unjust and Neeli was pure. This reference to Neeli in Ratnakarandaka Sravakachara takes us to 2nd century A.D.; because that was the period when Swami Samantabhadra lived. We may mention in this connection that Samantabhadracharya was a South Indian and he belonged to Jinakanchi—modern Conjeevaram which

was a centre of Jaina faith in the early part of the Christian Era.

We have to candidly admit that not one of these Neeli stories faithfully answers to our Neelakesi. Samantabhadra's Neeli of course brings out one aspect of Neelakesi story *i.e.*, Neelakesi's opposition to Buddhism. But here Neeli is distinctly a human being and has nothing to do with Neelakesi of Pazhayanur. The Neeli story contained in the Saivite literature agrees with Neelakesi in one aspect. Both are evil spirits haunting about Pazhayanur. Except in this one resemblance there is nothing in common between the two stories. The Sthalamâhatnya of Tiruvâlangâdu indentifies Neeli with Kâli of Pazhayanur. In this respect it is identical with Neelakesi. But the story is afterwards purely mythological leading to Siva's conquest over Kâli in the dance contest. After all, we have to remember that the author of Neelakesi, though he takes her—the Kâli of Pazhayanur—as the heroine of the story, frankly confesses that the story is merely a dream. It is an entirely imaginative creation. He wanted somebody who was revelling in cruelty and himsa to be converted to the doctrine of Ahimsa and to serve as a model of harmony and non-violence. He could not think of anybody else than the Kâli of Pazhayanur. In this connection we have to notice one important fact.

All the Thevaram singers when they refer to Alan-gâdu or Pazhayanur, they refer to the Amman there—the Goddess as Vandârkuzhali. This seems to be an exact Tamil equivalent to the Sanskrit Neelakesi. This probably refers to the conquest of Kâli who was

probably accepted by Siva as her own consort in the form of Vandârkuzhali. From these several unconnected stories about Neeli, we may venture to suggest the following inference as quite probable.

At one time the Kâli temple of Pazhayanur must have been a very old well-known place where animal sacrifices were offered to Kâli. Probably as a result of Jaina influence this Kâli temple was converted into a place of worship according to Jaina doctrine of Ahimsa. The story of Neelakesi evidently suggests some such reform. The Jaina teachers of those periods probably instructed the people to offer clay models of animals, goats, buffaloes, horses, etc. to the Kâli temple to the satisfaction of their vow instead of shedding the blood of live victims. This must have gone on for a few centuries till the period of Saivite revival. Just then this Neeli temple of Pazhayanur which was reformed by the Jaina teachers and brought under their sway of Ahimsa Dharma was taken over by the Saivite reformers and the Goddess of the place elevated to the status of Siva's consort, still retaining the old name Neelakesi translated into the vernacular of the Dravidian people as Vandârkuzhali which term is one of the synonyms found in our work denoting Neelakesi. Such an inference is not altogether unfounded. The place Pazhayanur is situated in Tondaimandalam. Tondaimandalam in the early centuries of the Christian Era was entirely under the influence of the Jinas. The rulers of the country were most of them Jinas. The Saivite reformers had to contend against the opposition of the Pallava King of Conjeevaram who was a staunch Jaina and who evidently wanted to stem the tide of Saiva reformation.

Most of the important Jaina thinkers of the South belonged to this Tondainâdu. Even in the present day, Jains in the south, of the Tamil land, are entirely confined to the villages situated in the Tondainâdu. The famous Jaina-Mula-Sangha presided over by Sri Kundakundacharya had its habitation in southern Pataliputra—the modern Tiruppapuliyur—also in the Tondainâdu. We have already mentioned about Samantabhadraswami who was also a native of Tondainâdu which had its capital at Conjeevaram. Thus Tondainâdu had been famous for its Jaina influence for several centuries. Hence the inference suggested by us need not be brushed aside as altogether improbable and unfounded.

The career of Neelakesi need not be examined from a historical point of view since the author himself admits that the whole theme is an imaginary construction. In his own words, it is all a dream and he faithfully narrates the events as he observed in the dream.

Traditionally this work is included among the five minor Tamil classics called Sirupanchakavyam. It is not necessary for us to speak about the literary excellence of the work. It is now placed before the Tamil lovers and they can easily judge for themselves as to its literary importance. Being a book on Philosophy, the author has not got the general literary freedom enjoyed by a Poet dealing with a historical narrative or imaginative fiction. The author of Neelakesi has to attend to the accuracy of the statement and purity of logic more than anything else. This is certainly a literary handicap. In spite of this shortcoming, it must be said that he has succeeded wonderfully well. He has adopted the famous method of

NEELAKESI—
The book.

philosophical dialogue so splendidly used by Plato. The dialogue form adapts itself excellently for philosophical discussion. It introduces the human element in what would otherwise be a dry intellectual dissertation. Plato's dialogue has arisen to the literary eminence of a drama, because of the human characters introduced on the stage. The author of Neelakesi similarly sustains the same dramatic element while trying to present the various philosophical systems and to critically examine them.

The point which deserves notice is the interesting fact that extremely modern and scientific ideas are found scattered throughout the work. In this respect what is merely indicated and implied in the original by the author is elaborately worked out with a wealth of detail and catching illustrations by the commentator.

We need not have a general review of the work in order to elucidate this point. As it is proposed to give a full summary of the work and the several points mentioned therein, it is enough to touch upon a few important topics which are certainly worth mentioning. In the controversy with the Buddhist thinkers who reject the doctrine that plants are living organisms, Neelakesi marshals elaborate arguments to establish the Jaina attitude towards the vegetable kingdom. This is referred to by the technical term *Ekendria Jiva*-living beings having only one sense. The differentiation between growth by external accretion characteristic of inanimate things like ant-hill and growth by internal assimilation characteristic of living organisms and the enumeration of other characteristics which the plant world shares with the animal world, such as, the plants, are subject to disease ; that the disease can be cured by administering

curative medicines, that they have their respective cycle of life, that they behave quite like other living organisms with a characteristic re-action, in response to adequate stimulus, that they are capable of curing themselves by internal readjustment and the quoting of the very instance of the plant *Mimosa* which figures so much in the recent researches of Dr. Bose, for the purpose of illustrating the extreme sensitiveness in the plants, are details which would be emphasised in any modern treatise on plant biology. It is interesting to note that these ideas are contained in a Tamil classic several centuries old.

It is no less interesting to note certain facts relating to physical phenomena. In a discussion about sensation and sense stimulus the phenomenon of sound is explained in an extremely modern way. While all the other systems of Indian thought maintain that sound is the characteristic of space or *Akasa*, Jaina system alone maintains the doctrine that sound is the result of concussion of atmospheric molecules with one another, and that it takes time to travel in the medium of atmosphere. In a controversy about sense stimulus and sound which is grouped with visual stimulus by the Buddhist thinkers, Neelakesi in differentiating the two, draws attention to certain important characteristics of sound not found in light. Perception of light is almost instantaneous with the opening of eyes, whereas a sound stimulus proceeding from the same object as light, lags behind; because it takes time to reach the perceiving agent and hence is perceived only sometime after the corresponding visual perception. That sound stimulus is subject to obstruction and reflection by solid object in its path; that the sound perception by the two ears with the characteristic variation in

each, is able to reveal the distance and the direction of the sound producing object are some of the interesting facts noted in this work—facts which are generally found in scientific text-books relating to sound and sound perception.

Lastly we have similar interesting facts relating to Psychology. In contesting the materialism of the Bhûtavâda school, Neelakesi emphasises not only the impossibility of deriving consciousness by any process of physical or chemical activity but also adduces certain interesting arguments generally associated with modern psychic research. One of the arguments generally emphasised by modern psychic research society is the revelation through a medium of some hidden object by a disembodied spirit which alone possessed the secret while alive. This argument which is very often considered as a crucial one by modern students of psychic research is the very argument employed by Neelakesi in convincing the Bhûtavâdi of the reality and existence of the human personality which survives after death.

Our enumeration of these scientific and philosophical doctrines should not keep us away from emphasising the main theme of the work. It is quite obvious that the intention of the author in writing this work is to vindicate the doctrine of Ahimsa. Throughout, the idea that Ahimsa is Paramodharma, is kept in view by the author in his examination of the various Darsanas. More than half the work is devoted to the emphasis of this doctrine and its logical corollary of avoiding meat-diet. It is a well-known fact to students of Indian thought, that Buddhism while preaching the doctrine of Ahimsa, has never given up meat-eating

which ought to be considered as a necessary practical application of the ethical ideal of Ahimsa. Neelakesi throughout her criticism of the Buddhistic argument never fails to emphasise this fact that Buddhism in order to maintain ethical consistency must give up meat-eating and vote for vegetarian diet. The opposition to the Vedavâda school is also based upon the same principle. Religious rituals involving animal sacrifice and the religious scriptures which encourage the shedding of blood in the name of God are *ipso facto* self-condemned according to the Jaina ideal of Ahimsa. No wonder Neelakesi as a devotee of Jainism maintains a non-compromising attitude. Perhaps we are not justified in suggesting that this doctrine of Ahimsa is peculiar and proper to Jainism and that it is not found in any other religion. Such a suggestion would not be true to fact. The very school which is criticised by Neelakesi, Buddhism, has been maintaining the doctrine of Ahimsa as the central doctrine. Among the orthodox *Darsanas* which owe their allegiance to Vedic literature almost all with the exception of Pûrva Mîmâmsa have been maintaining the doctrine of Ahimsa either directly or indirectly as an essential religious *dharma*. The Sankhya School of Kapila is not in any way behind the Jaina School in its condemnation of animal sacrifice in the name of religion. The Sankhya writers openly condemn the vedic rituals since they involve cruelty to animals. The Yoga school which is another aspect of the Sankhya system completely adopts this anti-sacrificial attitude of the Sankhya school. The most important school of Indian thought—the Vedanta School—it is interesting to note, condemns sacrifice

in unmistakable terms. Sankara in establishing his own doctrine of the realisation of the self by knowledge summarily dismisses the Vedic ritualism as an inferior type of religion not fit for the enlightened one and in one place when he tries to define Dharma, he distinctly identifies it with Ahimsa; for he says "Dharma means Ahimsa-de-dharma." Similarly Ramanuja following the traditions of Bhagavatha cult emphasises Bhakti—devotion to Vishnu as a super-eminent means of salvation, thus completely discarding the vedic ritualism. In the case of Madhwa who is the founder of dualistic Vedanta, we find a complete rejection of animal sacrifice and the introduction of Pishtapasu,—corn flour, shaped in the form of an animal, as a substitute for real animals in sacrifice, probably to satisfy the orthodox and conservative section among his followers, while at the same time, to maintain the doctrine of Ahimsa inviolate. These three great leaders of the Vedanta school have been merely adopting the traditions of the Upanishads which set their face against animal sacrifice and emphasised Atma-Vidya as the ideal, worthy of adoption by the enlightened people. The same attitude you find expressed in the Mahabharata. In the Anusâsana Parva you have one whole chapter devoted to Ahimsa doctrine, and another full chapter devoted to the condemnation of mâmsabhakshina or meat-eating. Thus throughout the history of Indian thought this ideal has been kept in veneration by almost all the thinkers of importance. Then where is the difference between the Jainas and the others? What is the differentiating mark of the Jainas on account of which they keep themselves aloof from others and the others in their turn consider them

different from and rival to themselves. It is extremely difficult to answer this question. The only suggestion that we can think of as an explanation is the extremely uncompromising attitude adopted by the Jainas. Their intellectual rigourism and moral puritanism are the only difference that marks them out from the others. Buddhism throughout its career with the proselytising spirit characteristic of missionary movement freely adopted an attitude of compromise and admitted people into its fold freely if they satisfied the one condition, that they would not kill any animal with their own hand. Similarly the other Indian systems of thought recognise the principle of compromise. Ordinarily the doctrine of Ahimsa is to be accepted as the supreme principle in life; but occasionally when any vedic sacrifice is intended, the latter must be given precedence over the former. Thus, Mahabharata—that epic monument of Indian culture—which may also be characterised as a grand monument of thought-contradictions, immediately after praising Ahimsa and condemning māmsabhakshina, proceeds to set up exceptions to these principles and points out the cases in which violence, himsa, and meat-eating māmsabhakshina are quite justifiable. It is this attitude of compromise involving sacrifice of fundamental principle that Jainas would never consent to adopt. Logical consistency and ethical puritanism would never appeal to the ordinary masses; for, they will always consider these to be a rigourism unnecessary and uncalled for. Perhaps this explains their loss of ground and their loss of influence in Southern India. The masses under such a rigouristic discipline evidently sought

the welcome relaxation by taking refuge under Hinduism through the influence of the Hindu revivalists.

When we go through the literature of the revival period especially the Thevaram songs, we realise that no other explanation is available for the decline of Jaina influence in the south. Before the period of Hindu revivalism it was a dominant school of thought and religion in South India. That is obvious from the Thevaram songs. The Pallava King at Conjeevaram and the Pandyan King at Madura were the two prominent Kings who shared between themselves practically the whole of South India and both of them were Jains by faith and the Jainas were evidently very influential under their protection and patronage. This is clear from the fact that Sambanda prayed to Siva to equip him with courage to meet the Samanâs in debate and to assure him victory over them. Of course he succeeded in his aim by converting the ruler first by working a miracle and thus brought about the down-fall of the Jainas in Pandyan kingdom. Probably the main reason for conversion of the people is that the masses were weary of an extremely rigorous religious discipline imposed by Jaina teachers under which they suffered a good deal of inconvenience. Sambanda devotes invariably a stanza in each *pathika* of his Thevaram, in which he condemns conjointly the Jainas and the Bauddhas. He freely employs uncomplimentary and abusive epithets when he refers to these two sects ; but some of the epithets are really instructive revealing the appearance of Bauddha Bikshus and the Jaina yathis. "Jaina sanyasi in renouncing

the world completely discards also clothes whereas the Buddhist sanyasi covers himself with a cloak coloured red. The Sākya ascetic always carries a bowl in which he receives his food and kanji from the householder. The Digambara ascetic having discarded everything goes about nude carrying in his hand only a bunch of peacock feathers. The Buddhist bikshu lives in comfortable vihâras built for their convenience, whereas the Digambara sanyasi spends his time in the performance of tapas in the open, subject to the inclemency of the weather." Sambanda describes these two sects in such vivid manner and also gives an inkling into their behaviour. In one place he says that the Buddhist bikshu praises meat as delicious thing, whereas the Jaina yathi condemns it as sinful. In another place he says that the Buddhist bikshus seek their abode on the sea-shore, so that they may get easily fish to eat, whereas the Jaina yathis prefer to roam about in desolate hills and dales and stay under the scorching sun in the name of tapas. In spite of these antithetic characteristics in appearance and profession, both are considered equally as rivals to the orthodox Hindu system. But the opposition to orthodox Hindu ritualism was probably more pronounced in the case of Jainas. For, in the pathika 366, where Sambanda prays to Siva to instil in him the courage to meet the Jainas gives the reasons why the Jainas deserve to be defeated. "They always condemn Vedic yâgâs. They never accept in their conduct Vedic dharmas. They never study the Vedas studied by the Brahmins, nor do they study the several angas

associated with Vedas. They have as their aim in life to condemn the vedic rituals and vedic dharma. They have as their dharma something different from and opposed to the Vedic rituals. Hence they deserve to be destroyed and orthodox ritualism should be restored." Thus it is quite clear that in the eyes of the Hindu reformer—Sambanda, the Jaina teachers deserved to be destroyed, because of their uncompromising antagonism to vedic culture and vedic ritualism. Since he does not give any other reasons on account of which the Jaina influence should be put an end to, we have to accept him at his word. Thus we come back to our old assertion that the Jaina teachers by their tactless antagonism to vedic rituals in their undivided zeal and devotion to the fundamental principle of Ahimsa, they brought on themselves the opposition and finally the crushing hand of the Hindu reformers. But we must leave the question open here, whether in spiritual world as in social, and political world the principle of compromise is desirable or not. Neelakesi certainly adopts the traditional Jaina attitude in as much as it does not encourage the principle of compromise but insist on consistency of conduct with the accepted ethical ideal. Hence it is a work intended to praise the principle of Ahimsa and condemn the practice of meat-eating. All the other philosophical doctrines are examined from this fundamental principle and estimated in accordance with this primary ideal.

In this connection we have to note one important fact. The reference to the Jainas contained in the Thevaram hymns as well as in other orthodox Hindu literature is very often misunderstood by scholars

engaged in research work relating to past Indian History. That the Jaina ascetics were opposed to Vedic sacrifices and that they always preached to their lay disciples not to have anything to do with such sacrifices is certainly a fact to be accepted by all students of Indian History. But this antagonism to Vedic sacrifices on the part of the Jaina teachers is very often interpreted as completely giving up all ritualism of the type associated with fire worship. This mistake is commonly found both among Indian and European orientalists. Whenever they come across any reference to performance of any kind of ceremony which involves making fire, they at once jump to the conclusion that the persons concerned could not have been Jainas. It may be a reference to king's performance of Râjyâbhishêkha ceremony found in an inscription or in a classical work of literature. The inference is at once had that the king could not have been a follower of Jainism; for, if he had been one, he would not have performed the ceremony referred to. It is enough to point out here that such erroneous conclusions are the result of imperfect acquaintance with authoritative Jaina works on social and religious rituals. What the Jaina teachers objected to, from the very early days of Indian History, was the ritualism involving animal sacrifice, but not ritualism as such. This is borne out by the fact that even in the present day the Jainas observe all the necessary ceremony relating to and prescribed for the house-holder such as the birth ceremony, Upanayana,—investing of the sacred thread, marriage etc. In fact, all the 16 samskâras enjoined by the Hindu Dharmaśâstras are

recognised and observed by the Jaina householder even now. The very mantras employed in ceremonies are Vedic *mantras*. The Vedic Devatas themselves are invoked to be present at the ceremony and to accept the offerings. Indra, Varuna, Agni, Vayu, Rudra and such other Vedic deities are generally invoked in ordinary *homas* and other fire sacrifices ordinarily performed in a Jaina household. But what is offered is always ghee and fried rice. Such innocent things are offered to deities and they are supposed to be accepted; for, according to the Jaina worshipper, these deities are the observers of Jinadharma and would not accept anything incompatible with the principle of Ahimsa.

But these ceremonies which are prescribed for the householder are not certainly binding upon the Sanyasi who renounces the world. The Sanyasi who renounces the world in order to perform *tapas* not only leaves behind him the householder's life, but also all the conventional ritualism characteristic of the householder. Such discarding of the conventional rituals is common to all Sanyasis—Hindu and Jaina. Hence it would be inaccurate to maintain that the Jaina teachers preached against ritualism as such. But on the other hand they insisted on an important course of moral discipline associated with proper socio-religious ritualism to be strictly observed by the *grahasta*. Thus the Jaina code of morals is always presented in two sections—one Srāvakadharma for the householder, and the other Yathidharma for the ascetic. Both are based upon the fundamental principle of Ahimsa associated with other principles such as truthfulness, non-avarice, sexual purity, and restriction of personal enjoyment—Ahimsa,

Satya, Astheya, Brahmacharya, and Parimithaparigraha. These are referred to as five vrathas or panchavratas. In the case of the householder, these are interpreted in a limited sense and constitute the five *anuvratas*, whereas in the case of yathis, these are interpreted in their fulness without any limitation and thus constitute the *panchamahavratas*. The householder who is expected to observe the anuvratha is again provided with different grades of Sravakadharmā; in fact, the householder, before he qualifies himself for tapas, is expected to have a progressive development as a householder spread over eleven grades of householder's career. Only after he reaches the eleventh grade, he is fit to renounce the world completely and adopt the life of a *tapasi*. Till then he has to train himself by progressive steps in the five vrathas referred to. Till then it is binding on him to maintain all the necessary duties of the householder including the observance of the characteristic rituals. In fact the Jaina teachers have realised the importance of the householder's life as a necessary foundation for the successful carrying out of yathidharma. The yathi, since he renounced everything, must depend upon the householder for sustenance. He in his turn must contribute to the intellectual and ethical enrichment of the householder. So organised, the Jaina conception of the society is not far different from the Hindu ideal of social organisation, except in this one fundamental aspect. The Hindu social organisation always emphasised birth as a basis of Varnashramadharma, in spite of dissentient notes raised throughout the history of Hindu Thought. The

Upanishads, the later Vedantic reformers, such as Sankara, and Ramanuja, have always emphasised moral quality as superior to the social privilege of birth. In spite of such important influences, the principle is not recognised by the writers on Dharmasastras ; but in the case of Jainism there is no such emphasis merely on birth. The first three castes—Brhama, Kshatriya, and Vysya—in as much as they have the same ideal of Ahimsa have to adopt practically identical social and religious practices retaining their social difference based upon profession only. These social differences do not stand in the way of their inter-mingling for the purpose of dining and other social functions. Since it was a proselytising religion, it freely admitted into its fold converts from other social orders also. Even a Sudra, non-dvija, when he is admitted into Jaina fold must strictly observe the principle of Ahimsa and its logical corollary of vegetarian diet. He mixes with the other Jaina householders and becomes one of the Srāvakas and obtains the privilege of going through the various stages of householder's life, and even to become finally fit for adopting tapas. Probably it is this implicit recognition of the social organisation together with the associated ceremonies and rituals that is responsible for the survival of the Jainas in modern India, whereas Buddhism which adopted a radical social revolution had been completely swept out of the land of its birth.

The Jaina opposition against social organisation based upon birth is well brought out in Neelakesi when the Vedavâdi insults Neelakesi as a Sudra woman unfit to discuss the merits of Vedas ; she flares up and quotes

verses from some Hindu sastras probably from some forgotten chapters of Mahabharata, to emphasise the fact that even in the Brahminical literature, birth is considered immaterial and that anybody can become a Rishi, provided he obtains the necessary moral qualification. In conclusion, we have to restate the fact that ritualism is not quite foreign to Jainism and what the Jaina teachers preached against was only that kind of ritualism which involved animal sacrifice. This is again borne out by the claim made by the Jainas that originally the Vedas were based upon Ahimsadharma and later on became corrupt by the introduction of animal sacrifice by interested persons and hence they had to reject these corrupt Vedas which were upheld by the persons who did not fully subscribe to Ahimsadharma. Whether it is a historical fact or not, it is not possible for us to decide. But as an indication of the Jaina attitude towards the Vedas and the reason thereof, this story is extremely interesting. We may close this discussion by mentioning this fact that the Jainas repeat the Gayatri mantra during their daily Sandhyavandhanam—of course with the interpretation of the mantra according to their own conception of Jainadharma based upon the Ahimsa principle. These facts constrain us to conclude that the Jaina opposition to Vedic sacrifices complained of by Sambanda in his Thevaram hymns must certainly refer to the Yagas which involve animal sacrifice. It is strange to note that his brother reformer Appar, who was a Jain before he became a Saivite, maintains a different sentiment throughout his hymns. He does not accuse Jains for their opposition to their Vedic sacrifice. But on the

other hand he emphasises the principle of Ahimsa when he speaks of "Dayâmuladharmâ" which is distinctly a Jaina definition of Dharma as a contrast against Hindu conception of Dharma. It is not possible to detect such a sentiment anywhere in Sambanda's Thevara hymns.

In spite of the onslaught inflicted by the Hindu revivalistic movement, the Jains have survived to carry on the banner of Ahimsa up to the present time. The modern renaissance movement certainly indicates a desire for extending the value and usefulness of this principle. The political and social reorganisation demands certainly a wider and a higher appreciation of the principle of Ahimsa. A doctrine which taught its devotees to respect the sanctity of animal life in general has lost its significance as far as human beings are concerned. A person who is the follower of Ahimsadharmâ may scrupulously avoid violence to lower animals and insects. But he may not be alive to the harm caused to the individual human personality, or to social groups who may be treated worse than animals. It is this neglected aspect of Ahimsa principle that is emphasised in the modern movement led by Mr. Gandhi. It is an immutable duty devolving upon the followers of Ahimsadharmâ to restate this fundamental principle with a wider application for the benefit of mankind. Such a restatement is quite necessary for the purpose of giving a lead not only to India to set her house in order, but also to the world abroad consisting of nations accustomed to mangle one another in the scramble for economic aggrandisement, so that they recognise each other's right to exist and to promote universal peace and harmony

among nations. Certainly Ahimsa with this wider interpretation may form the basis for the formation of the new human ideal and a new world religion. For, certainly it requires much greater courage and strength to undergo suffering oneself than to inflict suffering on others. This is a fundamental message of all religions and also of Christianity—a message beautifully illustrated in the person of the founder of that religion. But unfortunately all the so-called Christian Nations of the West which adopted Christianity as their state religion have not understood this fundamental truth. Just at present as a post-war phenomenon the West is hankering after a living ideal by adopting which it hopes to save civilisation from complete destruction. It would not be an unwarranted presumption to suggest that it is the duty of India to give a lead in this matter, because her own civilisation and culture are based upon this principle of universal love, which appears to be the only panacea for all the evils which infest the world at present. Let us hope and pray that India will rise equal to the

SECTION II.

Extracts from Buddhist literature elucidating the references contained in Neelakesi :—

Before appearing in the world as Buddha he is said to have had a number of previous
Bodhisatva. births in which he qualified himself for the future Buddha-hood. The introduction to the Jâtakâ Tales begins with the story of Brahman Sumêda and his starting point of his pre-Buddhahood career. A hundred thousand cycles ago, there was born in the town of Amara, a brahman named Sumêda. He had vast riches as his private property. He was well-versed in the Vedas and kept every duty of his caste. While he was thus living in plenty and happiness, he began to ponder the nature of Samsâra and the misery involved in births and deaths. "Is existence merely a cycle of birth, old age, disease and death, or is there anything beyond this? Is existence merely exhausted by this foul body the charnel house, or is there any reality behind this? It is impossible to believe that this is the end. There must be some escape from this misery of Samsâra, and I shall make an attempt to discover that." So resolving in himself, he distributed all his wealth among the poor and went about in search of Nirvâna. He went far away from his native land to the foot of the Himalayas ; there he built a hermitage for himself, and a hut of leaves. Discarding his clothes, he garbed

himself with the bark of trees and lived in that hermitage in search of the truth. His daily fare consisted of the fruits picked up in the forest. While he was practising the ascetic life, he heard of the great conqueror Deepankara, the Lord of the World. One day when he was out from his hermitage he saw a number of people engaged in clearing a path in the forest area. When he asked them the reason, they replied that they were clearing the path for the great conqueror Deepankara who would walk along that path. When Sumêda heard the word Conqueror, the Buddha, there sprang up in his heart a joy. "Why not I become a Buddha myself? Let me qualify myself for that goal. I shall also work with my hands along with the multitude in clearing the way for the great Conqueror Deepankara." When Deepankara appeared with the throng of ascetics around him the ascetic Sumêda thought that here was his opportunity. "Let the conqueror Deepankara walk over my body and cloth, lest his feet should get miry. This little service to the great Buddha Deepankara may lay the foundation for my own Buddhahood." So thinking he spread his cloth across the path and laid himself down on the foot path and waited for the great conqueror to tread over him. When Deepankara approached this ascetic lying on the ground, he halted and spoke to his congregation, "Here lies one who is going to be the great Buddha of the future. He will be born in the town of Kapilavattu in a Kshatriya family." Thus he foretold the parents, the disciples, and the attendant of the future Buddha; and this message was received with joy by the Brahman ascetic Sumêda. From that

moment, always his heart was set on that one goal of becoming the future Buddha. For several thousands of years he lived a life of strenuous effort acquiring for himself the qualifications necessary for the attainment of Buddhahood. The whole nature seemed to echo the prophecy; plants and trees blossomed forth and appeared to utter "Surely a Buddha Thou Shalt Be."

The ten Pâramithas or the Perfections which constitute the necessary qualifications for Buddhahood :—

The term Pâramitha means perfection or complete happiness. It also occurs in the form of Pârame. These are ten Pâramithas or ten Perfections. These refer to the perfect exercises of the ten principal virtues by the Bodhisatva, as a preliminary condition of his attaining Buddhahood. These ten Pâramithas are as follows :—

1. Dâna Pâramitha, perfect exercise of almsgiving.
2. Sîla Pâramitha, perfect exercise of morality.
3. Nikkamma Pâramitha, perfect exercise of the abnegation of the world, and of self.
4. Pragna Pâramitha, perfect exercise of Wisdom.
5. Vîrya Pâramitha, of energy.
6. Ckhanti Pâramitha of patience.
7. Satya Pâramitha of truth.
8. Adittâna Pâramitha, Resolution.
9. Mitta Pâramitha, Kindness
and
10. Upêkka Pâramitha, Resignation or indifference.

Each of these is again sub-divided into the inferior,

the ordinary, and the superior perfection of virtue. Thus ultimately there are thirty different kinds of Pâramithas. For example, the superior kind of Dâna Pâramitha, "consists of gifts of highest order such as the gift of wife and children, the gift of one's own body, flesh, bone, blood and sinews as well as the principle of life, when required." The attainment of Buddhahood with all its super-human attributes, is the result of the consequence of the vast accumulation of merit due to the exercise of these ten Pâramithas. The Jâtakâ Tales and the Chariya Pitaka are full of tales relating to Bodhisatva practising these Pâramithas. The first Pâramitha relating to Dâna or gift, was practised by Bodhisatva during different periods of life. The most important of these Jâtakâ stories relate to King Sivi and the king Vessentera. But the most important one was when the Bodhisatva was born as the wise hare. It was during that period that he offered his own body when a beggar came for food. Similarly, in the case of the second Pâramitha, relating to Sîla Pâramitha keeping his precepts of morality. There were a number of births in which this Pâramitha was exercised. But the most important one relates to the Sankapala Birth story when as a Nâga chief, Sankapala was pierced through with pointed stakes, and hacked to pieces with hunting knives, without being enraged at the ill-treatment. Similarly, in the third case, the perfection of abnegation was practised during several births. But the most important was when he was born as lesser Suta Soma, when he renounced his kingdom as of very little value, and retired from the world, in order to obtain the perfection of abnegation. Similarly, in the

case of perfection of knowledge, it was exercised during several births such as Vidura Panditha, Mahôshata Panditha etc. But the perfection was reached when he was born as Senaka Panditha. Next, Vîrya Pâramitha, the perfection of courage. Though there was no limit to the number of births in which he exercised his Vîrya Pâramitha the perfection was reached when he was born as the Mahâ Janaka when, while crossing the Ocean, he exhibited courage of the highest degree. The perfection of patience was attained in its highest degree when the Bodhisatva was born as Khanti Vâda when he had to endure great suffering in the hands of the King of Benares. Perfection of truth was attained by the Bodhisatva according to the birth story relating to Mahâsautasôma when he kept his promise and offered his life in sacrifice. He acquired perfection of resolution in the highest degree as narrated in the Mooka Pakka birth story. Similarly, he acquired the perfection of good will to all as narrated in the Ekaraja birth story. The perfection of indifference to pleasure and pain, was acquired in the highest degree by the Bodhisatva according to Lomahamsa birth story. After performing all these Pâramithas and attaining perfection in each, Bodhisatva was born as a Deva in the Thushita Heaven. This is the immediately previous birth, to his birth as Buddha in the world. The long period, from the time when he fell at the feet of Deepankara Muni to his birth as a Deva in the Thushita Heaven, is generally referred to as the Distant Epoch.

At the proper time the Gods of the ten thousand
 Birth of Buddha. worlds approached the Great Being,
 who would be the Buddha, and besought

him to become one. "You fulfilled the ten perfections in order to gain the Buddhahood and to save the world. Sir, it is the proper time for your Buddhahood." The Great Being, in accordance with their requests, examined the proper time and place, and the proper family, and the parents for his Buddhahood. He perceived that it was the proper time when men were in need of wisdom. He chose as his continent India Bhâratavarsha. He chose as the country Madya Desa.

Then he chose as his family, the Sâkyas, a Kshatriya community. The Buddha thought that he should never be born "to the family of a peasant caste, or to the servile caste, but into one of the warrior or of the Brahman caste whichever at the time is the highest in the public estimate. The warrior caste is now the highest in the public estimation, and he will be born into a warrior family and King Suddhâdana shall be my father." Thus he decided his family. Similarly he decided that the Queen Mâyâ should be his mother whose span of life as Buddha Mâta was perceived to be ten months and seven days. Having made his choice in respect of these five requirements he accepted the suggestion made by the Gods that the time had come for his Buddhahood. Relinquishing his happiness of the Thushita Heaven he entered the womb of Queen Mâyâ, Queen of Suddhâdana, king of Kapilavattu. From the time of the conception of the future Buddha, the Queen Mâyâ was protected by four angels. Towards the close of the tenth month of her pregnancy, the Queen Mâyâ expressed her desire to go to her native town Dêvadâha in order to visit her kinsfolk. "So be it," said the King. The Queen started from Kapilavattu to her own city of

Dēvadāha. On her way she tarried for sometime in the pleasure grove called Lumbini Grove. While she was there in the grove, the future Buddha was born. "Rejoice, Oh Queen, a mighty son has been born to you" were the joyful words uttered by the angels, and the child was carried back to Kapilavattu where he was brought up in a fashion becoming a prince. The soothsayers examining the child foretold that he would be the great Buddha which he would become after renouncing his worldly riches. King Suddhōdana, was rather anxious about this prediction. He wanted to prevent such a calamity. He hoped that his son would succeed him to the throne, and rule over the land discharging the duties of a Kshatriya. Hence the father made all efforts to prevent his son becoming an ascetic. Hence he placed a palace at his disposal, and surrounded with objects and things which would give him an impression that the world was full of happiness and life was worth living. He was brought up in such artificial environment of beautiful and happy things. He had an occasion to go out from his palace into the town where he had opportunities of meeting with things in their proper perspective. There, he saw the world around, and life in reality were not the same as the artificial pleasure garden provided by his father for his sport and life. He realised the artificiality of the surroundings in which he had been brought up. He perceived the naked truth present in life in the city—how the peasant had to toil and till his land for his livelihood, how people had to toil with the sweat of their brow to make a living, how it was the fortunate few that possessed the necessities of life, how

youth and beauty were gradually yielding place to old age and decay, and how finally all beings had the same end in death. 'If this is the nature of reality, if this is the tragedy of life, of what use is it to remain in the palace artificially fitted up by my father in order to divert my attention from things as they are?' There grew in his heart a heaviness of thought directed to the tragedy around his own palace. "Is it meet to live in the midst of happy surroundings artificially fitted up for my benefit, while there is a volume of crying and wailing beyond? Is it any use to enjoy the beauty inside the palace, when there is ugliness all around staring you in the face? Is life within the palace of any worth, when life outside is hotly chased by disease and death?" Thus contemplating, the Sākya prince, resolved to cast away all the pleasant and beautiful things provided by his father and to go in pursuit of a cure for all the ills of life which he realised to be the truth. One night, he makes up his mind to renounce the world, his kingdom, and wealth. He orders his attendant, Channa, to harness his favourite horse. He takes leave of his wife and child in the dead of night, without waking them up. He notices them sound asleep. A look at them, that is enough, and he departs from the King's palace. He mounts up his horse, enters right into the forest, on horseback. In the midst of the forest, he halts, removes all his ornaments, and rich clothes, which he offers to his attendant, orders him to take back the horse to the city, himself adopts the garb of an ascetic and roams about in search of truth relating to life and of man's escaping from Samsāra. Thus the prince becomes a beggar, of his own choice, because he is

of the opinion that the encumbrance of a prince would be an impediment in his search after the truth. After this great retreatment, Buddha in the garb of an ascetic, wanted to go far away from Kapilavattu, lest he be disturbed by his kinsmen Sâkyas. He crossed the river Ganges and went to the kingdom of Maghada, where Srênika Bimbisâra was ruling; the capital of the kingdom was Râjagriha. The Sâkya prince went into the city of Râjagriha and was stopping on the mount Pândava. The King Srênika visited him there, and offered him everything that makes life agreeable—women, riches and pleasures. But the ascetic prince replied that he did not care for the worldly pleasures, for that could not bring him contentment. “I seek to conquer and not to indulge in desires. To be free from sorrow is he who has cast them far away. The treasure of my seeking is that wisdom which knoweth no superior.” The King Srênika left him there with this request; “Sire, when you have reached your goal teach them to me that unsurpassable wisdom.” The ascetic prince, the Buddha to be, promised him accordingly. After this interview he went to the Vulture’s Peak, “Gridra Kûta Parvata” near Râjagriha and there continued his *tapas*. On account of his success in *tapas* he was hailed by his fellow ascetics there as Mahâsramana. But he was not satisfied with that procedure; the ascetics assembled there on the peak were all undergoing self-mortification with the object of becoming either an Indra, a Brahma, or a universal monarch; that he considered not quite satisfactory. Thus from teacher to teacher, from friend to friend, he roamed about. All that he discovered was that some were indulging in extreme

self-mortification in the name of spiritual discipline, and others fully immersed in worldly pleasures, not recognising anything as superior to the pursuit of pleasures. Hence he chose his middle course. Neither severe asceticism and self-mortification, nor sole pursuit of pleasures, would satisfy his thirst for wisdom. When he was thus in pursuit of the great wisdom, Mâra the evil one, attempted to thwart him in his efforts. He carried to him the false news that Kapilavattu was subdued by an enemy, his wife and parents were all taken captives, and the Sâkyas his kinsmen, were in great trouble. But the Sâkya prince-ascetic, the Buddha to be, knew this to be false and remained unmoved. Failing to excite him through fear and pity, Mâra tried the contradictory method. He called his daughters and instructed them to try all their lurements to nullify his contemplation. Even this was in vain. Mâra, the evil one, had to acknowledge defeat. The Devas sang the praise of the Sâkya prince. All the Gods showered down flowers on the conqueror, because of his enlightenment. He became the Buddha, and discovered the cause of existence of old age and death. He saw the continuation of causes and effects which bring about existence, and he saw how the stream of existence should be dried up at the source, thus leading to Nirvâna. After the attainment of Buddhahood the joy he experienced in the new realisation was so great, that he passed seven whole days without partaking of food. When the seven days were passed, he had food offered to him by the Devas which he accepted. Thus under the Bodhi Tree he realised the wisdom, and the idea took possession of his mind that this doctrine of causes and effects must be placed at the

disposal of mankind, out of mercy on the ailing world. Then the Buddha, the enlightened One, left the Tree and went about preaching the Dharma.

There lived at Nalanda, near Rājagriha, a Brahman named Mādhava. He had a son called His two first disciples Sāriputta and Moggāla. Kôsh-tila went to Southern India to study the Lōkāyatha system. Sāri married a Brahman from Southern India called Tishya. She had a son named Upatishya, called so after his father. He had another son named after his mother Sāriputta. In a village nearby, there was a purohit whose wife Modgal bore a son. He was called Modgalaputra. He was called Moggalayana for the same reason. He also became a great master of learning at a very early age. Sāriputta and Moggalayana were school mates, and became very good friends from early days. This Moggalayana or Moggalana, as is in Pāli, decided to renounce the world in order to become an ascetic. Sāriputta, his friend also joined him. Both went to Rājagriha and became disciples of Sanjaya the great teacher who founded a separate school of thought. At the death of the master Sanjaya, they assumed the leadership of the Order founded by Sanjaya. While they were the leaders of the Sanjaya school, they heard of the Buddha, the Exalted One. They went to meet Gautama Buddha who gladly welcomed these two seekers after truth. After entering the Order, these two got to a very high position in the Buddhistic Order. Sāriputta and Moggalana are generally referred to in Buddhistic history as the model pair, the former so unsurpassable in wisdom, and the latter in magical power.

Several members of the Royal Family became converts and joined this Order. Gautama's own half-brother Nanda was one of the early converts to the Order. He stayed sometime with the teacher. His attachment was rather lukewarm. Prince Nanda was always thinking of his wife Janapathakalyâni. Hence, though he followed the teacher, much against his will, he desired to return to his own home and begin life as a householder. After a few days he expressed his wish to go back and communicated his desire to some of his fellow monks of the religious Order. "Brethren, I am dissatisfied of the religious life; but I cannot endure to live the religious life any longer. I intend to abandon the higher precepts and to return to the lower life of a lay man." Buddha hearing of this incident, sent for the prince Nanda and asked him whether the report was true that he longed to go back to the householder's life. He answered "Yes"; but the teacher wanted to cure him of his dissatisfaction. "Why do you intend to resume life of a layman" asked the Exalted One, to which Nanda answered that "when he took leave of his wife Janapathakalyâni she begged of him to return home as early as possible. Hence I cannot endure to lead the religious life any longer." The Exalted One perceived that he was attracted by his wife and hence he wanted to go back to her. By his magic power the teacher transported Nanda to the world of 33 Gods and pointed out the 500 celestial nymphs who were waiting upon Indra the King of Gods. Then the teacher asked Nanda whether he considered his own wife Janapathakalyâni more handsome than the 500 celestial nymphs. Then Nanda was made to realise that the

beauty of Janapathakalyâni was nothing when compared to these celestial beings. He had to acknowledge that his wife had not even a fraction of their beauty. "Cheer up Nanda" replied the Exalted One. I guarantee that you will win these 500 celestial ones. Tempted by this prospect of winning these celestial nymphs, Nanda consented to live the exalted life of a religious mendicant. So Nanda was persuaded not to leave the religious Order by this promise of the celestial nymphs. Nanda's fellow monks in the Order certainly did not appreciate his attitude. He was openly ridiculed as a hireling, as one bought with a price. But, in course of time, Nanda realised the importance of the Religious Order and he confessed, "I am in no way inclined to the life of a layman" and the monks were glad of the real conversion, the change of heart in Nanda.

The Exalted One had recruited to his Orders not merely from such a princely house and other aristocratic families, but also from the lower orders of society even from the ranks of the robbers and dacoits. The story of the conversion of Angulimâla will clearly illustrate this point. The story of Angulimâla as given in the Psalms of the Brothers is as follows:—

In this Buddha age, Angulimâla was born as the son of the Brahman Bâṛghava. He was the chaplain to the King of Kôśala. On the night of his birth all the armour in the town shone. The King's State armour too shone. The King was nervous and alarmed; the chaplain consulted the stars and concluded that his son was born in conjunction of the thief's constellation; because he was born vexing the king he was named Himsaka. But afterwards he became known as Ahimsaka.

He had the strength of seven elephants. He studied under a teacher at Thakaseela. He respectfully waited on his teacher, so that he was frequently with him at the time of meals. But the other Brahman youths could not endure him, and brought about a discord between him and the teacher. Because of his pupil's great strength the Brahman teacher devised a stratagem for his ruin and said, "Himsaka, you have now finished education as my pupil. I want my honorarium." "Very good Sir, How will you have it?" "Bring me a thousand human right hand fingers as my honorarium"; for the teacher expected that the pupil in trying to fulfil this request would get into trouble. The Himsaka's ruthless nature now had scope for expression. Arming himself well, he went into Jâlini forest in Kôśala, and from a cliff near the high road watched the passers-by and rushing down, would smite off their fingers and hang them on a tree till the vultures and crows had stripped the bones of flesh. Then making a garland of the finger bones he hung it round his shoulders. From that time he was called Angulimâla the 'finger garland.' The roads across the forest became deserted. People were afraid of walking along that road. Then the King proclaimed him an outlaw and sent a strong force to capture the bandit. Angulimâla's mother wanted somehow to save her son from the king's wrath and punishment and implored her husband to inform Angulimâla of the danger and advise him to reform himself. The father would have nothing of that sort. He told her that he being a wicked thief he must certainly be punished. But the mother certainly loved her son. Hence she took provision and set out saying,

"I will meet my son and advise him to give up his wickedness." Just then the Exalted One came to know of this. "If she goes to him, Angulimâla will certainly kill her to make up his garland of thousand fingers. But this is his last birth. If I don't go there now, there would be a great calamity. Hence I will anticipate his mother and go to him to preach Dharma." So after his meal, he walked thirty leagues along the road not heeding the warning of cowherds and others. Now Angulimâla had just seen his mother, and so reckoned on her finger to make up the desired number. Just then the Exalted One appeared between them. Then Angulimâla said, "Why should I kill my mother for finger. Let her live. I shall have the finger of that recluse." Drawing his sword he stalked the Exalted One. Then the Exalted One exerted such magic power that even though he was walking with his usual pace, he the robber could not overtake him even by running. Panting and fretting, unable to lift his feet, he stood like a post and cried, "Stop Friar." The Exalted One said "Though I walk yet have I stopped and do you Angulimâla stop?" Then the thief thought "They speak the truth, these Sâkya Friars. Yet he says he has stopped whereas it is I who had stopped. What can he mean?" So he asked "Thou who art walking doest say, 'I have stopped' and me thou tellest who have stopped, 'you have not stopped.' What is the meaning of thy words." Then the Exalted One replied "Eh Angulimâla—I have stopped everything more towards all living things renouncing violence. But you raise your hand always against your fellowmen. Therefore it is I have stopped but you still go on." Then

Angulimâla realised that this can be none other than the great Sramana Gautama. "The Exalted One had come here to help me." So the bandit doffed his armour and sword and threw them off down the cliff. Bowing low before the Exalted One, the bandit straightaway sought Buddha's permission to be enrolled as his disciple. Thereupon Buddha, Master of all the world, welcomed him saying, "Come Ye Bikshu." Angulimâla was thereafter given the status of a Bikshu. As a member of the Order he became very pious and devoted. But whenever he went to the town for alms, people remembered him as the old thief Angulimâla and would very often throw stones at him and spurn him. But he patiently put up with that ill-treatment, and fortified his patience. He richly deserved the new name Ahimsaka for now he had not injured any man though he was once an abnoxious bandit, known by the name of finger-wreathed. He became an important leader of the Buddhist Order and gained the love and appreciation of the Master.

"The Master hath my fealty and love ; and
all the Buddha's ordinance is done ;
Low have I laid the heavy load I bore
No cause for re-birth is found in me."

Thus for forty-five years Buddha went about preaching to the people his Dharma till finally he met his end in 483 B.C. in the outskirts of the city of Kûsinâra due to illness brought about by partaking of a meal hard of digestion. The body was cremated with great pomp attended by Ruling Chiefs and nobles. But before his death he organised on strong foundation the

Buddhist Order, the Sanga. Buddha, Dharma and Sanga constitute the three great jewels of Buddhism ; and the Buddhists even to this day, all over the world, worship the Ratnatraya ; Buddha, Dharma and Sanga.

If we transport ourselves to that period in India's history we should perceive a tremendous spiritual excitement all over Aryâvarta.

Dharma preached
by Buddha.

It was a period of the birth of a great religious vision. It was the period marked by the Upanishadic thought. It was also marked by a number of Protestant schools springing up side by side with Upanishadic thought. These Protestant schools together with the Upanishadic organisations were all opposed to the earlier creed of animal sacrifice. What is known as the Upanishadic literature marks the mode of readjustment within the conservative camp. Buddha and other Protestant leaders of Indian Thought represent the extreme left wing. Evidently they were not willing to be a party to any compromise, if compromise would mean the giving up of the principle of Ahimsa. In this opposing camp were probably ranged the early Sâṅkhyas of the Kapila school, the Jainas or the Nigranthas as they were called at that time, and also Gautama Sâkya Muni. The last represents the most radical of the Reformers. Gautama Buddha certainly started his career preaching against animal sacrifice. The beautiful story of his going to Benares after the enlightenment to deliver his first sermon on Dharma, and on the way how he met a herd of sheep led by a shepherd to be slaughtered, and how out of pity he followed the flock with a view to save them from sacrifice, all exhibit the fine trait of his own life as well as the importance of his

message to the world. Unlike the various other religious teachers who had the ideal of personal perfection, he was the first to conceive the idea of presenting the Dharma to the masses and thus made religion mainly a matter of social service. It was with this object that he roamed about from place to place till the end of his life. Though it must be admitted that his religion was merely a Protestant Reformation of the early Aryan creed still it must be confessed that in fundamental matters there is a difference between his religion and the pre-Buddhistic thought. In the Upanishadic period the most important concept was "Atma" which was later on identified with Brahman. But Gautama Buddha discarded both. He considered the Brahma ideal as distinctly lower to his own conception of Nirvâna. That was one of the reasons why he seceded from the early ascetics and he made his religion a religion of Anâtmanavâda as a protest against an earlier conception of Atmanavâda. In this respect his philosophical message is almost identical with that of Hume. Both admit only the series of conscious states and beyond the series of conscious states they would not admit a physical reality in the objective world or a Self in the subjective world. Hume's famous declaration that, "Whenever I try to introspectively perceive what is called the Self, I merely stumble upon a particular idea or sensation," seems to be merely an echo of Buddha's message delivered to the world several centuries prior to Hume.

The Aryasatyâs, four noble truths of Buddha's message to the world are (1) Dukka (2) Dukkôtpatthi (3) Dukkanirôdha and (4) Dukkanirôdha Marga (Misery, the cause of misery, getting rid of misery and path to

salvation.) The whole Buddhist philosophy is practically summed up in these four noble truths and all the other doctrines are but the expansion and interpretation of these four noble truths or Aryasatyās.

The first is the realisation of *Dukka* in *Samsāra*. Life intrinsically is pain and the *Summum bonum* of life consists in getting rid of this misery. In this respect Buddhism is not alone. This is a common doctrine of all Indian Darsanas, except Chārvākas, who alone maintain that life here is everything and the other world is but a foolish dream. You may say without much exaggeration that this idea forms the turning point in the history of Indian Thought and it is the central idea of the Upanishadic thinking. The Upanishadic schools emphasize this aspect of concrete life. Life here was important according to the pre-Upanishadic thought. In the period of the Mantrās and Brahmanās the thought of the Aryans was mainly directed to prosperity and plenty in this world. They appealed to their Vedic Gods and offered sacrifices to them with prayers to bring prosperity and plenty for themselves and to bring confusion and disorder to their enemies. They were frankly hedonistic. But when we enter the threshold of the Upanishadic world we hear a new voice. Happiness consisting of worldly riches and prosperity would not satisfy anybody. The thinker in the Upanishadic period was always dissatisfied with his environment and was always in search of something far more valuable than worldly wealth. Not even the glory of a crown would be accepted by him as a substitute. Hence this attitude towards concrete life was spurned as worthless trash; and the attempt to peep behind the veil was

evidently the common attitude of all thinkers about the time of Upanishadic period. Gautama Buddha was in tune with the general tendency of the age. But in his exposition of the other three noble truths he differed materially from the other schools. These constitute the differentiating mark of the Buddhistic thought. For his solution of getting rid of misery is quite different from that offered by the rival teachers.

This is called the middle doctrine, the two extremes being, one, that things have being, and the other, things have no being. This doctrine of Pratitya Samutpâda the chain of causation, or the dependent origination, is intended by Gautama to be the solution of the great problem of the origin of evil. It is one of the most fundamental doctrines taught by Gautama. It is as follows :—“ *Avidya Pratyayo Samskâra, Samskârâ Pratyayo Vignâna, Vignâna Pratyayo Nâmarûpan, Nâmarûpa Pratyayo Shadâyathanam, Shadâyathana Pratyayo Sparsa, Sparsa Pratyayo Vêdana, Vêdana Pratyayo Thrishna, Thrishna Pratyayo Upâdanu, Upadana Pratyayo Bava, Bava Pratyayo Jâthi, Jâthi Pratyayo Jarâmaranam,*” which means, on ignorance depends *karma*, on *karma* depends consciousness, on consciousness depends the organised being otherwise known as *nâma* and *rûpa*, on *nâma* and form depend the six organs of sense, on six organs of sense depends contact, on contact depends sensation, on sensation depends desire, on desire depends attachment, on attachment depend existence, on existence depends birth, on birth depend old age and death, sorrow, lamentation, misery, grief and despair. Thus this entire aggregation of misery arises.

The doctrine of dependent origination or Pratitya Samutpâda.

The origin of evil is thus traced to ignorance or error. But on the complete fading out or cessation of ignorance ceases karma; on the cessation of karma ceases consciousness; on the cessation of consciousness cease *nāma* and form; on the cessation of *nāma* and form cease the six organs of sense; on the cessation of six organs of sense ceases contact; on the cessation of contact ceases sensation; on the cessation of sensation ceases desire; on the cessation of desire ceases attachment; on the cessation of attachment ceases existence; on the cessation of existence ceases birth; and on the cessation of birth cease old age, death and sorrow. Thus does this entire aggregation of misery cease. The word "Dependent" implies the condition or dependence; and it is intended to avoid such heresies as that of the persistence of existence, that existence undergoes changes, due to overwhelming power and self determining existence; with the object of rejecting all such doctrines as to the origin of things, this doctrine of dependent origination is taught by the Buddha. The second word "origination" is intended to reject such heresies as the annihilation of existence, of Nihilism and of the inefficacy of karma. If the elements of being are continually originating by means of antecedent conditions, how can we justify the annihilation of existence or the inefficacy of *karma*? The phrase *Pratitya Samutpāda*, "dependent origination" is therefore intended to avoid the two extremes and to emphasize the middle course which is the truth. It is intended to reject the heretical doctrine of a permanent entity as the basis of experience, that he who experiences the fruit of the deed is the same as the one who performed the deed. And it is also

intended to reject the converse one, that he who experiences the fruit of a deed is entirely different from the one who performed the deed.

What is meant by *Avidya* or ignorance which is said to be the root cause of all misery? Ignorance mainly implies ignorance of the four noble truths, the *Aryasatyâs*, *Dukka*, *Dukkôtpatti*, *Dukkanivarana*, and *Dukkanivarana Mârگا*. The wheel of Samsâra is thus caused by *Avidya* or ignorance, and it would come into fullstop only by the removal of ignorance. *Karma* which arises from ignorance is of three kinds, bodily karma, vocal karma, and mental karma. Bodily karma consists of the eight meritorious thoughts which belong to the realm of sensual pleasure and the twelve demeritorious ones. These express themselves through the body. Vocal karma is that which is expressed through voice, and the mental karma consists of the thoughts which spring up in the mind without exciting either the body or the speech. These three kinds of karmas may be generally either good or bad, meritorious or otherwise. How can it be maintained that karma arises from ignorance? Because they exist where ignorance exists, and disappear when ignorance disappears. Consciousness originates from karma. By consciousness is meant the six-fold sensory awareness, vision from the eye, awareness of sound through the ear, odour from the nose, taste from the tongue, touch from contact through the body as a whole, and the inner ideas from the mind. Thus consciousness is named after the particular sense organ through which it arises.

These two indicate any organised being. Human personality is described in terms of *Nâmarûpa*, in

Buddhist thought. Each by itself is ineffective. *Nāma* of its own accord is incapable of moving about. It can neither eat, nor drink, nor speak. The term form denotes the four *bhātas* which constitute the body. This *Rūpa* by itself is also inert. It can have no desire either to eat, or to drink, or to speak, or to move about. But when these two are combined, then you have a living body. *Nāma* which has the desire to eat, drink, or speak, or move, is able to achieve its object through the vehicle of *Rūpa*. Out of this *Nāma Rūpa* combination, arise the living beings which are capable of activity and awareness. The combination of *Nāma Rūpa* is compared to the Sāṅkhya conception of the Prakṛiti Puruṣa combination, the blind and the lame constituting the human personality. When the organised body is so constituted, there arise the Shadâyathanas the six organs of sense. When the six organs are so constituted they are able to bring about contact. The term contact implies two things coming together like clapping of hands. Similarly, each sense organ comes in contact with a corresponding sense stimulus or object. Out of this contact arise sensations which may be pleasant or unpleasant. Out of these affective elements arises desire. These desires may be related to the six kinds of sense objects. Out of this desire arises attachment—attachment leading to the various kinds of sensual pleasures—thus arises the chain of causation leading to Samsāra. One who is able to understand the significance of this chain of causation, and how it is fed up by ignorance and desire, is able to attack the root cause and may thus finally escape

from the cycle of Samsâra. One who wants to walk the middle path must therefore prepare himself by avoiding the two kinds of heresies which may lead to the fanatical conduct on the one hand, indulge in sensual pleasures on the other hand. Both must be destroyed by the middle path of conduct leading to Nirvâna.

“ Verily, this *nâma* and form coupled with consciousness, is all there is to be born or to grow old, or to die, or to leave one existence or to spring up in another. It is all that is meant by any affirmation, predication, or declaration, we may make concerning anybody. It constitutes knowledge as full of action and it is all that is reborn to appear in its present shape. Even as the word chariot means that members join to frame the whole, when the groups appear to grow we use the phrase a living being. The different members or elements constitute an organic unity and apart from members, the constituent elements, there is no such thing as substance or an ego. The word chariot is but a mode of expression for the assembled group such as axle, wheels, chariot body, and other constituent members. Similarly, the word house is but a mode of expression for the several building materials used to erect a house. Similarly, the word fist, is but a mode of expression for the fingers in a particular relation. Now exactly the same way are the words living-entity or ego. They are but a mode of expression for the presence of five Skandas. Apart from these five constituent elements there is no basis for such fictions, as I, or ego.” In the absolute sense there is only Nâmarûpa. He who perceives it knows the truth. There is not only no ego there is also no continuous person-

ality ; the elements join one another in serial succession, if one element perishes, and another arises succeeding that instantaneously. Therefore, neither as the same nor as a different person do you arrive at the latest aggregation of consciousness. An illustration is given to elucidate this point. Milk changes into curd and from curd you get clarified butter. In exactly the same way do the elements of being, join one another in serial succession, each element having only a moment's existence and giving place to the next one.

The whole reality is analysed into five skandas or the constituent elements, Rûpa, Sagna, Vignâna, Vêdana, and Samskâra. Rûpa Skanda is the basis of the whole of physical universe. The term means, form, figure, or shape. Hence any special object is constituted by this Rûpa Skanda, which generally refers to what are called the *Bhûtas*. This Rûpa Skanda consists of twenty-eight sub-divisions, Earth, Water, Fire, Eye, Ear, Nose, the Tongue, the Body, Form, Sound, Smell, Taste, etc. The first four of these are called Bhûta Rûpas, the remainder are called Upâdêyarûpa. A physical object is also called Ashtaka, the Octad—an aggregate of eight—the four *Bhûtas* and the four sense elements, colour, taste, smell and touch.

The next is Vêdana Skanda :—It is one of the links of the Pratîtya Samutpâda. It is of three kinds, Suka Vêdana, Dukka Vêdana, Aduka Asuka Vêdana which mean respectively (pleasurable feeling, painful feeling, and neutral feeling). From the point of view of the sense organs, Vêdana is again sub-divided into six kinds, the feeling element of visual sensation (Chakshu Vêdana),

the feeling element of auditory sensation (Sôtâ Vêdana), the feeling element of olfactory sensation (Grâna Vêdana), the feeling element of taste sensation (Jihva Vêdana), the feeling element of contact sensation (Kâya Vêdana), the feeling element of inner sensation (Manô Vêdana). These are the six kinds of pleasure-pain elements of sensation springing from the contact of the six senses with the outer world.

Next is Sagna Skanda :—The term implies sign or name and refers to a particular aspect of sense perception. This is also sub-divided into six classes according to the different sense organs ; perception springing from the contact of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, touch and mind with the external objects, Chakshu Sanna, Sabda Sanna, Grâna Sanna, Jihva Sanna, Kâya Sanna, and Manô Sanna.

Next is Samskâra Skanda :—This term has several different shades of meaning. As a link of the Pratitya Samutpâda it means those traits or dispositions of the mind which bring about the performance of good and bad actions. Practically, it is identified with karma. In this sense, it is of three kinds, Punya Samskâra, Apunya Samskâra, Punyâpunya Samskâra (good traits of mind, sinful traits of mind, and traits of mind leading to inactivity). From another point of view the samskâras are spoken of as three, Kâya Samskâras, Vâchiya Samskâras and Manô Samskâras, (dispositions resulting in good or bad actions, dispositions resulting in good or bad speech, and dispositions causing good or bad thoughts). These are respectively called Kâya Kammam, Vâchiya Kammam and Manô Kammam respectively.

The next is Vignâna Skanda:—It is generally rendered as consciousness. Vignâna Skanda is the most important of the five Skandas, since it refers to the *chêtana* aspect of the individual. The nature of human personality rests upon this Vignâna Skanda. Of the five Skandas the first one Rûpa Skanda refers to physical objects. The other four are related to consciousness and of these the Vignâna Skanda is certainly the dominating factor. From the moral point of view, this Vignâna Skanda is of three kinds; Kusala Vignânânam, Akusala Vignânânam, Avyakata Vignânânam, (meritorious thought, de-meritorious thought, and neutral or indifferent thought). As a metaphysical term, "Vignâna" is divided into several sub-clauses. It is not necessary for us to go through all these classes.

The five Skandas together constitute any sentient being. When a man dies the constituent skandas also perish. But, on account of his karma, a new set of skandas immediately comes into existence, and a new person appears here or in another world. This one, though constituted by different skandas, is identical with the person who just died and the connecting link between his death and the new birth being his karma. It is this link of karma that preserves the identity of person through all the countless births and deaths in his *samsâra*. Hence the perishing of the skandas at the time of death does not mean a real break in the line of existence, for the formation of the new skandas constituting the new personality appears immediately, without any interval between the dissolution of the old skandas and the constitution of the new ones, between the death of the old being and the birth of the new being. But at

the time of Nirvâna, which is the result of complete destruction of karmas, the potentiality for re-birth associated with karmas is completely destroyed. Since the karma is completely destroyed there is no re-birth after attainment of Arhatship. In this case, not merely skandas perish but also the karma with its potentiality for re-birth. Thus the samsâric cycle itself comes to a full stop and it is called Nirvâna which is the ideal of Buddhism.

Next the thirteen ascetic practices of the Thuthânga
 —the code of moral discipline according to Buddhist Ethics prescribed
 Thuthângas. for the religious meditator. These practices are intended to reduce the personal wants and desires and to promote contentment as a means of religious contemplation. These ascetic practices are thirteen in number and they are intended for those Bikshus who join the Order and who put away the worldly needs of the flesh. These are :—

1. The refuse ragman's practice.
2. Three rober's practice.
3. Almsman's practice.
4. House to house goer's practice.
5. One sessioner's practice.
6. Bowl fooder's practice.
7. Food refuser's practice.
8. Forester's practice.
9. Tree rootman's practice.
10. Open spacer's practice.
11. The Burning grounder's practice.
12. Any bedder's practice.
13. Sitting man's practice.

The meaning of these is as follows:—

1. *Refuse-rag means, any piece of rag found in a refuse heap, or on the road side, or in the burning ground:—* The Buddhistic ascetic is to pick up these rags from such loathsome places and make a clothing out of these. One who has made a robe made of such refuse rags, is known as Refuse ragman ; and the practice of making a robe out of rags picked from rubbish heap is known as Refuse Ragman's Practice.

2. *Three Rober's practice:—*Every Bikshu is expected to have only three robes, the waist cloth, the upper garment, and the shoulder cloth. This being the maximum prescribed for the Bikshu, he is expected to refuse the fourth robe and this practice is known as the Three Rober's practice.

3. *Almsman's practice:—*Alms means whatever morsels of food fall into the bowl carried by the Bikshu. One who gathers alms is called an Almsman. He who observes this practice should not accept food offered at a feast for the whole Order. This practice of rejecting food offered either by invitation or during feast, and accepting only morsels offered as alms is the "Almsman's practice" because he has morsels of alms as his only resource for food. A Brother who is contented with such morsels of alms is certainly independent in his life and forsakes a lust for food. Him the Gods admire for he is free from gain and fame.

4. *House to house goer's practice:—*With the object of gathering alms if one goes from one house to another in an unbroken series he is said to be a house to house goer and the practice is called house to house goer's practice. This is intended evidently to prevent

the Bikshu from choosing the house of a wealthy householder in order to obtain richer food. Irrespective of the status of the householder he is to visit all the houses for obtaining alms in his bowl. This practice is expected to create in the mind of the ascetic an attitude of good-will and impartiality to all the families.

5. *One sessioner's practice* :—One who observes this practice should not eat food at more than one sitting. This is intended to promote moderation in eating. He may eat until he rises up and never afterwards ; and this practice is known as One sessioner's practice.

6. *Bowl fooder's practice* :—Bowl food is food that falls into a single bowl, a second bowl being refused. One who has the habit of accepting such food is a bowl fooder. He is expected to refuse a second bowl as he observes the bowl fooder's practice. This is also intended to promote temperance in eating.

7. *After-food refuser's practice* :—Food that is got later by one while eating his first meal is called after-food. The partaking of that after-food is after-food taking. After-food refuser is one who does not take such after-food. After-food refuser is a name for one who refuses such additional food.

This practice is also intended to promote moderation in eating and contentment.

8. *Forester's practice* :—One who dwells in the forest is a forester and choosing such a habitation is a forester's practice. This implies the refusal of dwelling in a village or town enjoying the privileges of luxuries of a householder. Ascetic discipline must train the individual not to expect such luxuries. Hence he is expected to take his abode in an adjoining forest.

This forester's life is expected to promote the bliss of solitude, and the consequent freedom from the temptations of life.

“At the Forester's battle ground he
conquers erelong Mâra and his hosts.

So the wise delight in forester's life.”

9. *Tree rootman's practice* :—This means dwelling at the foot of a tree. One who has the habit of dwelling at such a place is a tree rootman and the practice is called the Tree rootman practice. This implies the absence of a dwelling place. Even as a forest dweller he is expected to put up a hut for his dwelling. A person dwelling under the foot of a tree not only rejects a dwelling place for himself but also possesses further advantage. Being directly in contact with nature he is able to perceive the impermanence of things around him, seeing the old leaf from the tree withering and the tender leave sprouting out would be a constant reminder to him of the transient nature of reality. From this he learns the lesson of impermanence. Therefore the wise do not despise to dwell in isolation at the foot of the tree.

10. *Open spacer's practice* :—This implies discarding even the shade of a tree. One who observes this practice not only refuses a roof over his head but also the shade of a tree. He chooses open space for his dwelling and he is prepared to put up with the inclemencies of the weather. One who observes this practice is known as open spacer. Just as the animals roam about freely in open space, the brother leads an easy home-less life. The vault of the Heaven itself

becomes the roof of his dwelling, the Sun or Moon becomes a lamp or light of his habitation, and he enjoys his life of solitude because of his nearness to nature herself.

11. *The Burning grounder's practice*:—Even in open space a cremation ground is chosen as his habitation. A Bikshu who chooses this as his habitation is the Burning grounder and the practice is the Burning grounder's practice. Even in the burning ground there may be buildings put up by the villagers. But one who observes this practice should not live in such places; for a burning ground means the place where the dead body is cremated. This ascetic practice is indeed rigorous. This practice is intended to remove fear of death in him. Living in cremation ground he has direct knowledge of death which inevitably overtakes every body. That life must inevitably end in death, that the body which is adorned during the life time is but a filthy combination of foul things and hence love of such a body is meaningless, are some of the lessons learnt from the cremation ground. It leads to the rejection of pride of youth, the pride of health, and so on. Hence the Burning grounder's practice bestows manifold merits and qualities.

12. *The any bedder's practice*:—He who observes this practice should be content with whatever dwelling is allotted him by the distributor who says "this is for you." One should be content with what one gets. He should give up the opinion of inferiority or superiority in the matter of residence. So, a wise man ought to be content with any sleeping place and should not complain of inconvenience.

13. *Sitting man's practice* :—A sitting man is one whose habit is to refuse to lie down; that means both day and night he is prevented from spreading himself on a bed. He refuses to lie down because he observes the sitting man's practice. One who observes this practice may rise up and walk to and fro but he should never lie down; for lying down is considered to be a luxury for the ascetic, and promotes the pleasure of a sluggard. Hence the monk is expected to sit cross-legged and keep the light of his Dyâna burning. By thus sitting he is able to avoid the pleasure of sluggishness which is associated with lying down. Thus sitting cross-legged is a necessary condition for contemplation and Dyâna. These are the practices known as *Thuthânga* enjoined for the cultivation of virtue according to the Path of Purity, *Visuddhi Marga*.

Buddha preached the eightfold path as a means of escape from the misery of existence.

The Eightfold Path. These eight constitute the path of virtuous life which is supposed to consist of eight *angas* or members. Hence the path is called *Ashtânga*. These are :—

1. *Sammaditti* or *Samyakdrishti*, which means right faith. It consists in believing in the four Aryasatyas, misery of existence, the cause of misery, the prevention of misery, and the path to avoiding misery.

2. *Sammasankappo* or *Samyaksankalpo*, which means right thought—determination to get rid of karmas, to obtain freedom from hatred, and to follow the path of Ahimsa—. These are the right thoughts.

3. *Sammavâcha* or *Samyavrâchana*, or right speech.

It consists in avoiding falsehood, back biting, harsh speech, and useless speaking.

4. *Samma Kamânto*, or *Samyak karmânto*, which means right actions. It consists in avoiding injury to sentient beings, and not taking anything which is not given, and avoiding illicit sexual intercourse.

5. *Samma Jivô* or *Samyak Ajîva*, which means adopting right means of livelihood.

6. *Samma Vâyâmo* or *Samyak Vyâyâma*, right exertion. It consists in the mental exertion to resolve and control harmful thought activities that may not occur in future. To get rid of harmful thought activities, which have already arisen and conversely to promote thought activities in the present and in the future.

7. *Samma Sati*, or *Samyak Smriti*, which means right recollection. It consists in remembering the impermanence, impurity etc., of the body and not to have over-attachment to it.

8. *Samma Samâji*, or *Samyak Samâdhi*, or the right meditation. The last is elaborately described in Buddhist literature ; but it is enough to mention here that it refers to the process of contemplation more or less analogous to yogic ideal to Samâdhi, success in which would necessarily lead the person on to Arhatship which is the ultimate Buddhist ideal.

Nirvâna which means extinction, destruction or annihilation is the ultimate goal aimed

The doctrine of
Nirvâna.

by the Buddhist. It exactly corresponds to the conception of Moksha in other Darsanas. It presupposes the doctrine that Samsâra is evil. Buddhism starts with the same assump-

tion of the "Sarvam Dukkam, everything is misery." It is the first of the four Aryasatyâs, the noble truths which form the foundation of Buddhism. In conformity with other Darsanas, Buddhism which begins with the assumption that existence is misery, also ends by preaching the ideal of Moksha or liberation from existence. This ideal of liberation from existence is always referred to by the term Nibbâna, or Nirvâna, which is the supreme goal to be obtained by the Buddhist. There is a good deal of controversy as to the exact significance of this term Nirvâna. There is a great diversity of opinion among European scholars as to the significance of the term Nirvâna. In the description of Nirvâna found in Buddhist literature, terms which are generally used by other Darsanas are freely used which indicates that Nirvâna means, for the Buddhist, the highest Bliss.

This gives rise to a problem. If Nirvâna means positive state of existence, how could this doctrine be reconciled to the general doctrine of Anâtmanavâda. The doctrine of Anâtmanavâda if strictly interpreted, must end in Nirvâna in the sense of annihilation. But if Nirvâna is interpreted as final bliss, you have to postulate a positive being in the state of Nirvâna which should be inconsistent with the general trend of Buddhistic thought. Thus there is the co-existence of two irreconcilable views as to the nature of Nirvâna. Max-Muller, who was the first to attack this doctrine, maintains that the original doctrine taught by Buddha is that of the entrance of the soul into rest, while the doctrine of annihilation is a perversion introduced by later metaphysicians. Dr. Childers in his valuable

article on the subject, in his Pali dictionary, rejects this view and elaborately argues the case for the other side. He maintains that the word "Nirvâna" designates two different things (1) state of bliss associated with the attainment of Arhatship, (2) the annihilation of existence consequent upon the death of Arhat. He proceeds to state the doctrine of Nirvâna as follows:—

"Every being born into the Universe is subject to transmigration. Death is followed by re-birth in a new existence, which might be one either of misery, or of happiness. An insect may be re-born as an angel by the force of karma, or an angel may be hurled down into nethermost hell. The whole sum of sentient existence is suffering, and release from suffering can only be obtained by release from existence. The cause of continued existence is sin. Remove this and you strike at the root of existence. Sin is removed by the four paths of sanctification, and to these entrance is obtained by the sublime eight branch road; by the practice of charity and other good words, by purity in word, thought and deed, and by the exercise of religious meditation, the disciple of Buddha is enabled to escape from the misery of existence. The four paths are the four stages of sanctification, and the fourth and the last stage is the highest which is called Arhatship. Arhatship is final, and perfect sanctification, and it is a state in which merit and de-merit, original sin, desire and attachment, are rooted out; all that binds man to existence, all that leads to transmigration is wholly extinct. The Arhat is still a man though purified and exalted. He cannot sin, for, his heart is purged from every taint of human passion. Free from

the trammels that bind man to earth he has developed Riddhis—supernatural powers. He traverses the air and works great miracles. He scans the thoughts of others, he can recall his own past life in countless existences, he hears the sound in distant spheres, he beholds with divine eye the beings that people Universe, dying and being re-born. In all the vicissitudes of life, his mind preserves his even tenor serene and tranquil. He lives out the span of life rejoicing in the ever-present consciousness that he has triumphed over man's great enemy 'existence.' Death comes at last. But the stage of existence has withered, the lamp of life is burnt out. The Arhat is born no more again. He has attained Nirvâna. He has ceased to exist. A great number of expressions are used with reference to Nirvâna which leave no room to doubt that it is absolute extinction of being, the annihilation of the individual. Thus Nirvâna is called the void, unconditioned abstract, the uncreate, the infinite, the eternal, the formless, the invisible and so forth. And its common synonym is Nirôdha—Bliss. The death of an Arhat is likened to the extinction of a flame, a strongest possible way of expressing annihilation intelligibly to all. Thus to maintain that the goal of Buddhism is a state of blissful exemption from human passion with its Arhatship, are at once confronted by an objection a formidable one that the Arhats die like other men. The great Arhat himself died at the age of 79. He even predicted his own death. To be the ultimate goal of Buddhism Arhatship must be an eternal stage. But since Arhats die, Arhatship is not an eternal stage and therefore it is not the goal of Buddhism. Arhat does not live again

after death. He ceases to exist. There is probably no doctrine more distinctive of Sâkya Muni's original teaching than that of the annihilation of being. To suppose that the Buddhist Nirvâna is the blissful repose of Hinduism is to suppose that Sâkya Muni on a leading question of religious philosophy that of a future state would content himself with borrowing from the creed which it was his mission to subvert." Stating in such emphatic terms the Buddhist ideal of life Dr. Childers tries to explain the difficulty. "Is this discrepancy reconciled?" I reply "the word Nirvâna is applied to two different things (1) to that annihilation of beings which is the goal of Buddhism (2) by the state of blissful sanctification called Arhatship. This fact at once explains the apparent contradiction." Then he gives a number of quotations to show that the term Nirvâna is used in relation to Arhatship also. Since Arhatship automatically leads to complete Nirvâna, naturally there is a tendency to identify cause and effect and both are referred to by the same term by later writers. After using the same term Nirvâna to designate both the stages, differentiating adjectives are added on to the term to distinguish the two Nirvânas, *Sa Upâdhi Sêsha Nirvâna*, *Anupâdhi Sêsha Nirvâna*, Nirvâna with Upâdhis and Nirvâna without Upâdhis, with Upâdhis representing the Arhat and without Upâdhis representing the complete annihilation. He considers the later introduction of such ideas as the Adhi Buddha, Dyâna Buddha, and the Worship of Amitâba and Avalôkitêsvara are distinctly modern innovations due to the general religious degeneration of Buddhism. Having defended the doctrine that

Nirvâna means complete extinction, Dr. Childers is not altogether unconscious of the moral difficulties arising from such a religious ideal. But he says "It is not my intention here to discuss the ethical aspect of Nirvâna, and I shall content myself with observing that Christianity with its doctrine of everlasting punishment, can ill afford to reproach Buddhism with their doctrine of annihilation." Thus Dr. Childers withdraws the Buddhistic Nirvâna from the category of the disputed questions. We may add, this seems to be the only interpretation of Nirvâna consistent with the fundamental Buddhistic doctrine of Anâtmanvâda.

Kundalakêsi was evidently one of the important female disciples of Buddha. She was a prominent Sister of the Buddhist Order, and her story is given in *Têrigâtha* or the Psalms of the Sisters. The story is given in the 46th section of the Psalms of the Sisters, edited by Mrs. Rhys Davids under the heading, "Badra Kundalakêsi, the ex-Jain." After several previous births, in this Buddha era, Kundalakêsi was born at Râjagriha in the family of the King's treasurer. She was named Badra. Born in plenty and prosperity, she grew up surrounded by a large number of attendants. One day, when she was looking through her window, she saw the Chaplain's son Sattuka being led to execution by the city guard, since he was condemned as a highway man by the order of the King. Seeing him, Badra fell in love with him at first sight. She shut herself in her bed-room saying, "If I get him as my husband, I shall live. If not, I shall die." This was reported to her father. Out of great affection for

his daughter, the treasurer heavily bribed the guard, and got the thief released. The released thief was offered the hand of Badra who was bedecked with very valuable jewels. While he was living with his wife in the treasurer's house, there was slight misunderstanding between husband and wife. Sattuka wanted somehow to deprive his wife of her valuable jewels and get away. With this object in view, he said to her, "Badra, when the city guards were taking me to the Robber's cliff I vowed to the cliff deity that if my life were spared I would bring an offering. You do make one ready." Accordingly, she did so, to please him. Adorning herself with all her jewels, she mounted a chariot with him and both drove to the cliff. Sattuka, in order to have her completely in his power, instructed the attendants to stay back. Taking the offering, alone with him, she went up the hill. Since he spoke no word of affection to her, she began to suspect his motive. Reaching the top of the cliff, he instructed her to remove all her jewels and to make a bundle of the same with her outer robe. Knowing his plot, she politely asked him how she had offended him. Then he openly revealed the plot. "You fool, do you fancy I have come here to make offering. I have come here to get your ornaments." But she points out that she herself belongs to him and hence all her ornaments as well. Hence "you may have all the ornaments." But he would listen to nothing of that kind. He made up his mind to walk away with jewels after killing his wife. Then Badra makes a request of him. "Grant me this one wish. Let me make a *pradakshana* to you and worship you before being thrown down from

the cliff." He consented saying "very well." She; thereupon, went round him embraced him in the front, and then as if embracing him from the back, she pushed him over the precipice; and the mountain déity saw her do this feat, and praised her cleverness.

Thus disposing of her husband, Badra did not want to go back to her home. "I cannot in this course of event, go home. I will go hence and renounce the world." So she entered the Order of the Nigranthas. They asked her "in what grade you make renunciation." She replied "in whatever is your extreme creed, in that let me be admitted." They tore out her hair and admitted her as a female ascetic. When the hair grew again in close curls, she was called "curly hair," or Kundalakêsi. During the period of probation, she learnt their doctrines and became well-versed in them. As there was nothing more to be learnt from them, she left them. Going wherever there were learned persons, she learnt their methods of knowledge. Then she became an adept in holding debates with learned men. It was a habit with her wherever she went to make a heap of sand at the gate of the village or the town in which she would set up a branch of a rose apple tree. Then she would instruct the children playing there to watch saying "Whoever is able to join issue with me in debate, let him trample on this bough." She would wait in the village for a week. If nobody dare to trample the branch of the rose apple tree, she would conclude after a week, that there was nobody in the town equal to her, and willing to debate with her. Then, after the lapse of the week, she would take the branch with her and depart from the place. While

she was in her round, thus roaming about from place to place, she came to Srāvasti. At that time the great Buddha was staying in the Jetavana near Srāvasti. Kṛṇḍalakêsi had set up the rose apple branch at the city gate of Srāvasti. Just then, the apostle Sâriputta, while entering the city noticed the branch put by Kundalakêsi. He had a wish to conquer her. He asked the children playing there, "Why is this bough stuck up here?" They informed him the story of the bough, and how it was put up there by Kundalakêsi, and why it was so put up. Then the elder said, "If that is so, trample on the bough" and the children did so accordingly. Then Kundalakêsi after seeking her meal in the town came out and saw the trampled bough and asked the children who had done it. She heard that it was the elder Sâriputta. She went back into the town Srāvasti and collected a strong gathering around her to witness her debate with the Sâkya reclause. Thus with a great following she went to Sâriputta, the captain of the Norm, who was seated beneath a tree and greeted him in a friendly manner. Then she asked him, "Was it by your orders that my rose apple bough was trampled down?" "Yes, by my orders." "Then let us have the debate together." "Let us, Badra. Who shall put the questions first and who shall answer?" When it was arranged that Kundalakêsi should put questions first, and the elder Sâriputta began to answer the questions put to him. When she was unable to think of further questions, Sâriputta said "Now, I will put only this question." "Do so, Lord" said Kundalakêsi. Then Sâriputta put this question. "One, What is that?" Kundala-

kêsi was not able to understand the significance of the question and said, "I know not Sir." Then he said "You know not even this much. How should you know ought else?" and taught her the Law. Then she fell at his feet saying "Lord, I take refuge with you." Then Badra was instructed to go for refuge to the Exalted One, the supreme among men and Gods. She did accordingly. That evening she went to the Master at the hour of his teaching the Law, worshipped him and stood respectfully on one side. Discerning the ripeness of her knowledge the Exalted One said

"Better than one thousand verses where no
profit wings the word,
Is a solitary stanza bringing calm and
peace when heard."

She was thus admitted into the Order by the Master himself as an Arhanta. She went into the Sisters' quarters where she took her abode in the bliss of Nirvâna. Obtaining the ordination from the Master himself, for fifty years she had been a pilgrim in Anga, Maghada, in Vajji, in Kâsi and Kôsala, living on the alms given by the people and wholly free from the bondage of the mind.

This story is also given in *Dammapada Buddhist Legend*, Harvard Oriental Series. In this, there is no mention of the fact that Kundalakêsi was originally a member of the Nigrantha Order, before she became an ardent convert to Buddhism. Probably, Kundalakêsi was a historical person. The Tamil work Kundalakêsi to which Neelakesi is an answer, is evidently based upon the career of this Kundalakêsi who was a pro-

minent Sister of the Buddhist Order. The fact that she was a Jain originally probably explains the very sharp criticism found in Neelakêsi.

This account of the conversion of Kundalakêsi requires some elucidation. The question put to her by Sâriputta, "*Ekam Nâma Kim*" "One, what is that," is rather cryptic and the sudden collapse of Kundalakêsi who was able to ask him thousand questions on philosophical topic also requires elucidation. The footnote on chapter 66 "Psalms of the Sisters" also raises some doubt. "The Jainas do not appear to have been any more monistically or pantheistically inclined than the Buddhists. Hence possibly her lack of ready reply. The system she is said to have acquired cannot well have included the more esoteric and more zealously reserved Brahmanic lore. It is difficult otherwise to imagine her at such a loss, unless because it was of the extreme vagueness of the question. In the beginning there was One only. It is One and he becomes many and so on," This suggestion that the question refers to the Upanishadic doctrine of Brahman and that it was a sort of esoteric doctrine kept as a secret by the Brahmanical teachers cannot stand examination. As a matter of fact, the Upanishadic doctrine of Atman and Brahman was originally associated with the Kshatriya leaders of thought, and we have sufficient evidence in Upanishadic literature to show that the Brahmins well-versed in the old Ritualistic lore had to go to kings like Ajâtasatru and Janaka for the purpose of getting initiated into the so-called mysteries of the Upanishadic thought. This Atma cult which probably originated among the Kahatriyas must cer-

tainly be well-known both to the Jaina teachers as well as the Buddhist teachers. These represent the Kshatriya revolt against the Vedic ritualism of the earlier period. Hence the doctrine must have been quite well-known to Kundalakêsi one of the very learned scholars of those days, and probably of the same type as the woman philosopher Gârgi who figured in Janaka's court. Further it is not likely that Sâriputta who was one of the important Buddhist teachers and who was known by the famous name "The Captain of the Law" would put a question relating to the fundamental doctrine of the Upanishads. Both Sâriputta and Kundalakesi must have been acquainted with that doctrine and certainly must have rejected it as untrue; both being of the camp of revolvers. Hence we have to find an explanation in some other form, where the question will have certainly a significance. The account given above gives us the clue. When Kundalakêsi was directed by Sâriputta to go to Buddha himself to seek admission into the Order, it is said that the Master discerned the high merit of her knowledge. As she was welcomed by the Master she attained Arhatship together with thorough grasp of the letter and spirit of the Law. It is further narrated when she entered the Order as an Arhat the Master himself admitted her; and it is further said, "she abode in the bliss of fruition in Nirvâna." These words are very significant, and we have to find an explanation of the sudden conversion of Kundalakêsi from this clue.

Buddha himself, when he organised the Order, was very reluctant to admit women into the Sanga. But finally he yielded to the importunate requests of his

friends and disciples. He was willing to admit women into the Order provided they were willing to submit to rigorous discipline. Anyhow women were admitted into the Order and they formed an important section of the Buddhist Sanga. But, in the case of Nigranthas, women were admitted into the Order of ascetics from the very beginning. Women had no difficulty in securing admission. But from the very beginning they were under a disability due to an important Nigrantha doctrine which became later a bone of contention between Digambaras and Svetambaras the two later sections of the Jainas due to a schism about the time of Bhadrabâhu. This Nigrantha doctrine is that since women are not fit to adopt the Nigrantha *tapas* they could not become Arhats in the same birth. The Nigrantha *tapas* referred to consists in complete renunciation of worldly things including clothes. This is technically known as Nigrantha Mudra or Digambara Mudra, and the early Nigranthas evidently emphasised this aspect and included in their teachings the doctrine that women were not fit to attain Mukti as women. Learned in all the Sâstras, Kundalakêsi was evidently not satisfied with this inferiority of women according to the Nigrantha doctrine. She must have been too proud to acquiesce in such an inferior status. But in the case of the Buddhists when once they admitted women into the fold they treated them as equals; provided the women kept up all the *śilachâras*, they were also equally qualified for Arhatship. This being the case, Kundalakêsi who was on her debating tour visiting all the learned men of the country met Sâriputta at Srâvasti. Sâriputta who must have known the Nigrantha doctrine

very well must have exploited it to the full advantage. Knowing that the lady before him was thoroughly learned in all important philosophical doctrines of the day, he evidently wanted to bring to her consciousness, how with all her scholarship she was not given the status that she deserved, by the Nigrantha teachers to whom she owed allegiance. Hence the question which he put her must certainly have reference to Arhatship. *Ekam Nāma Kim* must be interpreted to mean the state of perfection, the *Paramâtmasvarūpa*, the state of conquering of the karmas and the state of perfect knowledge and perfect bliss. Hence the question refers not to the Upanishadic doctrine but to the state of perfect realisation which was considered to be the goal of life both by the Jainas and the Buddhists as well as by others. Kundalakêsi brought up under the traditions of Nigrantha school must have been taught about the inferior status of women in the Order and must have accepted the doctrine as a Jain female ascetic; with the firm conviction that it was not her lot to know anything directly of the state of Arhatship she would have naturally answered Sâriputta in the negative. But when Sâriputta began his exposition of his Buddhistic doctrine he must have certainly emphasised the fact that the goal was within the reach of women also and this particular lady Kundalakêsi was eminently fit to be one of the Arhats. That would have captured her imagination at once. She must have realised how she was not given her due by the Nigrantha teachers. She herself realised before she started out on her tour that she had no more to learn from them. From the point of view of intellect,

certainly, the male members of the Nigrantha Order associated with her were not in any way superior to herself. From the point of view of moral discipline and devotion to truth she was quite their equal. In spite of such equality she was assigned only an inferior status merely on the strength of difference of sex. When the Buddhist teacher Sâriputta pointed out that sex was no disqualification to Arhatship she must have perceived her opportunity. It is no wonder that she immediately offered herself as a candidate to be admitted into the Order. Knowing her eminent culture, Sâriputta naturally suggested that she must have her ordination directly from Buddha himself. Therefore she was sent to appear personally before Buddha to be admitted into the Order. Then the whole thing is clear. She made her obeisance to the Master and stood on one side. The Master welcomed her. Just then she attained Arhatship, it is said. And therefore she entered the Order as an Arhat, a privilege which she never would have dreamt of obtaining had she remained in the Order of the Nigrantha. That explains her enthusiasm for her new faith. It is just this doctrine of the Nigranthas that is one of the disputed doctrines by the Svetambara Jains who also believe that women are quite qualified to attain Moksha as women. This explanation of the conversion of Kundalakësi is suggested by the very account given in *Thërigâtha*, *Psahms of the Sisters*.

SECTION III.

*Extracts from Jātaka Tales to illustrate the references
contained in the book.*

1. VATTAKA JĀTAKA.

(No. 35. Cambridge edition of the Jātaka Tales).

This is intended to illustrate the efficacy of prayer technically called in Buddhistic literature as the efficacy of Truth.

Once upon a time Bôdhisatva was born in Maghada as a bird. His parents kept him in the nest where he was fed by them with food brought by them in their beaks. He was still too young to spread his wings and fly through the air. Then, there was a forest fire. All the birds seeing the flames darted out from their several nests flew away and escaped from the fire. The parents of Bôdhisatva were also frightened and flew away leaving the poor young bird in the nest. The Bôdhisatva from the nest saw the flames spreading towards him. He had no power to spread his wings or fly away for safety. While he was thus left destitute by the parents this thought came to him. "In this world there exists what is termed the efficacy of goodness and the efficacy of truth. Many a person attain perfection through the efficacy of goodness and truth. I also shall grasp that. Therefore it behoves me to call to mind the Buddhas of the past and by an act of truth make the flames go back and thus save both myself and the rest of the birds. Therefore he resolved to work that matchless act of truth. With

firm faith in the efficacy of this act of truth he repeated the following stanza.

“ With the wings that fly not and feet that walk not,
 yet forsaken by my parents here I lie ;
 Wherefore I conjure the dread Lord of Fire Primeval
 Jathaveda “ Turn and go back.”

When this verse was sung in prayer, faith had effected the desired result. Fire receded several leagues as if it was quenched by water. Bôdhisatva and all the other helpless birds in the forest were thus saved from destruction by the Bôdhisatva's act of truth.

2. MATSYAJĀTAKA.

(No. 75 of the Cambridge Edition).

Once upon a time Bôdhisatva was born as a fish in a pond near Srāvasti. Then there was a draught in the land. Crops withered, and tanks got dried up. The fishes and the tortoises in the pond were in great danger of destruction. The fishes and tortoises of the pond in which Bôdhisatva was living were also experiencing great difficulty. Though they got buried in the mire, crows and other birds easily caught them and killed them. Bôdhisatva, out of natural benevolence and mercy, wanted to save his kinsfolk from destruction. Hence he resolved by performing the act of goodness to bring rain from the Heavens and so save all his kinsfolk from certain death. So he came out of the hiding place, looking up to the Heavens, thus he prayed to Pârjanya, King of Devas, “ My heart is heavy for the sake of my kinsfolk. Pray send rain from Heaven. I have been righteous throughout my life, nor have I ever robbed a single living creature

of its life. By the truth of this I pray you to send rain and support my kinsfolk."

Then Pârjanya, the King of Devas, immediately caused a heavy down-pour Grain and relieved all the fish from the fear of death. This tale is also illustrative of the efficacy of goodness of nature, and how it can be of help and service to fellow beings.

3. SASA JĀTAKA.

Bôdhisatva came to live as a young hare and lived in a wood. The hare had three friends, a monkey, a jackal, and an Otter. Hare in his wisdom preached the truth to his three companions, teaching that alms ought to be given, moral law to be observed, and holy days to be kept. They all accepted his admonition. One day Bôdhisatva looking at the moon knew that the next day would be a fast day. "To-morrow is a fast day, let all three of you take upon the moral precepts and observe the Holy day. Alms giving brings a great reward. Therefore feed any beggars that come to you." They readily assented. Each of the three companions, next morning, went out in search of food and each secured food which was kept solely for future consumption, that day being the fast day. Thus they all observed the fast. Bôdhisatva the hare also went out intending to brouse on the Kusa grass. Then he remembered the fast day and thought thus:—"It is impossible for me to offer grass to any beggars. I have no oil or rice or such like thing. If any beggar comes I shall have to give my own body to eat." Sakra, the king of Gods, observing certain symptoms of his throne, discovered the cause of the disturbance, and

resolved to put the royal hare to test. Disguised as a Brahman he visited one after the other the three friends of the hare. Each offered him food but the Brahman said, "Let it be till to-morrow." Finally he went to the hare. Bôdhisatva on hearing what he wanted was highly delighted. "You have done well in coming to me for food. I will grant you a boon that I have never granted before. Go and have logs of wood piled together. Then kindle a fire, and come and let me know. I will sacrifice myself by jumping into the midst of the flames, when my body is roasted you shall eat my flesh and be satisfied." Sakra caused a heap of burning coals to appear and informed Bôdhisatva. Rising from his bed of Kusa grass, he offered his whole body as a free gift and fell on the heap of live coals. But the flame failed even to heat the hair on the body of Bôdhisatva. "The fire you have kindled is icy cold. What is the meaning of this?" Then Sakra revealed himself and told the hare that he had come to put his virtue to the test. Then Sakra said, "Oh Wise Hare, Be Thy virtue known throughout the whole Aeon" and thus made a mark of the hare on the face of the moon.

4. MAHĀKAPI JĀTAKA No. 407.

Once upon a time Bôdhisatva was born as a monkey. In course of time he became the leader of eighty thousand monkeys. There was a mangoe tree on the bank of the Ganges whose fruits had divine fragrance and flavour, and the fruits were also very large as big as a pot. He went with his large retinue to eat the fruits of that mangoe tree. Knowing the excellence

of the flavour, he thought there would be danger some day, hence instructed his followers not to drop down any fruit either in the ground or in the stream. Unluckily, one day a fruit dropped in the water; and the King of Benares who was bathing down in the stream happened to get it. Learning that it was a mango fruit he ate it and discovered its excellent flavour and fragrance. He ordered his forest guards to locate the tree and to guard it. The forest guards reported to the King that the monkeys visited the tree every day and made a havoc of the fruits. The King ordered the forest guards to shoot all the monkeys, so that the fruits may not be eaten by them. One morning when all the monkeys were on the mango tree they were all caught by surprise; the guards were ready to shoot every one of them. In great distress all the monkeys appealed to Bôdhisatva. The monkey king Bôdhisatva consoled them by saying, "Do not be afraid of death; I shall see that every one of you is saved." So saying he thought of a plan for escape. He asked his retinues to bring a long bamboo shoot, long enough to measure the width of the river, tied one end of it to his own body, and the other end to the nearest branch of the mango tree. Thus he thought of making a bridge across the river in order that his disciples should walk across the bamboo bridge and escape. While he attempted to carry out the plan, the bamboo was found a bit too short. Bôdhisatva, therefore, could not jump right across to the other bund. He had to fall a bit short of the bund in a bush. Anyhow the bridge was formed by his miraculous lengthening of his body, and all the monkeys escaped

crossing the river, over the bridge made of the bamboo, as well as of the body of the Bôdhisatva. Thus he allowed everyone of his retinue to escape. But the Bôdhisatva himself was captured by the king's servants. Knowing the story of the capture of the Bôdhisatva the king was very much pleased with the attitude of self-sacrifice shown by the monkey king; he praised the monkey king for having made a bridge himself for the other monkeys to pass in safety, and never caring for his own life. But the Bôdhisatva explained to the king how it was his duty to save his followers. "I fear no pain of death, bonds do not give me pain. The happiness of those was won o'er whom I used to reign." Thus the Bôdhisatva taught the duties of the King to the King of Benares. While preaching, he died. The dead monkey king was buried with all the royal honours. A shrine was built at the Bôdhisatva's burial place. The King accepting the advice of Bôdhisatva ruled over his kingdom righteously and thus became destined for Heaven.

5. SIBI JĀTAKA No. 499.

When the mighty King Sibi was reigning in the city of Arishtapura, Bôdhisatva was born as his son. They called him Prince Sibi. As a prince he had his education at Thakasila. After his father's death he became king himself. As a king he kept the ten royal virtues and ruled the kingdom in righteousness. He caused alms-house to be built in the midst of the city, and he was very munificent in distributing alms and money to the poor. On a full moon day, when he was seated on the royal throne he thought to himself thus:—

"Till now I have been distributing as gifts, money and other things. These things I cannot call my own. I want to give something which is part of myself. This day when I go to the alms hall, I vow that if any one asks a part of my self, even if he should mean my very heart, I will cut open my breast with a knife, and pull forth my heart dripping with blood, and give it to him. If he should name the flesh of my body, I will cut the flesh of my body and give it, and if any man demands my eyes, I will pull out my eyes and give them. Thus he thought to himself, if there be any human gift that I have never made, 'be it my eyes' I will give it now all firm and unafraid." Sakra perceiving his resolution, determined to try him, and in the form of a Brahman, old and blind, he posted himself on a high place when the king came to the alms hall. Sakra stretched out his hand and cried, "Long Live the King." The king seated on his elephant went near him and said, "What do you want Brahman?" "I have heard your fame spread in all parts of the world, Oh Great King. I am blind, and you have two eyes. As I have none, Oh give me one of your eyes I pray." The Bôdhisatva was glad when he heard this. For that was just the thing that he was thinking of. "My heart's desire will be fulfilled to-day. I will give a gift which no man ever gave yet." So he took the Brahman indoors; seating himself on the royal throne, he sent for the surgeon and told him, "Take out one of my eyes." The news spread all over the city; the ministers and the commanders of the army all gathered at the alms hall imploring the king not to do any such thing.

But the king did not heed. He instructed the surgeon not to delay. So the surgeon had to take out one of the eye balls. The eye ball was placed in the great king's hand who said, "Brahman, come here. The eye of the Omniscience is dearer hundred-fold than this eye of flesh." So saying he gave it to the Brahman who placed it in his own socket. With the joy of the gift the king gave the other eye also when it was demanded by Sakra who departed from the king's palace to his own world of Gods. For sometime he thus suffered as a blind man having given away both his eyes. While thus he was leading a blind life, as a reward for his gift the king of Gods restored him both his eyes. Thus the king was able to see once again, and Sakra praised the king of Sibiland for his wonderful gift. Self-sacrifice in a man, mortal living, of all things is most fine. "I sacrificed a mortal eye and received an eye divine." Thus he declared the law to all his people and the people gave alms and did good deeds and followed the righteous way.

6. SANKAPALA JĀTAKA.

(No. 524, otherwise known as Drishti-risha Jātaka)

Once upon a time the Bodhisatva was born in the Nāga world as King Sankapala. In course of time he grew sick of this magnificence as a Nāga king. Desiring to be born again as a man he kept the holy days. In order to observe his fast successfully he left the Nāga world and came and stayed on the banks of the river Kannapenna. There he coiled round an ant hill before the high road and the narrow path and resolved to keep the holy day taking upon himself the

moral law. "Those that want my skin and flesh let them take it off." Thus he lay on the top of the ant hill in order to sacrifice himself by way of charity. One day when he was lying there with this moral vow a party of sixteen men from a neighbouring village roamed about in the forest with the object of hunting animals for meat. Without finding anything to hunt they came to the ant hill on which the Nâga king was found coiled. "To-day we kill and eat this Snake King." Fearing to approach him lest he should kill all of them they thought they would pierce him with stakes from a distance before capturing him. It was a great opportunity for the Nâga king. "To-day my desire would be fulfilled. I will be firm in my resolution and offer myself to them as sacrifice. When they strike me with their javelins and wound me in the body I will not open my eyes, nor regard them with anger." The hunters came near him and wounded him in eight different places with sharp stakes. Then when he was disabled he was dragged along by means of strings tied to his body. When they found that he was completely disabled and his head was drooping they pierced his nostrils and inserted a cord through it. Fastening the cord thus, they dragged along the road, the Nâga king with this cord through the nose. The Bôdhisatva never once opened his eyes. For he knew that if he opened his eyes and regarded them, they would all be burnt to ashes. At this moment a land-owner by name Alâra, a citizen of Mithila noticed this cruelty inflicted on the Nâga King by these sixteen ruffians. He released the Nâga King by giving each one of the sixteen fellows handful of gold coins

together with an ox apiece. Thus released, the Nāga king Saṅkapala went back to his Nāga world. The benefactor Alāra was invited to the Nāga world where he was amply rewarded for his good act. After some time both the Nāga king and Alāra became ascetics and lived in the outskirts of the Himalayas keeping the law and preaching the Dharma.

7. VYĀGRI JĀTAKA.

(No. 1. *Jātakamāla* Ed. by Ry. Arjyasura Dr. Kern
Harvard Oriental Series Vol. 1.)

Once upon a time the Bôdhisatva was born in a well-known Brahman family, famous for its scholarship as well as righteous conduct. His parents performed his *samskâras* such as the birth ceremony. Naturally intelligent, the boy very soon learnt all the Vedas and Vedāṅgas according to the traditions of the Brahmanical creed. He very soon rose to the status of an Achârya. In his knowledge of the Vedas, he was equal to Brahma himself, the author of the Vedas. In his command of respect from Kings, he was equal to the King of Kings. He was adored and worshipped by his people, as the Indra among the Devas. In his affection to his subjects and in his eagerness to promote their welfare, he was as their father. Thus he became very great and so loved and respected by his people because of his nobility of nature and righteous conduct. Though he enjoyed all the prosperity of a King, together with the affection of his subjects, still from the very beginning his thoughts were turned otherwise. Because of the acquisition of merits in his previous lives, he was not able to appreciate any

worth in the wealth and prosperity of life even as a King. Life appeared to him to be entirely an insipid affair. Things which would be appreciated and welcomed by ordinary people, appeared absolutely useless to him. His heart was longing for something which he could not derive from his life even as a King. Hence he renounced his kingdom and chose for himself the life of a forester; accordingly he had as his abode a forest region at the foot of a hill. There, he spent his time, teaching to the people the greatness of Dharma, and the littleness of the worldly riches, the value of humility and charity, and the danger of evil conduct. On account of his greatness in intellect and good conduct, many became his disciples. They were also living in the forest Asrama. His love, goodness, and charity were such that even wild animals living in the forest, were influenced and were tame and harmless. Even the Devatas living in the forest praised him for his good and merciful conduct. Day by day his congregation increased in numbers; many from towns renounced their worldly possessions and adopted the life of a religious mendicant, and went to the forest to live and learn under the great Acharya. His disciples grew not only in numbers, but also in scholarship and good conduct equally. Thus he was laying out the path of righteousness for the benefit of mankind.

One day, he left the Asrama and went out to the thick of the forest, just in search of solitude to spend a few hours by himself. He had with him only one of his disciples named Ajita. While he was thus roaming about he came near a mountain cave. There he saw

a tigress, which had just given birth to tiger cubs. The tigress appeared to be extremely hungry. On account of hunger, she behaved even contrary to the ordinary maternal instinct. Instead of allowing the cubs to suck, she growled at them when they approached the mother. The hunger instinct in the tigress, completely defeated the maternal instinct. She was even thinking of killing her own cubs to appease her hunger, and the Bôdhisatva saw the tigress in the clutches of hunger, and how she was preparing to eat her own young ones. He was very much perturbed in his heart. The Great Being who had courage to face any kind of horror and misery directed against himself was now quaking in his heart when he observed the tigress devoid of maternal instinct. He drew the attention of his disciple to the tragic situation. He pointed out how self-interest was the ruling power of life. He pointed out how when self-interest was uppermost, it would create such a situation, that even a mother would devour her own young ones. "Escape from the misery of life is just the escape from self-interest. One who becomes a victim to self-interest will have no salvation. Hence please run and bring some meat to appease the hunger of the tigress, in order to save the cubs from certain death. I shall remain here and see that the mother does not devour her young ones, till you bring meat over here." Thus saying he sent out his disciple on an errand of mercy. When his disciple Ajita went away he was alone there face to face with the tragedy of life. He thought within himself thus :—"This body of mine carries within itself the seed of disease and death. It is the source of misery.

It is impure in nature. It is merely an aggregate of a number of impure things. This mass of flesh and blood I have to carry about myself only as a necessary means of good deed. When this is available to me at present, why should I wait till Ajita brings meat? Meat may not be available to him. Further, to carry the body without making use of it for the benefit of others, is not real wisdom. If one keeps quiet in the presence of suffering found in others, it must be due to two causes. Either he must be motivated by self-interest and self-happiness, or even if he is not a victim of self-interest he must suffer from lack of courage to do the right thing. In my case, it is impossible for me to derive any pleasure when others are suffering, and certainly I am in possession of necessary strength and courage to remove all such sufferings in others. Why should I then hesitate to do the right thing? This tigress completely possessed by hunger is going to devour her own young ones. I have the strength and courage to avoid this. If I delay any longer, it would be inconsistent with the ideal of good that I have undertaken to follow. To keep quiet in the face of that great tragedy, and to see the young ones devoured by their own mother, would be the height of sin. It is my duty therefore to divert this calamity. Hence I shall climb up the cliff and cast myself down from the precipice, just at the entrance to the cave, so that the tigress may appease her hunger by feeding on my own dead body. Thus she can save herself from hunger and save her young cubs from certain death. Further this conduct of mine may serve as a model to humanity. People actuated by self-interest may

not have either wisdom to see the good or the courage to carry it out. I shall serve as a model to them. They will realise that it is within the reach of every one to see the good and do the good, if one has only the will. Hence there is the further prospect of serving the humanity by showing them the path of goodness and charity. The good among the people would be glad in their heart to walk in the path of righteousness. The evil-hearted will desist from their wickedness out of shame. The course of conduct that is prospective of so much goodness to the world, this intrinsic capacity to promote virtue and prevent evil, must be immediately carried out without any delay. I am directed to this course of conduct not because of any selfish desire of self-aggrandisement. It is not to strike the imagination of the people and to exact adoration and praise from them. It is not with the object of enjoying future happiness in Swarga; nay, not even the idea of unalloyed bliss, in a state of Nirvâna. These fail to serve as motive in me. Then what is it that drives me to this course of conduct. Nothing but the humble desire to be of service to others, to serve as a means for removing misery and unhappiness around. That, by itself, is sufficiently a high motive. And I know no aim beside that." Thus resolving himself that the highest of service under the sun is sacrifice of oneself for the benefit of others, the great Bôdhisatva climbed up the hill and from the top of the precipice cast his body down as a sacrifice to appease the hunger of the tigress and save her cubs. The Gods praised him for the great sacrifice. The tigress who was all the

while regarding the young ones was surprised at the thud of the falling body, turned back and she saw a dead body within her reach. The struggle between the self-interest, and maternal instinct which delayed her devouring her young ones now was at an end. The maternal instinct was released from the clutches of hunger. The mother was glad that she had her food otherwise. Now, she could appease her hunger, as well as save her young ones. Then she turned to the dead body of the Bôdhisatva and began to feed herself on it. Just at that time the disciple who went in search of the meat returned empty-handed. Where was the master? He could not be found anywhere near the place. When he went near the cave he beheld the strange and wonderful scene, the hungry tigress feeding on his master's body. He realised what has happened. He had a mixed emotion of great joy and sorrow—sorrow because he lost his great and reverend master, and joy because of the wonderful sacrifice made by his master out of his love and charity towards others. "What a Great Being! He could not think of self when he perceived the slightest sorrow in others. What his courage! that he would not hesitate to cast away his own body as food for a hungry tigress. It is really wonderful that a person who was by nature so peace loving, should develop all of a sudden such wonderful courage leading to self-sacrifice. It is an undreamt of heroism in the world. I would consider myself fortunate because of my being his disciple all this while and that I could worship him as my Lord." Thus the disciple worshipped the great Being, the very incarnation of love, love that passeth

understanding. Thus he went about proclaiming among his fellow disciples and friends, the heroism, and courage, exhibited by his Master who did not lose the opportunity of doing good even if it meant certain death to himself.

8. MAITRIBALAJĀTAKA.

(No. 8. *Jātakamāla.*)

Once upon a time the Bôdhisatva was born as a King named Maitribala. He was characterised by love towards all, benevolence and generosity to the needy, and desire to walk in the path of righteousness. Thus he became famous throughout the land on account of his nobility of character. He always identified his own interests with the interests of his subjects. On account of such identification of his personality with his people, his own happiness consisted in promoting their happiness, and their difficulties, he felt as his own. He had his education both intellectual and physical, for the sole purpose of devoting all his resources for the welfare of his subjects. He studied the Nîti sâstras solely with the object of doing good to his people, and of directing them to walk the straight path of righteousness. Hence, he was loved by his own people, and respected by other kings. He had no enemies either internal or external to his state. Hence, his army was but an ornament, or paraphernalia, for his Royalty. He discharged his kingly duties with absolute impartiality, meeting out punishment to the wicked and rewarding the good. He loved his subjects and directed them to good behaviour as an affectionate father to them. It was his pleasure to communicate his own characteristics of truth, benevolence, humility, and wisdom to his people. Thus he

was qualifying himself in an eminent way to attain the wisdom of Buddha in future. While Maitribala was reigning over his subjects, there came to his country five Yakshâs, who were banished from their land by their King on account of some crime committed by them against the state. Yakshâs, by nature, are wicked and cruel; and their whole occupation consisted in inflicting pain on others. When these Yakshâs observed the happiness and contentment of the people ruled over by the king Maitribala, they became envious of the state of happiness and complete satisfaction which they found around them, among the subjects. Hence, they set their heart on mischief. They wanted to create discord between the king and his subjects. But they found no scope for carrying out their mischievous intention. All powers of evil that they were in possession of, appeared to be completely paralysed by the good nature of the King, and the complete satisfaction of his people. They had to acknowledge defeat in their attempt. They counselled with one another that they should somehow find a way to give effect to their evil intention. They disguised themselves as Brahmans, and roamed all over the country, in order to discover some chance of creating trouble. While they were thus roaming about, in disguise, they went into a forest. There, they noticed a cowherd with his herd of cattle. Seated in the shade of a tree, the cowherd was singing himself in joy, absolutely care-free, though he was in a forest. He was adorned with a garland of white flowers which he made for himself. While the Yakshâs observed this cowherd, in such a state of happiness in that forest environment, they were really surprised. They went near him and

asked him, "Oh cowherd, how is it that you are so very care-free and joyful, though you are alone in this forest which is infested with so many cruel wild animals?" The cowherd answered them, "Why should I fear anything?" The Yakshâs told him "that the forest area was not only infested with wild animals, but was the habitation of Yakshâs, Râkshasâs, and Pisâchâs, who were, by nature, wicked and whose pleasure was to create trouble and inflict pain on others. Even if one is surrounded by large concourse of people, even if one is blessed with the friendship of the Great and Powerful, even if one is deeply rooted in his yogic dyâna, even if one is by nature a courageous hero, one cannot escape from these Yakshâs, Râkshasâs, and Pisâchâs. This forest is vast and dense. There is not a single human soul here. You are alone here helpss. The sport of Yakshâs and Râkshasâs consists in hunting human beings and devouring them as their food. When you are in the midst of such terrible sursoundings, how is it that you are heedless of any danger?" Thus the Yakshâs described the situation in horrid colours with the object of frightening the cowherd. The cowherd simply smiled and said, "Oh noble Brahmans, You need not be anxious about my safety. I am well protected. Even Indra cannot transgress the fortress of my protection. Râkshasâs will feel helpless before that. When I am so guarded by a power which is mighty, and proof against all attack, I need not be afraid of roaming about in this forest alone guarding my herd of cattle. Having nothing to fear, I enjoy myself fully and freely, even my loneliness in this forest. I do not recognise any difference between my home and this

ferest. Both night and day are the same to me, so long as I am taken care of, by that protecting hand." Hearing this, the Yakshâs in wonder, asked him, "What is that protecting hand which you speak of so highly?" The cowherd said in reply, "We have a mighty King. This noble being, who is strong in body, courageous in mind, good at heart, is our sure protection. As long as he is there, we need fear nothing; and further, the cowherd expressed a surprise at their ignorance of such a great being. "Have you not heard of our great King? Is it possible that you are ignorant of his good nature and noble deeds? It is incredible that you have forgotten him altogether. Is it because that you do not care for discovering where good is found or is it due to your indifference to such things? It is certainly a pity that you have had no acquaintance with such a great being. Still, there is chance for you. Still, you can have the honour of making his acquaintance. It is probably because of your good luck, that you have met me. Hence, do not lose this opportunity of acquainting yourself with our noble king." Then the Yakshâs asked the cowherd, "How do you account for such greatness in your king that even the Yakshâs and Râkshasâs are evidently helpless to carry out their wicked intentions of inflicting pain on the people of this land." Then the Gopala answered, "Oh Brahmins, this greatness of our King is entirely the result of his own nobility of nature and righteousness of conduct. His strength consists in his love towards his subjects. The army, bearing his standard, is but a royal insignia. Anger is entirely foreign to his nature. No harsh words will escape from his

lips. Promoting the prosperity of his people, he considers his duty. Dharma forms the foundation of his reign. He knows not any crooked method of controlling his people. He uses his wealth for protecting the needy, and for giving alms to those that ask for it. So great in power, so noble in bearing, so righteous in conduct, he has the additional ornament of humility. People, living under the protection of such a noble king, can never be within the reach of the wicked and evil-loving Yakshâs and Râkshasâs. Oh brahmans how is it possible for me a poor cowherd, to describe the greatness of our King? It is not possible for me to communicate even a fraction of his nature. If you are sincerely eager to know about them, you do better go straight to that city, and gain a direct knowledge of our King. There, you can see how the people, by nature, accept and follow the example of the King. How, even as a householder, they try to carry out the ideals and aspirations of the Royal House. How their whole pleasure consists in extending hospitality to their kinstolk, as well as to alien guests. Their rich clothes, their valuable jewels, their smiling face, will all narrate their prosperity and happiness under the noble ruler. You can directly have the knowledge of the people dancing, and singing, and feasting, so fully expressive of their prosperity and happiness derived in that land of the noble king. If you are really interested in goodness in life, and if you are actuated by desire to know these things, directly get you there without wasting time." The Yakshâs after hearing such a glorious account of the noble king from the cowherd ought to have evinced good

will and admiration towards the noble king. But, In their case, the effect was just the reverse. Wicked and evil-minded by nature, they could not brook the idea of such nobility and righteousness in any person. Hence they began to hate him. The heart of the ruffian is, by nature, evil-disposed to everybody. But, when they hear greatness in any noble soul, the envy and the hatred in the wicked, begin to burn furiously. Therefore, these wicked Yakshâs counselled among themselves that they should somehow bring about the ruin of this King. They were already in the know of the King's munificence and how he distributed alms in his great house of charity. The Yakshâs thought they would make use of this institution to give effect to their evil thoughts. They approached the king and begged him to provide them with food. The King was delighted at the sight of the Brahmans, and instructed his servants to bring food rich and pure and fit for the Brahmans to eat. Accordingly, his servants prepared food as instructed, and offered to these Brahmans who were really Yakshâs in disguise. They rejected it. "This is not fit for us to eat. We will not touch this. A tiger even if it is hungry will never eat grass. Take this away from us." The servants reported this to the King who hastened to the Brahmans who would not eat the food provided for them. "Please let me know what you want. I will have food prepared that is acceptable to you, and if you would kindly let me know your desire." "Oh noble king, you never swerve from the path of righteousness. What we like to have is human flesh, and human blood, quite fresh and hot, just from the living human body. This is what we are accustomed

to eat and drink. And this is what we wish to have now." So saying, the Yakshâs revealed their horrid nature to the King, their wild face, showing the cruel tusks, eyes red with cruelty and anger, everything of the features exhibiting their cruel cannibalic tendency. The King discovered that they were not Brahmans at all. "These are not human beings. These must be Pisâchâs. That is why they reject the food offered to them. But the King could not refuse any request. He cannot turn down even the unreasonable request and even a cruel cannibalic Râkshasâ's. It is immaterial wherefrom the request proceeds. He must automatically offer the desired thing to the entire satisfaction of the person begging. The food that is prepared for these people will not be ordinarily available to the mild and merciful human being. A weakling can do no harm to others even if he is possessed with hatred. The weakling, by nature, however much he tries to do mischief to others, will not be able to carry out his intention. But, one who is endowed with strength, can easily inflict pain on others. But, if strength is associated with natural cruelty there is no greater danger to the world than this. These cannibalic Yakshâs want human meat and human blood. Mercy is entirely foreign to their nature. Cruelty is their sport, wickedness is their pleasure. What a pity that they are absolutely ignorant of any higher ideal in life. Anyhow, I must fulfil my promise. I must offer them food and appease their hunger, however undesirable it is. How is it possible for me to give them human flesh without killing others? How can I raise my sword against any human being? I dread the very thought of Himsa. But, till

now, no one who came to me praying for a gift, went back empty-handed. They have already expressed through their face how much they are dissatisfied in not getting what they want. Why should I waste time in deliberation? There is only one way by which I can keep my promise and make them satisfied. I shall give them flesh and blood from my own body. There is no other way by which I can satisfy them, and at the same time to serve my ideal of non-cruelty—Ahimsa—. These Yakshâs complain that they are suffering from acute hunger. They insist that flesh and blood offered to them must be fresh and hot from the body. If I kill myself and offer my corpse to them to eat, they may reject that, as not being fresh and hot. Hence there is no use of offering them a corpse. Hence, I must be alive, while offering human flesh and human blood. It is quite against my nature, to get such flesh and blood from some other human being. If I delay in offering, these Yakshâs may go away in disgust. They will despise me, they will condemn my charity, and benevolence, as merely fictitious. Hence I must do something to satisfy them, and that, quickly. Have I not learnt that human body is merely the hot-bed of disease and decay? Do you not require the aid of a surgeon's knife if there is a boil in your body? What is the source of evil and pain in itself must certainly be got rid of. It is but wisdom to get rid of it, by sacrificing such a thing at the altar of goodness." So having resolved within himself, the noble king, with a joyful heart and smiling face, pointed his own body to the cruel Yakshâs and spoke as follows:—"This body made up of flesh and blood exist only for service

to mankind. If I can satisfy you by offering flesh and blood from this body it would immensely satisfy me. Hence this body is yours." Realising that the King was serious, the Yakshâs expressed a desire to have whatever is offered to them. The King was glad that they consented to have the flesh and blood of his own body. He sent for the royal surgeon to cut the arteries in his body, so that the Yakshâs may drink to their fill, hot blood from his body.

The news spread all over the city. The ministers and other noble men of the court ran to the audience hall. They protested against such a decision. They pointed out that it was not fit for a noble King to sacrifice his body for the purpose of satisfying hungry, but wicked Yakshâs. The Yakshâs did not deserve any fair treatment, because of their cruelty and wickedness. Their whole occupation consist in inflicting misery and pain, on the innocent people. Wicked by nature, prone to hunt the poor for sport, absolutely devoid of even an iota of goodness at heart, they do not deserve your sympathy; how is it then that you have decided to sacrifice yourself for the satisfaction of such wretches. This would be the ruin of the whole land. This would break the heart of all your subjects. They would all be drowned in universal sorrow. How can you justify your sacrifice, resulting in so much misery, to your own loving subjects. Merely for the purpose of satisfying the cruel and the wicked, that you should heap the burden of sorrow and misery upon your own affectionate people, is quite inconsistent with your own noble nature. These Yakshâs, are evidently bent on creating mischief among

your people. That is why they have rejected the rich and valuable food that you have offered them. What are we, before you, the wise King, that we should remind you of your noble duty. Yet, our own self-interest, and the interest of the people at large, make us bold to appeal to you in this fashion. Pray desist from ruining the whole land, in order to satisfy these wicked five. If you are not willing to turn them out, "Here we are stout in body full of flesh and blood. Permit us to offer these bodies to them. Let the Yakshâs be satisfied. Let the Royal body be preserved for the benefit and happiness of the people in the State." In reply to this request of the ministers the King addressed them as follows:—"Oh Ye ministers! How is it possible for me to say 'no' to a person who begs of something from my hands. I cannot reject any request directly made to me. As a King it is my duty to defend the path of charity. If, as a King, I swerve from the path of righteousness that will certainly be an excuse for my subjects to adopt crooked methods of life. How would you appreciate such a result. Hence in the name of general welfare I cannot withhold my promise. It is because I love my subjects and desire their welfare, that I have decided to part with the flesh and blood of my own body. If I do not keep my promise, and if I attempt to excuse myself out of the difficult situation, where is my much boasted greatness and benevolence. The fact that I do not make use of you in this matter and that I directly undertake to satisfy the Yakshâs, need not be interpreted as lack of affection on my part towards my ministers. Nor does it imply on my part any lack

of faith in your loyalty and affection towards the King. It is justifiable to depend upon one's friends only, when one is not able to satisfy the request of beggars himself. So long as it is possible for me to discharge my duties without calling upon my friends to help me, if I transfer my responsibility to my friends, it must be interpreted as shifting my own duty. That is not fair. Hence do not stand between me and my gift. Further these Yakshâs made their request to me and they never approached you with a similar prayer. Hence it is but proper that I should directly satisfy their requests. Hence it is not proper on my part to permit you to give the Yakshâs flesh and blood to appease their hunger. Further it is said that any attempt to dissuade a person from offering charity is not good; and the person who makes such an attempt to thwart charity will not be called a good man. It will be put down distinctly as an evil and such a man will be condemned as an evil person trying to obstruct Dharma. Hence do not try to dissuade me from my resolution. Remember that this kind of dissuasion will be interpreted as wrong on the part of the ministers whose duty it is to see that the King does not swerve from the straight path of Dharma. Listen to my words; here I have a unique opportunity. Heretofore all those that came to me for charity begged only for money or clothes or ornaments. No one came to me with such a request as this. I consider this an important occasion in my life when I shall be put to the test. After all, this body of mine is not such a great thing. It is not going to be an eternal affair. Its impermanence is well-known. Its whole

existence and justification consists in serving as a means for some good. To hesitate to make the best use of it, will be a mean attachment to something which is intrinsically worthless. Delay in doing the good will ultimately end in sinfulness." Thus the King convinced the ministers that they were entirely wrong in their attempt to dissuade him from his act of charity. Immediately he sent for his surgeon and asked him to cut open five of the main arteries of his body. Blood rushed out from these opened arteries. The King addressed the Yakshas, "Here you have what you want. Drink and quench your thirst to your satisfaction. I am glad I have this opportunity of serving the needy." Then the five Yakshâs drank from the five opened arteries the rushing blood from the king's body. The king did not flinch. He enjoyed the whole situation. Out of joy, he did not experience even any fatigue, due to loss of blood. The strength of his mind sustained his body. He felt no pain. The Yakshâs drank to their complete satisfaction and told the King, "We want no more." The king was delighted to hear of the satisfaction of the Yakshâs. The King thereafter took the knife from the surgeon and began to cut pieces of flesh from his body and offered these to the Yakshâs to eat. Even here the strength and courage in mind made the king perfectly immune from any pain when he cut pieces of flesh from his body. On the other hand, he was delighted at the opportunity given to him by the Yakshâs in order to exhibit his unstinting generosity and benevolence. When a person, in the name of Dharma, offers himself as a sacrifice for the benefit of others,

even his enemies would be constrained to admit his good nature and adore his right conduct. Hence when the Yakshâs observed the king thus cutting pieces of flesh from his body and offering them for the purpose of appeasing their hunger, they were lost in admiration and adoration. "What a wonderful behaviour for a mortal! What we see before us, is it real or but a dream! Such a conduct is never associated with a human being." So thinking the Yakshâs were completely changed in their heart, their evil nature disappeared from them, when they were directly in front of such a noble deed. Evil cannot thrive in the presence of goodness and nobility. Hence they all cried "Oh noble King, 'Enough.' Stop cutting your body. We are immensely satisfied. We are glad that we had the opportunity of witnessing such a noble deed!"

So saying, even the wicked Yakshâs were completely changed in their nature and shed tears of joy. They confessed to the King that it was no wonder that he was loved and adored by his subjects; and they began to praise him as follows:—"It is but right that even the Goddess of wealth left her abode of flower to take her habitation with you. Even the land of Gods Swarga desires to be ruled over by you instead of by Indra, God of Gods. Yours is the real kingdom, and you are the real King. Not knowing your greatness, we have done much harm to you. We express our sincere regret and beg you to excuse us. If we have the good fortune to have the friendship of a person like you, we can easily find a method of getting rid of our own evil nature and transport ourselves to the land of the good. The fact that you are prepared

to sacrifice everything, even the flesh and blood of your own body, distinctly points out some great end towards which you set your heart. It is clear that there is something great and noble which you are eager to obtain sacrificing everything that you can call your own. That ideal of yours must certainly be a most valuable thing. Is it the desire of ruling over the whole world as Universal monarch? Is it the wish to command the wealth of the whole world at your feet as the God of Wealth, Kubera? Or is it the desire to be born as Indra to rule over the whole Swarga? Or do you hope to be born as a Brahma; or is it something different from all these much greater and much higher than all these? It is not within our reach to know your aim in life. Pray let us have the benefit of knowing that. Reveal to us that ideal of yours which you prize as most valuable under the Sun."

The King told them in answer as follows:—
"Oh Brahmans, I will reveal to you the high purpose in life which I adopt as my ideal. Harken unto me. The wealth and prosperity that you find in this world are certainly to be acquired with great effort. But all things in life are intrinsically subject to decay and destruction. One who realises the true nature of such transcient things can never find satisfaction in them. This will never lead to peace of mind. When once you attach yourself to these things you will be carried away from misery to misery. Since I am aware of this intrinsic nature of things, how can I aspire to be born as Indra? That would not save me from the cycle of Samsâra. Hence I would not even think of such an ideal. But this should not be understood as an effort to

escape myself from misery from Samsâra and that I aspire to save myself alone from such evil. Such an egoistic ideal does not satisfy me either. Self-interest can never satisfy me. I can derive no pleasure in any egoistic ideal when I am face to face with the struggle experienced by all my subjects floundering in Samsâra. As a result of previous Punya, I am fortunately free from the six kinds of spiritual enemies. I am hoping to develop that universal love which knows no friend or enemy. My whole object is to save all those that are in imminent danger of being drowned in this terrible sea of Samsâra. This is my ideal for which I live, and this is my ideal for which I am prepared to die."

When the Yakshâs listened to these words they were transported with joy, and they begged of the king that they should also have the privilege of being instructed on that path of righteousness. "The path which you have chosen" they said "is certainly fruitful of great benevolence to mankind. There is no doubt about that, hence, let us also be instructed on that path. Till now, we have been ignorant of any distinction between good and evil. Being ignorant of the higher value in life, we have been following the path of evil. We have been inflicting pain on others. We have had Evil as our God. The cause of all this is but our own ignorance. Pray try to remove our ignorance. We will submit ourselves to your rule. You have the right to command us as you do your own subordinate ministers. To be ruled by you, we would consider as our good fortune, and it would be an act of mercy on your part. In our sincerity, we wish to be admitted into the group of your servants. You need have no suspicion about us." The

King noticed their change of heart and admitted them into his fold. He congratulated them for their service to him, for had it not been for their importunate demand for human flesh and blood, he would have had no opportunity of exhibiting his greatness and charity. The king had the satisfaction of offering himself as a sacrifice in the name of charity. The Yakshâs themselves had the good fortune of ridding themselves of their evil nature. Then the king addressed them thus:—"From to-day onwards you must absolutely give up your evil habits. You must give up injuring others even in thought. Don't desire other man's property. You must give up the habit of drink." The Yakshâs solemnly promised that they would give up all such evil habits and made *pradakshana* to the Bôdhisatva and disappeared after worshipping him. The whole nature expressed their joy at the wonderful conduct of this Bôdhisatva. The whole world seemed to vibrate with ecstasy, even the Mount Meru oscillating, the divine orchestra sounded; the trees rained their fragrant flowers; the odour-carrying winds spread the fragrance all over; Indra the king of kings himself came down to offer worship. He himself confessed his impossibility to praise the greatness and nobility of such a benevolent King. Indra blessed Bôdhisatva thus:—"Oh Great King, your noble duty and pleasure consist in helping others. You have made the whole world your own by your conduct." By the magic power of the Devas the wounds in the Bôdhisatva's body got healed. His body became once again healthy and strong and it regained its original beauty. Indra returned to Swarga after restoring the King to original wholesomeness and

beauty. He departed after worshipping him. This Jātaka story proclaims to the world that great men, when they see others in difficulty, will make efforts to remove misery and pain in others even to the extent of sacrificing themselves without any thought of Self.

9. VISWĀNTARA JĀTAKA.

(No. 9, Jātakamāla —No. 547. Cambridge edition of the Jātaka stories.)

When King Sanjaya was ruling over Sibi country, Bôdhisatva was born as his son, and was named Viswāntara. On his very birth day, a white elephant was also born in the royal stables, and this was considered to be a lucky omen. The king appointed 240 nurses for the Great Being. The king made a jewelled necklace for his son. The young prince Viswāntara, because of his intrinsic nature of benevolence even when he was only of four years of age, presented the valuable necklace to his nurse. When the nurse reported the matter to the King, the king merely replied "whatever is given away by my son is a gift well-given." Hence, he would not accept the necklace, when the nurse tried to return it. He had another necklace made for his son. The prince gifted this also away to his nurse. When he was but of eight years of age, reclining on his couch, he thought of charity thus :—"What is the use of giving things which come from without? I should like to give something of my own. If one should ask my heart, I would cut open my breast and tear it out, and give it. If one asks my eyes, I will pluck out my eyes, and give them. If one should ask my flesh, I would cut off all the flesh of my body and give it." Thus he pondered

over charity, and longed for an opportunity. Before he attained the age of sixteen, Bôdhisatva mastered all the sciences. He was made Yuvaraja by his father, King Sanjaya; and he was married to the princess Mâdri from the neighbouring country. In course of time, he had a son and a daughter born to Mâdri. Viswântara, the Bôdhisatva, had put up a huge alms-house in the city, and he would personally visit this alms-house to distribute charity. At that time, there was a drought in the kingdom of Kalinga. There was a terrible famine in the country, on account of lack of rains. The King of Kalinga was very much aggrieved and did not know what to do. He consulted his ministers. They advised him that if he could get some how the white elephant owned by Viswântara, the prince of Sibi country, prosperity in the land would be restored. The King agreed to this proposal. He selected eight Brahmans of his land who were instructed to go and fetch Viswântara's white elephant. The Brahmans started with this mission to meet Viswântara. They went to the Sibi country and waited at the great alms-house for the noble Viswântara. When he appeared mounted on his elephant the Brahmans saluted him and cried "Victory to the noble king Viswântara." The prince Viswântara hearing the Brahmans' salutation turned his elephant towards them and asked them what they wanted. They told him frankly that what they wanted was his glorious white elephant. Bôdhisatva thought within himself, "When I am willing to give anything, even my own body, they ask only for this elephant. I will fulfill their wish;" and accordingly he offered the noble elephant to the Brahmans with all the

jewels and ornaments with which the elephant was bedecked. The Brahmans received the elephant, mounted on his back and began to leave the city. The crowd beholding them, cried out, "Oh ye Brahmans! why are you taking our noble elephant?" to which the Brahmans replied, "The noble elephant was given to us as a gift by the noble Viswântara. Who are you to challenge us?" The people of the city got angry and they all ran to the King uttering loud reproaches against the Bôdhisatva. The citizens very much perturbed at heart addressed the king as follows:—"Oh king, bestowing food and drink, offering clothes and money, that is the proper gift for Brahmans. But, Viswântara the prince, has parted away with the noble white elephant which was our great national asset. He has given away this precious animal with all the jewels and ornaments with which it was bedecked. We will have the prince no more in our land. The prince must be banished from the land. If you refuse to do the bidding of the Sibi folk, the people of the Sibi land will then act of their own accord against your son and you." The King consented to send out his son from the land. But he was to stay there at least one day and one night. The people agreed to the king's proposal. The king accordingly sent a messenger to the prince Viswântara and told him what had befallen him. The prince Viswântara could not understand why the people were wrath with him for he had not offended them in any way. "Tell me, Oh good fellow wherefore they wish to banish me?" The messenger told the great being that the people were displeased at his giving away the noble elephant to the Brahmans. The Bôdhisatva could

not understand their attitude. "Why, I would give away my very eye and heart; then why not an elephant which is not a part of my self? If the gift of charity is a crime, let the people banish me. Even if the people threaten to kill me, never will I cease from my gifts." He merely prayed the citizens to grant him one day's delay. The next day he would make his gift and then depart from the land. The citizens consented to this accordingly. The next morning, the Bôdhisatva, distributed great gifts in the shape of elephants, horses, chariots as well as other kinds of food and drink among his people. When the distribution was over he went to meet his consort Mâdri to communicate to her the resolution of the people, and also his determination to leave the country and to pass the rest of his time in a forest as a hermit. He instructed his queen Mâdri to stay back with her children and to take care of them; but she would not do any such thing. She could not bear to live alone without her Lord. She would go with him wherever he went. To stay behind without her Lord, would be worse than death. Hence she begged of him to take her and her children with him wherever he went. Then the great being Viswântara took leave of the King and Queen—his parents—and departed from the land with his wife and children mounting on a gorgeous chariot drawn by a magnificent team of Sind horses. While he was thus on his way to the mountains he was met by four Brahmans who had been unable to be present at the time of distribution of gifts. They approached the Great Being and announced that they were beggars expecting gifts. The Bôdhisatva stopped the chariot and asked them what they wanted.

They said that they would have the horses. He gave away the horses to the Brahmans as gift. Immediately the yoke of the chariot was caught hold of by four gods in the disguise of deer and they dragged the chariot. Thus they went up for some time when they met another Brahman who asked for the chariot. Viswântara got down from the chariot with his wife and children and gave the chariot to the Brahman. Thereafter they had to walk to their destination. The two children being unable to walk were carried by them. Thus they went on foot, carrying their children, towards the Vanka hill. On their way they had to pass through his uncle's (Mâdri's father) city where they were met by thousands of citizens. When the people saw Viswântara and his queen Mâdri thus walking with their children, they all ran to their king and informed him of the miserable state in which they found his daughter and his son-in-law. Viswântara was requested to stay there and rule over the kingdom. The sons of Cheta land would welcome him as their king, though banished by the Sibi folk. But the great being, in spite of so many requests, declined the offer of the kingdom. He wanted to go to the Vanka hill to take his forest abode there. In the meanwhile, Indra instructed the divine builder Viswakarma, to erect a habitation—a pleasant spot—in the outskirts of Vanka Parvata, for Viswântara to dwell in. The great being found his way to the forest habitation erected for his benefit. At the sight of this habitation, he put off his bow and sword, and donned the robe of a hermit. Mâdri with her children also entered the hermitage; she also put on the ascetic's dress and

took her abode in a separate cell. Thus as ascetics they dwelt in the hermitage. Mâdri, every morning, would go about to pick up the wild fruits to serve as food for her children and her Lord; and in the night she would go to her cell with her two children. Thus they lived for seven months in the hermitage, Mâdri serving her Lord faithfully and bringing up her two children most affectionately, though they were all deprived of their royal privileges. At that time in the kingdom of Kalinga there lived an old Brahman with a young wife. Being of a poor family, she had to attend to all the household work herself and also to attend on her old husband. She was ridiculed by the village people for working so hard. Therefore she, one day, begged of her husband to obtain domestic servants to help her in her work. Being very poor he could not find money to engage servants. Hence he was not able to get any servants to help his wife. Finally they both thought of going to Viswântara famous for his charity. The Brahman was instructed by his wife to approach the King Viswântara and obtain from him as a gift domestic servants. So this Brahman set out to obtain servants from the King Viswântara. Learning that he was banished from his kingdom and that he was living in a forest hermitage near the Vanka hill, the Brahman turned towards the hill. He underwent lot of difficulties in finding the dwelling place of Viswântara. There he had to meet the opposition of the forest guard who would not let him go any further. The forest guard suspected the motive of this Brahman. He feared that he would approach the noble Viswântara and beg of him to part with his wife and

children. The forest guard was thus even prepared to kill the Brahman on his way. But the Brahman easily duped this forest guard by telling him that he was sent as a messenger by the people of Sibi to bring back Viswântara to rule over the land. Hearing this good news, the man gave the Brahman food, and directed him to the place where Viswântara had his forest abode. Thus the Brahman went by the route pointed out to him and reached the hermitage. He waited there till the next morning when he could approach the king Viswântara, when queen Mâdri would be out to gather fruits. Accordingly, he went the next morning to the hut where Viswântara was living. There he met the great Bôdhisatva seated on a slab of stone in front of the hut. "Here is a suitor coming," thought the Royal hermit and watched with gladness his approach. His children were playing in front at his feet. At the approach of the Brahman, the Bôdhisatva welcomed him and instructed his boy also to show honour by saluting the Brahman guest. The Brahman approaching the Bôdhisatva politely greeted him and the Great Being asked him why he took so much trouble to go over there experiencing all the difficulties of travelling in a forest. In reply to the King's query the Brahman announced the reason of his visit. "I come to beg, give me your children, pray." The Bôdhisatva gladly replied, "Take them, I give them to you with pleasure. Certainly you shall be their master. Please wait till my queen returns." But the Brahman would not agree to this arrangement. That would upset his own plan. The queen would never consent to part with her children.

Hence he proposed to take the children immediately, for he wanted servants to help his wife. When the children heard these harsh words, they were very much frightened, and hid themselves in the adjoining bushes. But the Brahman rebuked the Bôdhisatva that the children who were given away as gift to him, disappeared and hid themselves and he scolded the King that all his words were a lie. The noble King Viswântara was very much moved. "Don't trouble about that, Sir, I will fetch them." He went out, in search of his children, and called out each by their names. They certainly would not keep silent without answering when their father called them. They came out from their hiding place. The children were asked to go with the Brahman to work as his servants, and if they were keen on freedom, they could easily purchase their freedom by giving the Brahman a sufficient amount as ransom. Thus the Great Being, handed over his children to the Brahman by pouring out water according to gift ceremony. Viswântara was really joyful of the gift he had made. The old Brahman tied the children hand to hand with forest creeper, and drove them away like beasts of burden, beating them from behind. The children were so cruelly beaten on their back that their skin was so cut that even blood ran. In spite of bitter lamentations, the children were mercilessly dragged along by the Brahman towards his own place. The great Bôdhisatva, Viswântara, became sick of heart. He could no more endure the separation of his children from him. He went into the hut with tears streaming from his eyes. When he heard the lamentations of

his children from at a distance, he even thought of chasing the Brahman killing him and rescuing back his children. But, on the second thought, he realised that it would be a serious mistake. To give a gift, and to repent for the same, is not righteousness. Therefore he consoled himself even though tears of blood fell from his eyes. "All this pain is due to my affection. I must get rid of this affection and regain the calmness of mind." Thus with a great effort, with the help of his wisdom he got rid of that pang of sorrow.

What would be the sorrow of the mother when she knew the terrible bereavement? When she returned from her work of gathering fruits, she did not see her children in the usual place. Usually they would run to meet her in the evening. Where were they now? What had happened to them? Whither had they gone? Why was the place so desolate? The very forest birds became dumb. She came to the Great Being thus lamenting, and set the basket of fruit down. She wanted to know the fate of her children. But the Great Being sat silent and made no reply. "How is it, my Lord, you are silent? Have I offended you in any way?" Since the great being did not answer to her query, she herself set about in search of her darlings. She did not find them in their usual playground. Nowhere were they to be found. She then returned to the great being who was found crest fallen, sad and silent. Still the great being said no word. Again, she went out by herself in search of her children, but to no purpose, At the dawn, she again went to the King and stood before him lamenting.

Then the Bôdhisatva explained to her how the children were given away as domestic servants to a Brahman, who begged for them. "If you had given the children to a Brahman as domestic servants why did you make me go about weeping all the night?" Then the great being explained to her, how he himself had been weak of heart at some moments. Hence communicating the bad news to the queen, he feared, would break her heart completely. Thus he justified his silence, as an attempt on his part to regain peace of mind both for himself, and for his queen. Mâdri had no other ideal in life, except to serve her Lord in every way. Though she was pierced to the quick for being separated from her children, still she was so glad that she appreciated the noble gift made by her Lord. She also rejoiced at the gift which brought so much pleasure to her Lord. Thus, Mâdri, princess of a higher degree and of royal birth, rejoiced with the Lord who gave away the noble gift. There can be no greater gift than the gift of one's own children.

Just then Sakra, in the form of a Brahman, approached Viswântara the noble King, with the purpose of putting him to the test. "I will beg of him to part with his wife. By this request I shall make it impossible that she should be given away to any one else. For I can give her back to him at the proper moment." Thus in the form of an old Brahman he begged of the king. "Oh king I am old and infirm. I have come here to beg your wife Mâdri. Pray give her to me." "Yesterday I gave my children to a Brahman, how can I give Mâdri to you and be left alone in this forest?" But the next moment he

made up his mind, quickly he took water in a pitcher, and poured it upon his hand and handed over Mâdri to the Brahman. Mâdri, gladly consented to be given away thus. Indra, sang their praise, how noble was the King and how willing was the Queen? Indra was immensely satisfied. It was no more necessary to try them. He gave the queen back to her Lord to be of service to him. Thus leaving the King and his Queen in the hermitage, Indra went back to his Swarga. In course of time, Viswântara was invited back to his land; and his people were reconciled to him. Once again, he lived with his wife and children in his own land and ruled over his people according to his ideal of Dharma, following the path of righteousness and Universal love.

This birth of Viswântara was the last birth of the Bôdhisatva. Thereafter he was born as a Deva in heaven, before he was born in the world as Buddha; in this life of Viswântara the future Buddha, perfected his qualification to be born as the Buddha. Hence it is the last of the closing chapters of the birth stories.

The Buddhist Scripture.

The Sacred Books of the Buddhists are in Pâli language, just as early Sacred Books of the Jains are in Ardhamâghadhi language, a form of Prakritic dialect. The Buddhist Sacred Books consist of three Pitakas or the three baskets, Vinaya Pitaka, Sûtra Pitaka and Abhidhamma Pitaka. The first, Vinaya Pitaka, means discipline-basket. It describes the various rules and injunctions for the Buddhistic Order. These disciplinary principles are to be observed by Bikshus constituting the Sanga, the congregation of ascetics. This Vinaya Pitaka, or the discipline-basket, consists of the following works :—Bikshu Vibhanga Mahâvâgga, Chulla Vâgga and Parivârapatha. The second, Sûtra Pitaka, or the sermon basket, consists of sermons and discourses delivered by Buddha on important philosophical topics. This consists of Digga Nikâya, Majjima Nikâya, Samyukta Nikâya, Anguttara Nikâya and Kuthapa Nikâya. Most of the important works of Buddhist literature belong to the last class. Dhammapada, Thêragâtha, Thêrigâtha, Jâtaka stories, Buddhavamsa, and Chariya Pitaka are some of the important works included in the last class. The third, Abhidhamma Pitaka, mainly deals with metaphysical topics. It is composed of the following works :—Dhammasangani, Vibhanga, Kathavathu, Puggalapannathi etc. The three Pitakas constituting the religious scripture of the Buddhists, have gained such sanctity and importance, as is generally associated with the Vedas of the Hindus.

Ahimsa and Buddhism.

From the above account consisting mainly of extracts from Buddhist literature, it would be quite clear that Buddha laid very great emphasis upon the doctrine of Ahimsa. That is but natural; as a revolt against the vedic ritualism which consisted mainly of animal sacrifice, Buddhism was bound to lay emphasis on Ahimsa. The religion was mainly intended to purify the form of worship and to lay a course of conduct mainly depending upon moral discipline; religious ceremonialism and ritualism were pushed to the background and people were taught that the real religious life consisted in purity of heart. Purity of thought, word, and deed, was presented as the essential ingredient of religious experience. The several Jâtaka Tales, illustrating the conduct of the Bôdhisatva, the future Buddha, are all intended to bring out this aspect of life. It is far better to suffer pain oneself, than to inflict pain on others. Absolute non-violence is presented there, as the creed of life. In successive births, the future Buddha, the Bôdhisatva, disciplined and trained himself by undergoing intense suffering for the future Buddhahood. On several occasions, Buddha himself expressed his ideal in life in unmistakable terms. He was never actuated by any motive of self-interest. He did not hope to become either an Indra, or a Brahma. He did not aspire even for the bliss of Nirvâna for himself. The highest pleasure consisted in removing the misery in others. He never

laid his thought towards individual Moksha. Mass liberation, and promoting the welfare of the whole society, was his object. That was the main theme of his message to mankind. While preaching such a noble doctrine of Ahimsa, it is curious that his religion should be associated with a practice which is an open contradiction and nullification of this Dharma—the practice of flesh eating. Whether Buddha himself permitted such a dietetic violation of the great Dharma, Ahimsa, preached by him it is not possible for us, at this distance of time, to judge accurately. The information that we can get from Buddhist literature is quite conflicting. It is quite possible for us to compile a string of quotations from Buddhist sources to prove that meat eating was permitted among the Bikshus from very early times, even from the time of the very founder of the religion. It is equally possible to compile passages from the same source to prove the opposite. That only shows that there has been no settled policy in this matter. Probably, the Buddhist missionaries, in their proselytising zeal admitted a number of people into the Order without strictly insisting on the doctrine of Ahimsa. The teachers must have been satisfied if the disciples kept the doctrine to this extent “that they do not kill any animal with their own hands.” Ahimsa was thus narrowed down to abstaining from cruelty as far as the person was concerned. To people addicted to a gross form of worshipping the village • Gods and Goddesses by shedding the blood of goats and fowls, abstinence from personal cruelty was considered to be a very wholesome reformation. This was necessarily

the first step in religious conversion. Their heart was set towards the ultimate goal of Ahimsa. The people were weaned from the evil practices and an ignoble religion. Further development in their nature was evidently left to the natural course of things. Those who adopted this new method of life were expected to carry it to its logical conclusion, of their reforming themselves even in the matter of food. Taking purer food must be considered the inevitable result of a purer form of religion.

It is a well-known fact that the religion of Buddhism was not confined to its land of birth. Very early in its career, it spread beyond the borders of Āryāvarta, the land of its birth. Missionaries were sent to far off places beyond the Indian Empire. Ceylon, Tibet, and even distant China, had the privilege of welcoming earnest missionaries from India carrying the torch of Buddhist wisdom. These countries outside India, had never heard of the doctrine of Ahimsa. The people of these lands would not readily accept the Buddhist doctrine of Ahimsa, if the missionaries insisted on a rigorous reformation even in the matter of their diet. Hence, they must have permitted the new converts, to have a certain amount of latitude in the matter of eating. Did not the Master himself emphasize the importance of the middle path? Did he not himself condemn extremes in the matter of religion and morality? Rigorous asceticism, and abstinence from one's own customary practice in the matter of food and clothing, therefore was not to be insisted on. Such must have been the attitude of missionaries who thought that it would be far better to acquaint the foreigners with the value of the

Dharma in its essentials, instead of attempting a wholesale conversion with the chance of having the noble doctrine rejected by these people.

Further, from early times, we have been hearing of a controversy as to this important matter of flesh eating. Even the incident in Buddha's life, his accepting food from a copper smith by name Chanda has been a matter of controversy. The writers who were in favour of meat eating made use of this incident to support their practice. According to their interpretation, the Master accepted *sūkara māmsa* from the hand of this copper smith, and that was the cause of his fatal sickness. The opposite camp, who always insisted on pure food, and who objected to taking flesh, maintain that this was a mischievous invention. The Master who devoted his life to preaching the doctrine of Ahimsa, non-violence even to the tiniest living creature, would not have accepted pork from anybody. The word is wrongly and mischievously translated by selfish people who wanted to invent some justification for their own conduct. The term "*sūkara mada*" does not mean anything more than ordinary rice porridge. Hence it is not proper to drag in the name of the most Exalted One, with the object of justifying an undesirable course of conduct which crept into the Sanga.

While such a controversy was going on within the Buddhist Order, the teachers belonging to the opposite camp and who were probably recruited from non-Aryans, invented doctrines to justify flesh eating. They introduced distinction between *Kalpaya* and *Akalpaya māmsa*, meat that can be accepted, and meat that ought to be rejected, and defined the former as that which was not obtained by killing by

one's own hand nor killed by one's own instruction. Flesh bought from the butcher's meat-stall was considered to be an acceptable food or *Kalpaya māmsa*, and they made out the case that what was rejected by Buddha and what ought to be rejected by his disciples was only *Akalpaya māmsa*, the flesh which ought not to be accepted as food. You should not kill any animal for your food. You should not ask anybody else to kill it for you, nor should you give your consent to any such killing. But meat obtained from meat stalls is just like any other article bought from the market. You are not a party to the killing of the animal from which meat was obtained. Hence, there is no responsibility on your side. Such *Kalpaya māmsa* can very well be accepted by a very pious Buddhist.

But even such a doctrine invented by the Buddhist teachers, probably recruited from the non-Aryan classes, was not meekly accepted by all. This would be evident from the following passages taken from *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. "Oh wise man, there is no such thing as acceptable flesh which may be described as not directly procured, not caused to be procured, and therefore which I may order for the disciples. In future, there will arise in my Sanga, some putting on a garb of a monk, and having pledged to follow the Dharma of Sākyaputra, putting on a red robe of Buddhist Bikshu, will be bent upon deluding the people to bodily pleasures. They will have many false notions in their minds, and preach false rules of conduct. With the object of satisfying their own tastes they will compile books inventing false arguments justifying flesh-eating. They will introduce doctrines which I have never

preached, ideas in support of their habit of flesh-eating. They will even go to the length of saying that I have permitted it and that I have included it among the accepted food. They will even say that myself have eaten such flesh. But Oh wise man, I have never ordered flesh-eating in any Sûtra, nor did I include it among the proper and acceptable food." Again, in this following passage from the same Lankâvatâra Sûtra, "Oh wise men ! Aryasrâvakas, do not even take the natural human diet. How can they eat the detestable flesh and blood. My disciples are followers of truth and so are the self-intelligent ones ; they are not flesh-eaters. Such were the Thathagatha's version. Thathagathas have truths as their body. They lived on truth. They do not sustain their body with flesh. They never eat any flesh. They are free from all the defects that cause misery. They look towards all the creatures as their own sons. They are by nature very compassionate. In the same way I also treat all creatures as my own children. Then how can I order my disciples to eat the flesh of my own sons and how can I myself eat it ? There is no truth in this, that I order my disciples to eat flesh and that I have myself eaten the same."

This Lankâvatâra Sûtra since it is composed in Sanskrit is evidently intended as a protest against the several Pâli works which attempted to justify flesh eating. It is not possible for us to decide in one way this question. What was the original intention of the founder of the religion, what was his own custom in this matter, and how this practice crept into the Sanga, and why it was justified by some writers of importance are questions which ought to be decided by Buddhist

scholars from within the fold. Any dogmatic assertion on this point by a non-Buddhist will at the most be a plausible conjecture.

Leaving this controversy to be settled by learned scholars among the Buddhists, it is enough to point out here that in the Tamil land, about the composition of the work under discussion, Neelakesi and of Kundalakesi of which this is intended to be a refutation, the practice must have been quite common among the Buddhists. The elaborate arguments in defence of flesh-eating adduced by Kundalakesi, and stoutly rejected by Neelakesi, all point out to the prevalence of that habit among the Buddhist Bikshus and the staunch faith that they must have had in their own correctness of conduct. For, otherwise, we cannot find any explanation for the amount of space and the number of arguments introduced in Neelakesi to disprove the Buddhist point of view. The main theme of Neelakesi appears to be this, that one who accepts the religious doctrine of Ahimsa must directly and logically carry it out in personal conduct, by rejecting flesh-eating. Otherwise it will mean merely accepting the letter of law and rejecting the spirit of it. The doctrine will be inconsistent with itself if associated with such a practice. That seems to be the main theme of Neelakesi, and it is with this object that nearly half the portion of the book is devoted to the examination of Buddhism. The final conclusion itself confirms this suggestion. Neelakesi while taking leave of Buddha states thus:—"You are good enough to preach the doctrine of Ahimsa. If you would only preach also against meat-eating you will fully justify

your claim to be one of the noblest and the most benevolent teachers of mankind. Then you will justify your claim that you are actuated by Universal love and mercy to all living creatures. So long as you permit meat-eating and thus indirectly accept killing, you can in no way claim to be the author of a religion preaching Universal love and mercy towards all living creatures." Such a defence of Ahimsa seems to be the message of Neelakesi when she criticises Buddhism and other Darsanas.

SECTION IV.

Summary of the Book.

CHAPTER I.

Dharma Urai or The Preaching of Dharma.

The scene is laid in Pāñchāladesa which is described by the author in beautiful stanzas. The king of the land is one Samudra Sâra whose capital was Pundravardhana. In the outskirts of this city is the cremation ground called Palâlaya. In this cremation ground is situated a Kâli temple. Close by stays a Jina Muni by name Muni Chandra. He has evidently chosen that abode during the *Châturmâsya*. One day the people of the city bring a number of animals to be slaughtered at the Kâli temple. The Jina Muni, being a follower of Ahimsa Dharma, is shocked at the sight of the numerous sacrificial victims and questions the people as to the reason for bringing in so many animals for sacrifice. The worshippers explain to the Yôgi that they have to perform this sacrifice as thanks-offering to the Goddess, because of the birth of an heir to the throne, through the blessings of the Goddess. But Muni Chandra, explains to the people that the birth of anybody is conditioned by the previous karma of the soul that enters into birth. Hence, birth which is the inevitable result of one's own karma cannot be attributed to the intervention of the Goddess. Further, even if it is supposed to have had some beneficial effect on the birth of an heir to the King, the Goddess would be completely satisfied if instead of killing all these

animals, clay models of these are offered as thanks-offerings. "This method of worship will fully express your gratefulness and piety without involving bloodshed which would result in the loss of life of so many animals and acquisition of sin to so many of you. This would be a purer form of worship which would be satisfactory to all concerned."

When Muni Chandra presented this higher form of religious worship to the townspeople, they were naturally attracted by the purity and nobility of the religious ideal presented to them, and accordingly released all the animals brought for sacrifice; and the worshippers returned home with a purer heart and nobler ideal of religious worship. This presentation of Ahimsa Dharma to the people who came to worship and the consequent liberation of animals brought for sacrifice naturally displeased the Goddess Kâli who wanted to devise some method of punishing the Jaina Muni for his interference in her worship. She herself was powerless to take action against the Yôgi and therefore sought the help of the great Neelakesi of the South who evidently occupied the place of leadership among the minor deities. She readily responded to the appeal and started on her mission towards the North. Reaching the cremation ground, the residence of Muni Chandra, the Kâli chief Neelakesi created terrific things around the Yôgi in order to frighten him away from the place. This act of hers made no impression on the Muni who remained in Yôgie contemplation quite undisturbed. Defeated in her attempts to cow down the ascetic, Neelakesi adopted a more subtle method. She assumed the form of the

princess Kâmaleka, the daughter of the king of the place. Assuming this beautiful form, adorned with the best of jewels, she appeared before Muni Chandra, and began to flirt with him with the object of disturbing his *tapas* and thus weakening his soul force. But it was easy for him to see through the disguise. He told her at once, that she was not the princess which she pretended to be, and frankly told her that she was none else but the Kâli Neelakesi. Entirely failing in her attempts to disturb the Yôgi from his contemplation and soul power, and struck with the marvellous Yôgic knowledge in discovering her true nature, she assumed apologetic tone and confessed to him how she was defeated in her mission by his own Yôgic strength. She further begged of him to be initiated into true Dharma which gave him so much strength of soul and peace of mind in the midst of extremely adverse environments.

Then Muni Chandra willingly consents to impart the knowledge of Dharma to Neelakesi who now becomes a docile and willing disciple at the feet of the Yôgi. Then he expounds to her the nature of *Samsâra*, the pain and misery which invariably dog the footsteps of the living beings in *Samsâra*, the panacea that will cure the ills of life and the greatness of this cure—all in detail. He begins his discourse with a description of the Jaina cosmology which is more or less akin to Dante's. The structure of the world into three main divisions, the lower, the middle and the higher, is the frame-work of this cosmology. The lower one is divided into seven successive regions one below the other and these

constitute the seven regions of the Hell. Below the seventh at the bottom is the region of super-hell or *Nigodha*. This represents the region from which lives have no chance of escape. But the residents of the seven different regions of hell have ultimately the chance of coming back to the world *Madhyaloka* after eating the fruits of their past karma which led them to the various hell regions according to the magnitude of their sins. Above these regions of hell is *Madhyaloka* which is the abode of human beings and lower animals. Here the author describes the various kinds of animals, birds, insects which are classified into distinct biological groups based upon the number of sense-organs possessed by them. This classification of living beings according to the number of sense-organs possessed by them is the peculiar biological doctrine of the Jainas. This classification is also found in the Tamil work on Grammar *Tholkappiam* from which evidently the present author has adapted. Above this *Madhyaloka*, the middle world is situated, and the various higher regions called *Devaloka* which are described in detail by Muni Chandra for the benefit of Neelakesi. The term *Samsāra* includes all the three great regions, the lower world consisting the regions of hell, the middle world the abode of men and animals and *Devaloka* the abode of various Devas. The inhabitants of these regions are subject to transmigration according to their conduct in life and final release can only be expected in *Madhyaloka*. Even here certain geographical regions are marked out as Karma Bhūmis where alone there is the necessary environment for the performance of *tapas* and destruction of karmas. In this scheme of life Neelakesi the

Goddess of Evil is shown her own place and function which is certainly much inferior to that occupied by the various Devas. She being the head of the forces of evil is despised by the good though feared by the ordinary. Her conduct would only tighten the chains of bondage to Samsâra the escape from which is the aspiration of every good soul.

Then he describes the great cure for the misery of Samsâra. This consists of the three ingredients, of heavenly elixir, right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. These constitute the means of liberation. It is this triad that forms the Môkshamârga. This great panacea to cure the misery of Samsâra is revealed for the benefit of mankind by the all-knowing and all-merciful Lord Jina; to adopt the Dharma of universal love and to live accordingly in such a way as to avoid pain to other living beings through mind, word, or deed is the path of supreme mercy which would lead to the higher happiness consequent of perfect liberation from karma. When she heard this path of universal love described by Muni Chandra, Neelakesi became quite disgusted with her past conduct and was filled with remorse and repentance. Nevertheless being fortunate in coming across this great Muni Chandra who is responsible for the falling of the scales from her eyes she sings in devotion to the glory of Dharma and the all-merciful and all-knowing Lord who revealed the same to mankind. As a mark of gratitude she devoted the rest of her life to the propagation of this Ahimsa Dharma, the Religion of universal love.

CHAPTER II.

Kundalakesi Vada.

After worshipping in the Jinâlaya Neelakesi decides to go about on propaganda work relating to her newly-acquired Dharma. She chooses first Buddhism for her attack, for, Buddhism, in her opinion, is opposed to Jina Dharma for the following reasons :—It encourages meat-eating, secondly it preaches that there is no soul, and thirdly it is indifferent to religious discipline. Hence this must be first attacked. She learns therefore through her *clairvoyance* about Kundalakesi's mission on behalf of Buddhism.

Just at that time Kundalakesi was at Campili, the capital of South Pâncâlâ. There she established in front of the city gate a branch of the rose apple tree, the symbol of religious challenge. The King and people of Campili were not prepared to accept this challenge and hence they were confined within their own homes. The city presented a deserted appearance on this account; when Neelakesi went there she found from the sentinel of the gate the reasons for such a deserted appearance of the city. Through the sentinel, she sent word to the king that she would accept the challenge and meet Kundalakesi in debate. The king and the people were glad to welcome this offer, and the debate was arranged in the royal hall before the king himself. Kundalakesi insisted on some kind of

reward to the victor in the debate, and some kind of punishment for the defeated. This was accepted by all there as a reasonable proposal.

Then Kundalakesi began expounding the fundamental doctrines of her religion, *Āpta*, *Āgama*, *Palārtha* and *Pravritti*. First, we have the description of the Lord Buddha, "Supreme from the beginning of the world, wandering through *Samsāra* for several *kalpas*, for the welfare of others, preaching Bauddha Dharma to the people, having no thought of his own good, and saviour of all those who accepted his message—Buddha is the Lord of our religion. The three *Pitakas* revealed by him constitute our Scripture. The five *Skandus* are the elements out of which the cosmos is built. These cosmic elements, because of their momentary existence, indicate the momentariness and unreality of the world as a whole." Thus, in short, is the exposition of Buddhism by Kundalakesi. Then Neelakesi begins to examine these doctrines in detail. If Lord Buddha is supreme and perfect from the very beginning, why should he wander about in *Samsāra* for a hundred thousand *kalpas*? If perfect from the beginning what has he obtained by his career in *Samsāra*? To be caught in the wheels of *Samsāra* is the result of previous karma. Hence Buddha's wandering in *Samsāra*—Is it due to his previous karma? If it is due to previous karma how can he be called perfect from the very beginning? If it is said that he did all these things for the benefit of mankind thoroughly selfless in himself, then why did he not complete in his mission? Why did he attain the Bodhihood leaving

behind several millions of souls still caught in *Samsâric* cyclone? These are some of the objections raised by Neelakesi as to the nature of the founder of Buddhism. The Scripture which he gave out to the world is similarly criticised. While preaching mercy to all living beings, it did not condemn flesh-eating. While this is incompatible with the doctrine of mercy, it actively encouraged this. Again, while preaching ethical conduct or *Silâchara* it rejects the doctrine of *Atma*. There is no meaning in insisting on moral life while rejecting the very basis of morality, the existence of *Atma*. Hence it is pointed out that it is defective in very many ways.

Next, the doctrine of Skandas and their momentariness are taken up for criticism. According to *Kshanabangharâda* each element in a series completely dies out before the next comes into existence. According to this doctrine of the Buddhists the occurrence of an event is absolutely unconnected with the antecedent conditions. This is the doctrine known as *Asatkâryarâda*. The effect originates from nothing. If the effect comes out of nothing and is unconditioned by the antecedent cause, then it is quite possible to think of the occurrence of any non-existent thing such as *Akâsapushpa*. If it is accounted for by postulating the principle of *Vâsana* as a connecting link between the antecedent and the consequent it would be merely postulating a sort of permanent condition throughout the series. It is merely another name for something which persists throughout the series and thus it would be incompatible with the doctrine of momentariness and the general *Nihilism*.

Finally Kundalakesi giving up the philosophical standpoint, takes her stand on the several noble qualities of the Buddha, related to his previous life as Bôdhisatva. As Bôdhistava in various previous births, he offered as gifts everything that was asked of him including his own head, eyes, flesh and blood of his body. He even gave his own sons as slaves to one who begged of him for domestic slaves. These gifts were narrated by Kundalakesi indicating the magnanimity and the nobility of Lord Buddha. Neelakesi easily points out that such gifts were useless and absurd. Magnanimous gifts to those that beg of you must be of some service to the persons who receive the gifts. For a headless trunk to go to the Bôdhisatva and ask for his head is primarily meaningless and impossible. It cannot live much less speak; and to satisfy this headless trunk by severing his own head does not indicate the wisdom of the giver. The various gifts narrated by Kundalakesi are of a similar type, therefore utterly useless to the receiver and perfectly meaningless to the giver. Kundalakesi, has suggested that it is a method of testing the worth of the Bôdhisatva by Indra, the Lord of the Deva. Even here Neelakesi points out that it is not necessary to have such repeated tests to discover the worth of the Bôdhisatva. Indra, as the chief of the Devas, must easily discover the greatness of the Bôdhisatva without subjecting him to such cruel tests. Thus every act of mercy, mentioned by Kundalakesi as indicative of the greatness of the Bôdhisatva, is rejected as meaningless and absurd by Neelakesi. Finally Kundalakesi remains dum-founded, unable to meet the objections raised by Neelakesi, which is

interpreted by the king and audience as confession of defeat. Kundalakesi is sent away in disgrace by the King and Neelakesi is praised for her ability in establishing the Dharma. Towards the close of the debate Neelakesi obtains information about Kundalakesi's teacher one Arkachandra whom she wants to tackle next.

CHAPTER III.

Arkachandra Vada.

The scene next shifts to Ujjain. Neelakesi meets Arkachandra a great Buddhist teacher who is known as the tiger among the debators. The topic of discussion with him is the ethical code described by Buddhism according to Vinaya Pitaka, the moral literature of the Buddhists. Neelakesi points out the great discrepancy that exists between the ideal of Buddhist ethics and the actual course of conduct adopted by the followers of Buddhism. It is impossible to put into practice some of these ideals. The several stories of the Jâtaka Tales which present the conduct of the Bôdhisatva even in parting with his own wife and children as gifts to the beggars naturally indicate the moral ideal of parting with anything and everything that is requested of him ; and yet no sane Bodhist would ever adopt such a course of conduct and give away his wife as gift if he is requested for such a gift. Next Neelakesi points out several corrupt practices that have entered into the Buddhist Sanga.

Singadatta Sthavira, a Buddhist monk, once met a female ascetic within the precincts of the Buddhist temple and made overtures to her by making indecent assault. When she objected to his behaviour as they were in the temple precincts he was said to have answered the objection by saying that for the ascetics, "the temple was as good as any other place for sexual intercourse." Another story relating to one Mahanâr

another Buddhist monk, is that one night he went out in disguise from the Sanga to have his nocturnal escapade. Seeing a dead body of a woman on a pial he had intercourse with the corpse, and when questioned by his comrades later as to the absurdity of his having intercourse with the corpse, he answered them by saying "Why talk of corpse, every person must be a corpse according to the doctrine of *Anâtmarâda*."

Similarly another story is narrated. When a Buddhist monk tried to have intercourse with a female ascetic she questioned his conduct as inconsistent with the Buddhist code of morals. To this objection the ascetic replied that there were two distinct codes of conduct, one based upon popular opinion and the other on the absolute Dharma. Non-violence, Truthfulness, Chastity etc., were all based upon merely public opinion, and no kind of religious principle was involved. Hence these were not of such great importance as the second kind; violation of these would not mean breach of any great spiritual principle; and these instances, probably taken out from Buddhist stories, would indicate looseness of conduct within the Buddhist Sanga during a period of moral degeneration. Evidently, during such a degenerate period several exceptions were allowed as an escape from rigorous moral discipline of an earlier period. Hence the Buddhist monks of that period must have by a sort of convention accepted some case of exceptions where they could indulge in sexual intercourse without violating the commandment about adultery. Eighteen such exceptions are mentioned by Neelakesi. Next, she points out the elaborate

paraphernalia of a Buddhist monk ; that he has to equip himself with several things for his own convenience which an ascetic need not possess. Further, contradictions in Buddhism are pointed out. Buddhism preaches mercy and love to all living creatures but encourages meat-eating ; enjoins a strict ethical code as a means of salvation and yet upholds the philosophical doctrine of *Sūnyarāda* ; preaches the doctrine that everything that exists is impure and yet enjoins worship of Buddha with flowers and other puja materials ; preaches that everything is impermanent and vanishing and yet elaborately builds huge edifices as temples and monasteries ; preaches the doctrine of non-existence of soul, and yet narrates the previous births of the Buddha in the Jātaka Tales ; preaches the brotherly love for all living beings and yet would eat these very brothers without compunction. In the various Jātaka Tales Buddha is described as having lived in the forms of various animals and birds. Buddhist art in representing this Jātaka Tales in the form of painting and sculpture depicts the Bôdhisatva in different forms of animals and birds. The Buddhists venerate these figures and even offer worship to these as forms of Buddha. Still neither affection nor veneration would stand in their way whenever they desire the flesh of the very same animals and birds for the purposes of eating. When these contradictions were pointed out to Arkachandra he had no satisfactory answer to meet these objections. He had to admit the points of criticism and acknowledge the defects within the Buddhist Order. He had to realise that the Buddhistic doctrine of *Ahimsa* was, in reality, a

lip-service, and the Buddhist code of morals and the doctrine of salvation had no significance when the fundamental basis, the "Ātman" had no reality. Hence he willingly accepted the Jina Dharma presented by Neelakesi, the Dharma based upon genuine doctrine of *Ahimsa* and which accepted the fundamental basis of the "Ātman" without which neither Mōksha, nor Mōkshamārga could have any meaning; and thus offering as a gift to Arkachandra the three jewels of Right Faith, Right Knowledge, and Right Conduct, Neelakesi takes leave of him.

CHAPTER IV.

Mokkalavada.

Neelakesi next goes to Padmapura to meet Makkala. Makkala or Makkalana, was one of the two prominent disciples of Buddha. Makkalana and Sâriputra were early leaders of Buddhist Sanga. In this chapter, some of the important topics of Buddhist philosophy are introduced. The major portion of the section is devoted to answering the criticism passed by the Buddhist writers on Jaina doctrines. Probably these criticisms were found in the lost work of Kundalakesi to which we have various references in this chapter. The apparent difference between the Buddhist ascetic and the Jaina ascetic is the elaborate dress-making of the former. Neelakesi points out the inconsistency of his conduct with the ideal of *tapas*. A complete renunciation of the world need not be draped in elaborately stitched dress worn by the Buddhist *Bikshus*. According to the Buddhist Order originally organised, the *Bikshu* was enjoined to make a dress to cover his nudity by picking up rags and stitching them into the covering for the body. This original injunction was interpreted later on, in such a way, that even when the *Bikshus* had new clothes presented to them by the house-holders they had to tear them into small pieces and stitch them together into a dress in order to be in conformity with the early injunction. This practice meant that every *Bikshu* should acquaint himself with the art of

tailoring. Not only this, they should also learn the practice of dyeing their clothes, because they were in the habit of using red-coloured clothes. Thus Neelakesi ridicules their renunciation of householder's life while even as *Bikshus* they had to maintain all this paraphernalia of the house-holder. This ridicule roused Mokkala's wrath. "I have defeated in debate one Irania. You have also come here, and your fate will not be far different from that person. You are certainly going to be routed in this religious debate." In reply to this, Neelakesi says "You boast of having defeated one opponent whereas I have silenced two, Kundalakesi and Arkachandra. I am not at all afraid of meeting you in religious debate." When the name of Kundalakesi was mentioned by Neelakesi, Mokkala could not believe it; for she defeated in open debate the Vedic religionists as well as the Ārhatas. The latter was represented by one Nāthagupta who was completely defeated by Kundalakesi in the city of Avana. Hearing this, Neelakesi challenges Mokkala to state the very arguments used by Kundalakesi in defeating Nāthagupta, and she hopes to answer all these to the entire satisfaction of Mokkala.

Then Mokkala narrates the various categories according to the Jaina philosophy such as Dharma, Adharma, Kāla, Ākāśa, Jīva, Pudgala, Punya, Pāpa, Bhandā and Mōksha—the principle of Motion, the principle of Rest, Time, Space, Soul, Matter, Virtue, Vice, Bondage and Liberation respectively. These categories were evidently criticised by Kundalakesi when she met the Jaina teacher Nāthagupta. Mokkala gives a resume of these criticisms which Neelakesi

takes up for examination. Since there was no criticism as to the nature of Lord Jina, Neelakesi leaves the topic alone.

The nature of Dharma and Adharma is generally misunderstood by the non-Jaina critics. These two categories hold a unique place in Jaina cosmology. These two are among the five constituent elements of the world—the five *Astikāyas*, the other three being Space, Matter and Soul. Dharma the principle of Motion, and Adharma the principle of Rest, are included by the Jaina thinkers as necessary elements in the cosmos without which there could be no cosmic structure. Dharma, the principle of Motion, is a necessary condition for the motion of matter and soul. The function of this principle of Motion is only secondary, and is compared to water in the ocean to enable the ships to move, while the actual motion of the ship is due to air propulsion of the sails. While the actual motive power is due to something else, this Dharma, the principle of motion, indirectly makes that motion possible. Similarly, the opposite principle of Adharma indirectly helps the moving objects to come to rest, while the arrest of motion must be due to some other factor. Non-Jaina critics generally misunderstand the function of these two principles and confound them with active forces that are responsible for motion or rest. What is the utility of these indirect categories endowed with such dubious functions? The Jaina answer to this is, that unless these categories are postulated the cosmos will not be able to preserve its structure. The atoms of matter and the souls will get dissipated and

spread over throughout infinite space and there will be no demarcation between the world and the beyond.

After expounding the nature of these two categories Neelakesi indulges in a sort of *argumentum ad hominem*. "The ultimate reals for the Buddhists are only the five Skandas, and yet you speak of the world with its boundary as distinct from the Devalokas and Hells. You deny the existence of Time as an independent category, and yet you speak of moments and kalpas. You deny the reality of heavenly bodies (Sun, Moon and Planets), and you deny the category of Time and yet accept the science of Astrology and the results of astrological calculations. You deny the existence of Soul according to your *Anâtma* doctrine. You challenge your opponent to show the *Pramâna* by which he accepts Soul as reality. You recognise only two *Pramânas*, Pratyaksha and Anumâna. Agama for you has no validity. Hence you invite your opponent to establish the doctrine of the reality of *Âtma* either through perception or inference. Since neither of these two *Pramânas* is able to establish the reality of the *Âtman* you conclude that it has no existence. You entirely forget that your own category *Vignânaskanda* is in the same boat as your opponent's *Âtman*. What are the *Pramânas* according to which you establish the reality of this *Vignânaskanda*? If you say that your internal perception—I know, I perceive—*Jânâmi*, *Pasyâmi*, indicates the reality of *Vignânaskanda*, the same inner perception also guarantees the existence of *Âtman*. If you condemn the knowledge of *Self* coming by introspection as an illusion, the same condemnation will also apply to *Vignânaskanda*.

If you say that sense-perception reveals only physical objects and not souls which are accepted on the strength of Scripture (which is not recognised by the Buddhists) then what do you say to your own beliefs as to the existence of Devâs, Indra and Swargâ? You freely refer to these entities and yet you must accept that they are not revealed either by sense-perception or by inferential knowledge. If you reject the acceptance of *Ātma* because it is not made evident by sense-perception, for the same reason you must reject the reality of Devâs and Swargâs. If you justify your belief in these on the ground that they are mentioned in your religious scripture and therefore must be accepted, for the same reason you have to accept the reality of *Ātma* which is implicitly assumed in your Sacred literature of Jâtaka Tales describing the previous births of Buddha."

The next topic of debate is the Jaina doctrine—that the soul in as much as it fills up the body it assumes just the same size as the body. This refers to an embodied Soul. This doctrine is intended to correct the error involved in describing the *Ātman*, as an atom located somewhere in the heart of the body. Since the *Ātma* alone is the *Chêtana* principle, and the body being purely physical, the living being must have consciousness confined to some tiny portion of the body and the rest of the body must be quite incapable of having any sort of awareness. In order to avoid this contingency the Jaina philosophy maintains the doctrine that the soul completely fills the body, and there is no portion in the body without awareness; the

soul being non-material spiritual principle there is no contradiction in this doctrine and yet it is very often criticised by the opponents as a doctrine impossible to be conceived. If the soul can be contained in the body, you might as well argue that one pot can be contained in another pot of equal size. This is the Buddhist argument that is next examined by Neelakesi. After disposing of the criticism, by pointing out that one is spiritual and non-corporeal, and the other is purely physical, and hence the one being present in the other does not involve any contradiction, she turns to the Buddhist doctrine of *Vignânaskanda*; the sensation of touch which is accepted as a form of *Vignâaskanda* by Buddhists is recognised to be present throughout the body and its relation to the body is exactly similar to the relation between Soul and body. If it is possible for *Vignânaskanda* to be present throughout the body then the Soul also can do so without any difficulty. Hence you have to recognise that your criticism is distinctly suicidal. The next doctrine criticised by the Buddhists is the inter-action between the Soul and body. If the Soul is *Chêtana*, spiritual principle, and if the body is purely material *Achêtana* substance, the inter-action of the two in *Samsâra* introduces a mysterious problem. When the nature of the one is directly opposed to that of the other, then how could there be any inter-relation between the two? Why should any injury to the body be experienced as pain by the Soul? It is as absurd as the statement that the ox broke its leg and the ass became lame. Neelakesi easily points out that this is just the criticism, which is passed on the Buddhist doctrine of the momentariness of the Skandas; the

Buddhist philosophy recognises four Skandas—Vēdana, Vignāna, Sajna and Samskāra as elements of consciousness ; and yet these are described as absolutely unconnected with one another each to be shut up in its own momentary existence ; and yet human conduct is to be explained with reference to these unrelated elements of consciousness.

You falsely accuse us of a doctrine which does not belong to us. You make us say that *Gnāna* and *Ātma* are entirely distinct, and that experience of knowing or feeling is the result of the combination of *Gnāna* and *Ātma*. This is certainly not a Jaina doctrine. We never take these two as distinct. For us there is no *Ātma* devoid of *Gnāna* ; for such an entity would not be different from *Achētana* matter. Again, you falsely attribute to us the Sāṅkhya doctrine of Samsāra Jīva according to which, the Chētana Purusha, being inactive, has to be carried on the shoulders of the blind but active *Prakriti*. For us Purusha is not only endowed with *Gnāna*, he is also an active entity ; and hence need not require any other vehicle. Similarly, you foist on us another doctrine which does not belong to our school of thought, and you begin to criticise the same. In order to disprove the existence of the Ātman, you present the following dilemma. If a person, on account of his meritorious conduct in the world, goes to Swarga to enjoy the happiness and his fruits of his past conduct in the same form as man, then he will have no chance of escaping from his manhood. If he goes to Swarga in the form of a Deva, then he is a different person altogether and the man who is responsible for the Karma is different

from the person who enjoys the fruits thereof. This is just the argument which the Jaina philosophers cast before the Non-Jaina thinkers. In fact, this is just the sort of criticism which is passed on the Buddhist doctrine of *Kṣhṇabhāṅgarāda*. According to this, the person who is responsible for the conduct, vanishes completely before the appearance of the enjoyer of the fruits thereof; and there is no ethical justification for this doctrine. You completely pass on your own defect to us not knowing the real nature of our doctrine. Your criticism is equally applicable to a philosophy which believes in the absolute unchangingness of the reals. Only in that case you can state that the person who acts goes to Swarga in absolutely the same form. But with us, all things including Ātma must undergo change while retaining its essential identity. Identity in the midst of change is our philosophical doctrine. Hence, your criticism becomes quite irrelevant, as far as our philosophical position is concerned.

The next topic is about the doctrine of causation. The Buddhist conception of cause, to be consistent with the doctrine of momentariness, is interpreted in a similar way. There is no inter-action between the cause and the effect. The cause would entirely disappear before the occurrence of the effect. This doctrine, known as *Asatkāryavāda*, is generally criticised by the opponents of Buddhism. The Jaina doctrine of causation is quite different from that of the Buddhists. The Jaina interpretation of causation is exactly similar to their doctrine of reality, as a permanent entity in the midst of change. Therefore the effect is identical with the cause, in as much as it is a development

of the cause, and yet different from the cause, for the same reason, that it is evolved out of the cause. Buddhist criticism of this doctrine is as follows. "If you say that the cause must be present in order to produce the effect, then the person who builds the temple out of devotion, must immediately enjoy the fruits thereof in the form of happiness and Swarga. If you say, that the fruits will appear later on, then, since the cause of condition will disappear by that time, there is no chance of its producing the necessary effect."

This criticism of *Satkāryavāda* is also shown by Neelakesi to be quite beside the point. It would be alright in the case of one who holds the doctrine of unchanging permanency of the reals. The operation of the cause, according to the Jaina doctrine, is a process of duration in time and hence though the fruit appears much later in time, the cause must be assumed throughout the intervening period. For how can we interpret the action of medicine taken by a sick man and the cure effected after the lapse of weeks? This continuous operation of the causal condition is certainly consistent with the Jaina doctrine of permanence through change. Though the cause, as operative principle, undergoes change, it does not lose its essence just as the substance gold will retain its true nature of gold though it may be used for making different ornaments. One ornament may be changed into another and that into a third, and thus there may be different modifications in the ornaments, one being melted, and the other being newly made, and yet it is the same substance gold that persists throughout these changing modifications; and this is the bed-rock

of the Jaina Metaphysics which all alien criticisms ineffectively knock against.

The next topic of criticism is the Jaina conception of *Tapas* or *Yôga*. *Tapas* or *Yôga*, in principle, is to maintain one's *Dyâna* or concentration in utter defiance of the environment. The inclemency of the weather, the presence of things in the environment which may cause pain and suffering and all such unwelcome things in the environment are practically non-existent for one who is in his *yôga Dyâna*. This indifference to the environment and treating petty suffering due to them as if it were not in existence, is exaggerated by the Buddhist critic. If pain is the result of petty previous karma, *tapas* involves pain; then one who performs *tapas* is only enjoying the painful fruit of his previous bad karma. What good are you going to derive by this kind of self-imposed pain and misery? Neelakesi easily answers this criticism. The pain and suffering that may be present in the case of a *Yôgi*, even if they are taken as such, are only incidental. At the most, the unpleasantness would be analogous to the experience of unpleasantness of medicine taken by a sick man. It is incidental to the means intended for a higher purpose. But, as a matter of fact, one who performs *tapas* and one who is lost in his *Dyâna* and contemplation is not likely to feel any pain at all on account of the environment. For the concentration consists in completely cutting off all the contacts with the environment. If the environment has no action on the *Yôgi* there will be no reaction of pain. If you object to this petty misery which you assume to be experienced by a *tapasi*, what have you to say to your own ethical

discipline described under the code Tuthânga. Tuthânga discipline, is exactly parallel to the Yôgic discipline contemplated in Jaina ethics. Further, it is nothing compared to the voluntary suffering associated with Buddha such as giving away one's own eye and head as gifts to beggars, tearing one's own body into halves, one half to be given as a gift, and letting out blood to satisfy the thirst for blood and such other absurd examples of conduct associated with horrid forms of suffering and pain.

Associated with this doctrine of *tapas*, there is also the Jaina doctrine of *Sallêkhana* which is very often misunderstood and wrongly criticised by the Non-Jaina thinkers. Similarly, there is false criticism of this practice from the Buddhist side and a vindication of the same by Neelakesi. This *Sallêkhana Vrata* is taken by persons who are in the jaws of death, and who find no escape therefrom. When they realise that they have only a short span of life in this world, after realising that they are not going to be saved from the jaws of death, they take a vow that they will not take any more care about their worldly possessions including their own body, in order to spend the remaining valuable short span of life in devotion and worship and purifying of heart, and not to be worried by anything else. This *Sallêkhana* is very often misinterpreted as meaningless starvation to death, or as killing oneself—a conduct which is quite inconsistent with the principle of Ahimsa. While preaching mercy and love to all living creatures, inflicting pain or himsa on oneself will certainly be an inconsistent course of conduct. But *Sallêkhana* is not such a voluntary pain on oneself as an end in itself. On the other hand, it is

just an attempt to better one's own spiritual condition when the end is realised as inevitable.

Similarly, Neelakesi answers the several charges brought against the Jaina doctrine of Brahmacharya, Truth-speaking etc., and points out that the Buddhist critic is more intent on abusing the Jaina monks than passing a fair criticism. The attention of the Buddhist is turned to the inconsistent doctrine of *Kalpyamāmsa* which the Buddhist is permitted to eat; the Buddhist admits that it is improper to kill; but why should this lead to the rejection of flesh-eating? This objection is met by Neelakesi by enunciating the principle of *Kāranāthpāpam*, the indirect relation to sin. The Buddhist accepts the same principle as far as merit is concerned. Going round the Bodhi tree, and worshipping the same, is justified by the Buddhist as a meritorious action because of its indirect relation to the Buddha himself. If merit is brought by this indirect relation, similarly de-merit also must be caused by such an indirect relation. Just as the worshipping of the Bodhi tree will direct your attention to Buddha himself, so also the eating of flesh, will direct your attention to the method of procuring flesh. The Buddhist turns round and says, "if you object to our eating flesh because it may involve killing, how do you justify your own conduct in carrying peacock feathers which may also be due to the killing of peacock." Neelakesi answers this criticism, by saying, the peacock periodically sheds off its feathers and these are picked up by persons who offer them for sale. Hence no killing is involved in carrying peacock feathers. Further, there is an injunction imposed upon the Jaina

ascetic, that if he suspects that the feathers are being violently plucked off from the bird he should reject them by carefully noticing whether there is any trace of blood in the stock. Again, our ascetics carry peacock feathers merely as a means of protecting the minor insects, not for the purpose of satisfying one's own hunger for flesh. Hence there is no parallel between the two. Flesh is obtained by killing, and is used for selfish satisfaction. Peacock feathers do not involve killing, and the use to which they are put, is the noble object of protecting the minute living beings.

The Buddhist, in his anxiety, to defend his conduct of flesh-eating, here adduces a very strange argument. Killing may be admitted as a mistake since it involves Himsa. But the process of killing as an effect must naturally pre-suppose as its antecedent causal condition, not only the person who kills but also the animal that is killed, for, without the latter there could be no killing at all. If the effect of killing is really sinful, the sin must be shared by both the causal factors, the killer and the killed. This sophistry is easily met by Neelakesi. By the same logic, you might apportion the evil of killing to the several instruments used for killing. No doubt, strictly from the logical point of view, these instruments employed for killing form the necessary part of the causal condition though only a minor part. But, nobody speaks of their responsibility in the act of killing. Moral responsibility, has meaning only in the case of a person, and even in his case, only when he wills the act. Wherever there is the voluntary attempt to realise the end there you apportion moral responsibility for the act. Hence it is extremely absurd to suggest that the animal

killed also shares the responsibility, for, no animal will ever desire its own death.

Again, in order to establish that eating of flesh has nothing to do with the killing of animal, the Buddhist brings in an argument of analogy. A person wantonly demolishes a temple. It may certainly involve moral turpitude of conduct. Another person, out of piety, builds up a temple out of the debris available to him by the sinful conduct of the former. Do you mean to say that the latter also shares the sin of the former when the latter raises a temple out of piety? Here also Neelakesi points out that the analogy is quite irrelevant and erroneous. In the case of your illustration, the person who raises the temple certainly does not approve of the conduct of the earlier mischief-monger and shows his disapproval by restoring the temple. But, in your case of flesh-eating, there is no such disapproval of the conduct of the person who kills. On the other hand, the flesh-eater implicitly approves of killing. Secondly, the restorer of the temple, rectifies the mischief committed by the former person and the temple is repaired. Whereas, in your case, the analogy would be quite valid if your conduct results in restoring the dead animal to life. But, on the other hand, you make use of the flesh for your own selfish purpose.

Again the Buddhist brings in another analogy to contend against the argument *Kāranāthpāpam*. If the moral element in the cause, or the effect is to be taken reciprocally you might as well argue that the sin committed by the son goes to the father. Neelakesi's answer to this is: The analogy which you bring in, is not quite so absurd as you imagine it to be. If the father connives at his

son's misconduct and thus indirectly approves of it just as the flesh-eater approves of the conduct of killing, certainly the father is morally responsible for his son's conduct.

The Buddhist again justifies his conduct by the following argument. One who eats meat gets it either by buying or stealing or begging. But certainly he has nothing to do with killing. Hence he is not a party to that and hence there is no moral responsibility. Neelakesi's answer to this is as follows: If a person who carries flowers from the Buddhist temple after worshipping at the feet of Buddha is waylaid on the street, and if his flowers are carried away by another person who desires them, out of piety, you admit that the latter has the same merit as the person who worshipped at the feet of the idol. If obtaining flowers by hook or crook, would produce the same merit as is associated with worship, similarly, getting meat by hook or crook, would result in a moral de-merit which is associated with killing. You cannot accept merit in the former case and disown de-merit in the latter case. You cannot accept the principle of *Kāranāthpunyam* and at the same time reject the same principle in the form of *Kāranāthpāpam*.

Again, the Buddhist adduces another argument. The man who kills the animal does not do so for our sake; nor does he commit the crime because of our instigation. He brings the flesh to the open market, not having anybody in view, as a special purchaser. Anyone can offer the price and purchase the meat in the open market. Since the person did not kill the animal with any special purchaser in mind, there is no

meaning in connecting the purchaser with the killer. Neelakesi suggests by way of answer an apt analogy. Suppose it is known that Buddha is going to have his Biksha in a particular place. In whose house he is going to accept his food is not previously announced; hence every householder in the town is prepared for such an honour. But, as a matter of fact, Buddha can accept only from one householder; and yet all those that are prepared to entertain him, because of their preparedness to offer Biksha to Buddha, must obtain the merit thereof, though only one householder has the privilege of offering Biksha to Buddha. You justify this inference because of the purity of heart and the desire to entertain Buddha which constitute the primary motive on which the moral value depends, though real action is associated with one particular individual. Similarly for evil, all those who were eagerly expecting to purchase meat must have known that they could not obtain meat except by killing and therefore must have indirectly approved of killing. This mental attitude being present in the case though only a few have the opportunity of purchasing the meat must certainly be connected with the opposite moral value. Even those that had not the opportunity to purchase meat must be eagerly expecting to purchase the same just as the householders are eagerly expecting to entertain Buddha by offering Biksha to him.

The Buddhist further enters this protest. "Your accusation will be alright only if you give money in advance for the person who kills the animal. But we don't give any such advance; hence there is no approval on our part of the conduct of the meat-seller." This

argument is answered by Neelakesi thus : Your giving money to purchase meat after the act of killing certainly fixes the responsibility on you because you know very well that the man who sells meat must have obtained only after killing and that he kills the animal for the sake of money which he desires and which he hopes to get from you in exchange for his meat. Hence, whether the money is given in advance of or after the purchase, is quite irrelevant and it does not alter the moral responsibility.

Again, the Buddhist takes refuge in a sort of metaphysical sophistry. Moral value, whether of good or evil, is associated only with action ; whereas eating flesh is merely a sort of enjoyment and not an action. Hence, enjoyment since it is not an action, cannot have any moral value either good or evil ; the action of *Kartha*, the actor, is subject to the moral evaluation whereas the feeling of *Bôktha*, the enjoyer, cannot have any moral value associated with it. Neelakesi ridicules this idea of absolutely disassociating the enjoyer from the actor and absolving the former of any moral responsibility. In this way you can justify any violent moral conduct ; sexual perversity, since it is mainly enjoyment, cannot be accused of any moral defect. This will certainly undermine the very foundation of morals, for anything may be justified in this principle.

The Buddhist turns round and offers an *argumentum ad hominem*, as an indirect justification for flesh-eating. If you object to meat-eating so much, why should you take milk which is the product of flesh ? How is it different from flesh eating ? Neelakesi laughs at this argument. Objection to flesh eating is based upon the

doctrine of Ahimsa. You cannot obtain meat without killing some animal; whereas milk is not so related to antecedent killing. Since there is no Himsa involved in obtaining milk it is not condemned by us. Further, you are not quite right in suggesting that it is merely another form of meat. It would be more proper to say that milk is the modification of grass and other fodder eaten by the cow. For, is it not known to you that the quality of fodder eaten by the cow determines the nature of the milk? Are you not aware of the fact that the medicine taken by the mother is very often effective in curing the disease in the case of babies who suck mother's milk? Hence, your contention that it is merely another form of meat is not quite accurate. Again, there is nobody in the world who condemns milk as impure whereas almost all condemn meat as certainly impure. Lastly, if you stick to your statement that the milk is merely another form of meat, then every human being must be accused of cannibalism for the simple reason, that as a baby, he must have drunk of mother's breast.

Lastly, the Buddhist brings in an argument based upon popular opinion. Though wise men have condemned drug habit, and drink habit, meat-eating is not so condemned by them. If it is really bad it must have been condemned by the wise. Neelakesi easily points out that there is no unanimity of opinion in these matters. Hence there is no use in basing their argument upon popular opinion. Your argument that drink habit is universally condemned is not borne out by the conduct of some of the Buddhists themselves. The Buddhists belonging to Mahâyâna and Mantrayâna

schools freely drink intoxicating liquor. Besides these there are several Non-Buddhists who also freely drink. Then how is it that you maintain that it is universally rejected. Whereas in the case of meat-eating it is just the other way. Except the Buddhists who justify meat-eating, other meat-eaters, though they have the habit, never believe that it is a good thing. This is clearly evident from their conduct when they reject meat as impure on certain important days as Ekâdasi. When the whole of Non-Buddhistic meat-eating public maintain that meat-eating is impure, it is certainly surprising to find you maintain that meat is universally accepted by the wise.

The Buddhist certainly is not yet vanquished. He comes out again with this argument. Whatever you may say, this you must admit. That killing is not our motive and hence without motive there could be no moral responsibility for killing. Neelakesi answers that if you emphasize motive, certainly even the person who kills has not that motive. His main motive is to make money and killing is merely an incidental means for realising money. On your argument, therefore, he must also be absolved of the moral responsibility for killing. The Buddhist next brings in this argument. If you say that eating of meat is an indirect cause of killing, I draw your attention to several causes which may actually bring about death and yet be free from responsibility thereof. By trying to pluck out an arrow from the body of a person struck by an enemy, you may bring about the death of the individual. A mother, in attempting to take out from the throat of the baby some piece of shell which it has swallowed, may bring

about the suffocation and the death of the child. A surgeon, in operating, similarly, may lead to the death of the patient. But no one will take these people responsible for the consequential death; but they are all figuring as the cause of death. Neelakesi accepts these exceptions; though these are considered as casual condition of death, strictly there is no moral responsibility in these cases. Why? Because their action was guided by love and affection to persons who died though they did not succeed in their attempts to save them; whereas killing for meat and eating meat are not actuated by such motive of love and affection and certainly the act is not done for the purpose of saving the animal from death.

There is another argument similar to this adduced by the defender of meat-eating. An evil spirit may attempt to take away a child whose mother clings to the baby. In this tug of war between the mother and the spirit the child may be torn to death. Is not the mother responsible for the death of the child and has she not a share in the moral responsibility? Neelakesi answers that though *prima facie* the mother is also responsible for the death of the child, certainly the motive is different in each case. The evil spirit wanted to take away the child for murdering it, while the mother struggled to save the same. Since the motive is different in each case, the moral value associated with the conduct must also be different. Hence it is not possible for you to escape the moral responsibility of killing, so long as you accept meat obtained by the process of killing the animal. Whereas the other illustration advanced by you as cause of death, cannot be considered to have any moral responsibility for death.

“Lastly, why should you take so much trouble to to defend this unjustifiable course of conduct. You yourself preach the doctrine of Ahimsa. You believe that in preaching this doctrine of Ahimsa you not only lead others to purity of conduct, but also you yourself obtain ethical purity. Your Lord, Gautama Buddha, while preaching Ahimsa to the robber chief Angulimâla weaned him from evil and made of him a gentleman of moral greatness. So he was actuated by love and charity for the several would-be victims of Angulimâla. Why not carry in your action the same principle and thus be guided by love and charity towards all human beings? Then there would be thorough consistency between your ideal and conduct. Then your religion will become nobler, your conduct will be more ethical, and your creed would be more acceptable. Your obstinacy in defending your conduct which is certainly inconsistent with your own doctrine of Ahimsa, is quite unintelligible to me, and what are you going to achieve by this obstinate inconsistency is not quite obvious.”

The next stage in the debate throws Neelakesi on her defence. The topic of *tapas* is again resumed. “If self-mortification is *tapas*, and if *tapas* is the ultimate aim of religion, you might as well burn your body in fire, cast it down from the top of a hill, chop off the flesh from your body, pluck out your eyes and tongue because all these will be more effective methods of *tapas*.” Neelakesi easily points out that this method of attack is merely the result of defeat. You become desperate, because you are not able to justify your conduct of meat-eating. You begin to attack *tapas* in a form which

is certainly not contemplated by us. The description of *tapas*, which you give, has nothing to do with our conception of *tapas*. For us, *tapas* does not mean self-mortification. The heart of *tapas* for us is non-injury to all living beings including one's own body by thought, word and deed. Further, the discipline of *tapas*, is arranged in different grades, suitable to the strength of the mind and body of the person willing to perform *tapas*. For us, *tapas* must be conditioned by one's own strength; for, the ethical motto for us is, *sakthithathyâga tapas*. *Tapas* does not mean search for misery and pain. The very argument which you adduce by way of criticism of *tapas*, are *en block* applicable to your own conception of Buddhahood which is to be obtained by various forms of cruelty on oneself experienced in the period of probation as the Bôdhisatva. The various Pâramithas or perfections obtained by the Bôdhisatva are full of *Âtmahatya* inflicted on oneself. Hence, the condemnation of *tapas* which you so rancorously adduce is just applicable to your own doctrine of Pâramithas. You must realise that the Tuthânga discipline prescribed for the Buddhist Bikshus is not far different from the discipline of *tapas* which we accept. Even in the life of Buddha, it is said, that while he was engaged in Dyâna under the Bôdhi Tree, he was fasting for several days before finally accepting food from the hands of the female disciple Visâka; and yet you ridicule the idea of fasting included in the Jaina discipline. You forget the instance in the life of the Bôdhisatva, where in order to appease the hunger of a hungry tiger, he cast himself from a precipice and offered his dead body as food for the tiger. If it is permissible to

undergo the various kinds of suffering contemplated in Pâramithas in order to realise Buddhahood, certainly it is equally permissible to practise ethical discipline of *Vratâs* and *Sîlas* in order to attain Siddhahood which is the Jaina ideal.

The next topic of discussion is, whether trees and plants are living? According to Jaina philosophy, the whole of the botanical kingdom is a part of the biological world, and plants and trees are classified as *Ekendriya Jiva*, organisms having one sense. This doctrine is not accepted by the Buddhists; hence it is criticised in this controversy. The Buddhist says, "if you maintain that trees have life because there is growth, certainly there is a similar growth in the case of ant-hills, hairs and nails of the human body, hence you have to admit life even in these cases, because of the presence of growth." Neelakesi answers by saying, that, in this case, there is no real growth. Plants and trees grow from inside after assimilating food and water just like animals. But, in the case of the growth of ant-hill, though it is called growth, it is really increasing by the addition to the external, of the quantity of mud brought out by the white ants from under-ground. Organic growth, is quite different from increase by external accretion. Similarly, the growth of hair or nail is by accretion at the root. Though hairs and nails are parts of living body, the growth of hair is not identical with growth in plants and trees where they sprout at the top. That the growth in the hair and nail is merely due to accretion is made obvious by noticing persons who dye their gray hair, and women who paint their nails red. After some time, it

will be noticed that the painted portion would be pushed out when there is addition to the root. The Buddhist asks why should you take so much trouble to distinguish the growth in these two cases? Why not accept that, in both cases, there is real growth? The answer is, there is a fundamental difference between the two processes. Further, abolition of the fundamental difference, would result in the confusion between the organic and inorganic world. Certainly, the living and non-living must be kept separate and distinct.

The next argument to show that plants and trees are living is, that they periodically undergo sleep by closing the leaves at night exactly like animals. This is found in trees like tamarind and others. The Buddhist's objection to this argument is, that only a few trees close their leaves and even there, it is not indicative of sleep. The answer is, some trees close their leaves and others do not, just like some animals close their lids and others do not while asleep. Just as you infer, in the case of animals, that when they open their eyes and move about they are awake, so also you have to infer in the case of trees, when they open their leaves in the morning. The next argument for the belief that trees are living is, that they have organic reaction, wants, and appetites, just like animals. The Buddhist points out by way of objection that there is a similar reaction even in the case of inanimate things. Wax melts and spreads at the proximity of fire. Hence reaction and growth in trees need not necessarily indicate that they are living. The answer to this objection is, that though there is reaction in the case of wax, its spreading is not identical with the growth

of trees. The behaviour of trees is exactly identical with the behaviour of animals whereas the reaction in the case of inanimate objects is quite different. A flame will grow when it is fed with firewood. This increase of flame cannot be compared to the growth of animals and trees. Trees and plants, just like animals, grow and decay. This process of growth and decay is determined by the normal age of plants and trees. Some plants are annual, and some trees live for many years. Though they have plenty of water and manure, when they reach the limit of their age, they automatically decay and die just like other animals. No amount of manuring and watering can prevent the natural decay of trees and plants; but such a thing is impossible in the case of fire. If it is possible for you to feed the flame with firewood to eternity, the flame must continue to exist as an inevitable result. This inevitable determination by the causal condition is the mark of inanimate things whereas self-determination is the characteristic of living beings. Certainly, plants and trees have this latter characteristic. Hence, by right, they belong to the animal kingdom.

Again, plants have life because they are responsive to touch just like leeches and snails; the moment you touch them they shrink and close until they realise that there is no danger from the environment, when they open their leaves just like those reptiles. This clearly proves that they are endowed with the sense of touch and are able to respond to environmental stimulus. Whenever there is a response to stimulus and a resumption of normal position after removal of stimulus, you have to admit the presence of life as the only explanation of the conduct. The

Buddhist objects to this argument by saying that you find a similar behaviour when a piece of leather is scotched by fire. That also shrinks and closes as the result of environmental heat stimulus. Are we to believe that the leather is endowed with life? The answer to this is that the behaviour of the leather is not quite identical with that of a plant which closes its leaf when it is touched. It is quite obvious, that, in the case of plants, on account of this principle they are able to resume their normal position, whereas in the case of shrunk leather, it must remain so for ever. The presence of spontaneous readjustment and regaining its normal position when the disturbing stimulus is removed is certainly the characteristic of life which is obviously absent in a torn leather. Again, plants and trees, are subject to disease and are capable of being cured by proper treatment just like animals. The Buddhist objects to this argument with the following counter-argument. Even an inanimate object, like a sword, can get deformed and may be set right with the help of a magnet. Deformation in a steel instrument, and the rectification of the same by magnetic treatment, are quite different from the diseases in plants which are cured by medical treatment. Since there is no common characteristic between the two, the analogy is quite erroneous. The blossoming of trees and flowers at the approach of spring, and their suffering at the approach of winter, are certainly indicative of their living nature. But smiling at the approach of spring, and weeping in winter, are also characteristic of the seasons, which are certainly not living. Neelakesi answers that this objection is quite irrelevant. The change of climatic

conditions is just the same as the change of seasons. The plants changing as the result of change of seasons is quite different from the change of seasons themselves. Again, it can be made out, that the plant world is living because the off-spring is identical with the parent tree or plant. The identity of young ones with the parent plants is just like the identity of calf with the cow. A she-ass will not bring forth a lamb. Similarly margosa seed will not bring forth mango tree. The Buddhist objection to this argument is in the following form. Whatever is born of a tree is identical with the tree itself and if that is the mark of life, you might as well argue that heat given out by human body must also have life, since it is born of a living body. Neelakesi's answer is: Certainly, the heat of a living body must be associated with life, though in itself, it cannot be called a living organism. Since you don't find such a temperature in a dead body, certainly, it must be taken as a mark of life.

Trees and plants must have life, because when they are cut they decay and die just like animals so maimed. But so does the skin when cut, objects the Buddhist. But, Neelakesi points out the fundamental difference between the two cases. No doubt, the skin when cut, will shrink just like the withering of the leaves from a cut tree. But in the case of the skin, even if it is left alone, it will behave like that on lapse of time; but if a tree is left alone without being cut it won't wither and die. Again, you have to infer that trees have life, because, when they are wounded the wound gets cured leaving a scar behind as in the case of a living being. This argument is objected to in the following way. A gold

ornament or a steel sword may be similarly wounded by a hard knock and the wound may be rectified by a goldsmith or blacksmith by proper treatment. Neelakesi rejects this objection by saying that the wound inflicted on a tree gets cured spontaneously and automatically, whereas a dent in the ornament or sword, must be cured by the smith by extraneous treatment. This fundamental difference makes it clear that the trees are living and are capable of spontaneously healing their wounds, whereas, in the other case, being inanimate, must be rectified by external human agency. Thus Neelakesi is able to establish the doctrine that the botanical kingdom is a part of the biological kingdom, and that plants and trees are living organisms though endowed only with one sense, viz., the sense of contact.

Next, there is a slight change in the topic. Jaina classification of organisms with one sense, or *Ekêndriyajîva* recognises a sub-class of *Ekêndriyajîvâs*. These one-sensed organisms are very minute and are not ordinarily perceived by the senses. These are called *Sûkshma Ekêndriyajîva*, minute one-sensed organisms. These minute organisms, may be present in earth, water, air and light. Hence they are therefore classified as earth organisms, water organisms and so on. This doctrine is very often mis-understood by Non-Jaina thinkers. They falsely interpret this, in such a way as makes Jaina thought animistic.* Here, exactly, a similar objection is raised by the Buddhist critic. Neelakesi answers this mistaken criticism, by explaining

* The critics imagine that Jaina philosophy recognises the existence of soul in earth, air, water and so on : that *Achêtana*, material objects are also endowed with *chêtana*, life and consciousness. This mistake is made by even such an eminent oriental scholar as Prof. Jacobi of Germany.

the point quite clearly. When the Jaina philosopher speaks of *Pradvikâyikajîva* or *Apkâyika Jîva* what is implied is, that these minute organisms reside in earth or water. It does not mean that earth or water has life of its own ; just as the name of the town may be used to denote the persons living therein, so also the place of residence is figuratively used to denote the organisms living therein. To use the place of residence to denote the living beings resident therein, is an ordinary figure of speech and, certainly, should not be interpreted as a meaningless metaphysical doctrine—that the material *Achêtana*, earth or water has a soul of its own. Such an interpretation is quite inconsistent with Jaina Metaphysics and the interpretation is entirely the result of ignorance and confusion, as to the nature of Jaina thought.

If *Ekêndriyajîva*, plants and animals and minute organisms in earth and water, are accepted as a class of *Samsârajîvâs*, then they will have the chance of being born as man some time or other. If a Jîva with one sense is born as man, then, that man also must have only one sense. The objection is met by Neelakesi by raising a similar objection to the Buddhist doctrine of the *Bôdhisatva*. Buddha, in order to perfect his Buddhahood, was born as various animals and birds in the previous births. If he was born as a rabbit in the previous birth, even when he is born as Buddha, he must have the limited intelligence of a rabbit and nothing more. If Buddha could be born transcending the limited intelligence of the rabbit, it is equally possible for a Jîva to be born as a man though it was something else in the past. When the behaviour of the

tree is exactly identical with that of the Sâkya, that it lives and enjoys when properly fed and manured, and that it famishes and dies when starved, why should you object to its living nature? Again, when a sleeping tree is quite identical with sleeping Sâkya, why should you believe that the latter is living and the former is non-living. Identity of behaviour must necessarily mean identity of nature, and therefore, it must be accepted that trees are living, because of their identity with the living beings. Next there is a change in the topic of discussion and Makkhali takes the Jaina Metaphysics for criticism.

Next, Makkhali begins to criticise the Jaina metaphysical doctrines of *Nitya*, *Anitya*, *Asti*, *Nâsti*, *Bhêda* and *Abhêda*. First, he takes for examination the categories of *Nitya* and *Anitya*, permanency and change. Are these characteristics mere states or modification of the real, or essential characteristics, or the accidental characteristics, associated with the real by external agency? To these alternative questions, Neelakesi answers, that they are the essential characteristics of things. If *Nitya* is the essential characteristic of the real, then the real must be an unchanging permanent existence. Being unchanging and absolute, it is incapable of producing any effect on living beings. Hence, it will not appear as an object for an experiencing agent. If, on the other hand, *Anitya* is the nature of things there would be no continuity of things and that every moment a new thing will appear, which is exactly the doctrine which the Buddhist accepts. Hence, whether reals are taken as *Nitya* or *Anitya*, there would be no possibility of experiencing the object. In reply, Neelakesi points out that this criticism is based upon imperfect under-

standing of the Jaina doctrine. The criticism will be relevant only in the case of *Ekāntavāda*. One who maintains that the reals are absolutely permanent, or absolutely changing, will be subject to your criticism. But, in our case, the real is always described relativistically. The same person Brahmadata is younger than Devadata, and older than Yagnadata, is an intelligible proposition; the same individual is described by contradictory objectives. Similarly the same individual may be praised, from the point of view of intellect, and blamed from the point of view of moral character. There is nothing impossible in a statement that a particular individual is intellectually great, though morally he is very low. What we maintain as a metaphysical doctrine is, that the reality is many-sided and it is capable of being described from different points of view. Hence, it is not self-contradictory to describe the real as both *Nitya* and *Anitya* so long as the points of view are different. Makkala naturally asks what is meant by different points of view? What is the point of view according to which the thing is permanent, and what is the other point of view according to which it is impermanent? Neelakesi explains the position in reply. A thing is described to be permanent *Nitya* when you attend to its essential nature—*Anuvrittārabhāva*. A thing is changing *Anitya* from its accidental characteristics of *Vyāvrittārabhāva*.

If, by essential nature, a thing is permanent, and if by accidental nature, a thing is impermanent, then say, that the characteristics make the thing and do not postulate thinghood besides and beyond qualities. This objection raised by Makkala that there is no thing

called substance apart from and independent of the qualities, is answered by Neelakesi thus. If you maintain that a thing cannot be separated from its qualities you are right. But, on account of this inseparability of the thing from its qualities, if you inter the non-existence of the thing, your conclusion is untenable and erroneous. You yourself have described Buddha as having innumerable good qualities. If you do not postulate an entity Buddha, apart from these qualities, your praising of your Lord will be meaningless. Because, there will be no one corresponding to Buddha. Again, you describe that the earth is hard, water is fluid, and fire is hot etc., and this description naturally implies substance with a quality. If there is no substance beyond the quality then your own statement would be without any significance. It is quite easy to conceive of a thing in the midst of its qualities. In the case of an ocean, the presence of water, its coolness etc., would be *Anuvrittasvabhāva* and the waves thereof will be *Vyāvrittasvabhāva*. By the former, the essential characteristic, the sea must be spoken of as permanent, whereas waves on its surface are ever changing. Similarly, the substance gold, may be spoken of as being permanent, and various ornaments made of it may be spoken of as changing modifications.

This leads to the next topic the relation between *Guna* and *Guni*, the quality and substance. If the terms *Guna* and *Guni* refer to two different things then show me the *Guni*—the substance apart from *Guna*, the quality. But, if you say that both refer to the same thing, then say that the real is one. You must either accept the first alternative or the second alternative.

You cannot say that both are true. Neelakesi answers this by saying that there is no internal contradiction in the position that *Guna* and *Guni* are different though they are inseparably present in the same real. She points out that even in the Buddhist thought, a similar doctrine is assumed. Complex human personality, is supposed to be constituted by the five *Skandas* which are different and distinct in nature and yet they are inseparable from one another as constituent elements in the *Purusha Pinda*. Similarly, the four *Aryasatyas*—*Anitya*, *Dukka*, *Asuchi* and *Anâtma*—are all associated with the same existence and yet they are spoken of as different. It is possible to associate unity and plurality in the same thing even in Buddhist Metaphysics. A similar doctrine in Jaina Metaphysics cannot be objected to. Similarly, you speak of one particular *Chitta*, an element of consciousness, as the effect of the previous one, and as the cause of the succeeding one. Here also, plural characteristics are associated with a single element. A doctrine which is accepted by you cannot be criticised when it proceeds from us.

Next, Makkala turns to the doctrine of *Avaktavya* that the real is indescribable. If you state that the real is indescribable then you contradict yourself. Because, you describe the real even while saying that it is indescribable. But, if by indescribability, you mean perfect silence, then there is no chance for you to state your doctrine. Neelakesi points out that this criticism is based upon a mis-understanding. Your criticism would be alright if the real is to be taken as absolutely indescribable. But with us it is not absolutely indescribable. It has been pointed out above, that, from

one point of view real can be described as eternal, and from another point of view, that it can be described as ephemeral; from one point of view it is identical, and that from another point of view it is different and so on. Real is thus describable by various adjectives from various points of view. From this it is quite clear that the many-sided reality is capable of being described from various points of view. What this term *Avaktavya* really means is that you cannot describe the real simultaneously from an absolute point of view. If you waive the relative point of view, and attempt to describe the real from an absolute point of view, certainly the real must remain beyond your speech and hence indescribable.

Mokkala next turns to the doctrine of *Parinâma*, or the doctrine of modification of things. He takes the illustration, milk changing into curd. According to the doctrine of *Parinâma* the change pre-supposes an underlying permanent substance. Since the Buddhist does not accept such a permanent underlying substance he cannot accept *Parinâma-vâda*. If curd is the result of milk, and if milk, while maintaining its permanency, changes into curd then there must be milk also in the curd and the curd itself would remain unexplained because there is no ostensible cause to produce it. According to this objection, Mokkala tries to establish the Buddhist doctrine of *Asatkârya-vâda*, that milk must completely disappear in order to produce curd. This objection is answered by Neelakesi. According to *Parinâma-vâda*, we believe in the existence of a permanent underlying substance, throughout the modifications. While milk and curd are all modifications

of a physical sub-stratum, which by no means disappears though there is appearance and disappearance among the various *Paryayas*. Though milk changes into curd the underlying material does not get destroyed. The physical molecules which constitute milk remain identically the same, though the mode of arrangement of the molecular structure is different when milk becomes curd. This is the meaning of *Parinâma*. But, on the other hand, according to your supposition, if milk completely disappears wherefrom do you get the curd? Further what necessity is there that curd should appear in the very same pot where you poured the milk?

To this Makkala objects that it is impossible to speak of an underlying sub-stratum behind the different *Parinâmas* since it is not evident to the senses. Neelakesi points out that this is a suicidal objection. In the same way, your own doctrine of Buddha may be objected to, as it is not perceptible apart from the five *Skandas*. If you say that "we do not believe in such an independent *Purusha* as an ultimate reality" then you have to accept that the whole of the Buddhist religion and Buddhist literature must be discarded as unreliable. For how can we believe in these if you do not believe in Buddha as a *Paramârtha*. Makkala again points out that the doctrine of *Parinâma* cannot be accepted because the water poured in the pot in order to cook pulses into *Pâyasa*, completely disappears. If you maintain that pulses themselves without getting destroyed completely become *Pâyasa*, you must have a similar transformation in the case of water poured into the pot. But the water completely disappears, without

leaving anything behind as its modification. Why not you argue that the pulses completely disappear like water and a new thing Pâyasa appears in the pot? Neelakesi easily points out that this objection is based upon ignorance. Water does not completely disappear though it is not found in the pot into which it is poured. Its disappearance from the pot is due to the fact that it changes into watery vapour and escapes from the pot; that water changes into vapour and disappears, is an argument in favour of Parinâma doctrine, and that it is used to support the doctrine of complete disappearance of the cause only exhibits ignorance of the speaker as to the fact that water is changed into watery vapour.

After answering the objection Neelakesi criticises the Buddhist doctrine that the cause must completely disappear before the effect is born. If it is possible for something to appear even after the complete destruction of the antecedent condition then there can be no full stop to any series of changes. The conception of Buddhist Nirvâna as a full stop to the conditional causation *Prateetyasamutpâda* would be impossible to realise. Even after Buddha's Nirvâna, and even after Buddhasantâna comes to a full stop some new thing may appear after the complete destruction and thus prolong the series. This would mean that even after Nirvâna the Buddhasantâna will be continued in Samsâra. Hence the Buddhist doctrine of causation is not entirely free from defects.

The next doctrine taken up for his criticism is the doctrine of *Asti Nâsti*. The meaning of this doctrine is, that a thing may be described positively when it is considered in relation to its own nature, its own place, its

own time and its own mode. Similarly, it may be described negatively from four opposite points of view. With reference to this doctrine Mekkala says, "If by this you mean that a fruit which is in your hand is not the fruit of the bazaar who will question this doctrine? It is so obvious that everyone will accept it. Is this a great metaphysical discovery?" Neelakesi answers, "Is it a mistake to state a doctrine which is acceptable to all? Is it your opinion that metaphysics must have nothing in common with concrete life? You also maintain several philosophical doctrines which are quite obvious to all." Mekkala says, "When you say that an elephant is not in its stable, it may be alright during the absence of the elephant. But the statement would become false when it returns to its place." Neelakesi answers "Yes, certainly. We don't say that the elephant is not in its place for all times. When it is absent it is not there and when it comes back certainly it will be there. The statement that it is absent will have truth not absolutely, but only in relation to a specified time and place." Mekkala continues his objection. "When you say that the horns of a bull were not in existence when he was a young calf it is quite evident to every one. The horns which were not in existence formerly are present now. Hence you can certainly apply *Asti Nāsti*, positive and negative attributes, with reference to the horns of a bull. But you should prove in a similar way that the non-existing horns in the calf are describable by *Asti Nāsti*". Neelakesi answers. "Your criticism is entirely irrelevant; for the doctrine of *Asti Nāsti* is applicable only to reals. Non-existing things cannot be so described." Again Mekkala repeats his objection.

“You say from one point of view a thing may be described as existing, and from another point of view that it is non-existent. According to your own position, from one point of view a young calf, or a hare or an ass must have horns. What is that point of view according to which these animals are credited with horns?” Neelakesi answers: “You wantonly repeat the objection already disposed of. It is pointed out above that the doctrine of *Asti Nāsti* is not applicable to the case of non-existing things.”

Mokkala continues his objection. “According to your doctrine, from the point of right hand, the left hand is not, and from the point of view of the left hand, the right hand may be negated. Thus both the hands may be negated which would certainly be an absurd conclusion. In spite of your metaphysical negation, the hands will not cease to exist.” Neelakesi answers: “You have entirely misunderstood the principle. What is intended here is, that the structure of one hand, is quite different from that of the other. Considered in relation to the left hand, the right hand must be of a different structure. Hence you have to admit that the structure of the left hand is absent in the other. If this distinguishing mark is not maintained, there would be no difference between the right hand and the left hand and there would be no reason to call one the right and the other left. Similarly, the distinction between *Chêtana* and *Achêtana*, must be maintained. Otherwise, there would be confusion of thought.”

The same criticism is repeated by Mokkala. “If, from the point of legs, hands are not, and from the point of hands, legs are not, then both legs and hands must be

not, and man's body must be merely a trunk without limbs." Neelakesi answers this objection also as irrelevant. If the nature of legs and hands is not true as legs and hands, but, absolutely without any limitation or differentiation, then a man may be said to have four legs or four hand. It will not be possible to differentiate a man from other quadrupeds. Mokkala continues : " When you say with reference to a dog, that it is not a fox, your predication may mean that fox does not exist at all." Neelakesi answers : " Your conclusion does not follow necessarily. Negative predication may have two kinds of distinctive significance. In one case, it may mean non-existence, and in the other case, it may mean non-similarity or non-identity with another thing. With reference to a dog, if it is said that it is not a fox, it would by no means imply that the class of animals called fox, has no existence. It simply means, that the dog has not got the nature and characteristics of a fox, which is as real and existing as the dog itself about whom the predication is made."

The topic is changed. Now Mokkala begins to criticise the doctrine of the relation between name and the thing, experience and the experienced object. He criticises a doctrine which is not the Jaina view. " If you maintain that a thing which has no name has no existence, and what is not experienced cannot be real, you land your self into absurdity. There must be several things which are not experienced by you and which are beyond your vocabulary. On that score you cannot deny their reality." Neelakesi answers : " That is not what we maintain. What we say is, a thing which has a name and which is experienced by us,

cannot be dismissed as unreal. This is not the same thing as the statement which you foist on us and which is quite alien to our philosophy." Mekkala points out, "If the nature of a thing is peculiar to it and cannot be found in another thing, how do you explain iron becoming red hot, cold water changing into hot water?" Neelakesi answers: "Though the nature of consciousness is entirely distinct from that of the physical body, still you find these two in conjunction; the presence of the two together in man does not mean that consciousness loses its own nature, nor the material body acquires new nature. You have to accept that the combination of two things in relation to each other, does not mean change of their natures. Similarly, in the illustration given by you, iron and cold water, these get raised in temperature because of the combination of heat. This does not mean that they lose their own nature and acquire different character. Your illustration cannot establish the doctrine of *Ścarâpaparityâga*, things losing their own essential nature."

Mekkala continues: "If by *Śvakshetra*, you mean that existing here, is non-existence in another place, then how can a virtuous man who exists here performing good deeds go to Swarga, another place, to enjoy the fruits of his good karmas? When you say he is here in the world, you must admit that he cannot be in Swarga. Then he has no chance of enjoying the fruits of his good deeds." Neelakesi answers: "This is certainly a wilful misunderstanding. A person who is here cannot exist elsewhere has significance only with a particular time. The denial has meaning only in relation to a specified period and not for all times. The existence in

the world does not preclude his existence in another part altogether. His future existence in Swarga is quite compatible with his present existence in the world." Similarly Neelakesi disposes of another objection from Mokkala, that a person who performs *tapas* now, has no chance of enjoying the fruits of his *tapas*, because his existence in future, is denied. Neelakesi meets his objection by explaining *Svakāla*. "When a person exists now, the period of his existence, is his *Svakāla*, and the past and the future would be *Parakāla*. But since Jīva does not cease to exist after a lapse of time, the future itself will become its *Svakāla* and then it will have existence according to the same principle of *Svakāla*, one's own time. Hence, there is nothing incongruent in the doctrine and your objections are quite pointless."

Mokkala next turns to the principle of *Svabhāva*.* "If milk can change its nature and give place to curd you may as well believe that yarn can give up its own nature and produce in its place iron implement." Neelakesi answers: "This objection is quite irrelevant to your own doctrine, that the cause must entirely disappear before the effect is brought into existence. It has no relevancy because our doctrine maintains that while one mode changes into another mode the underlying substance maintains its identity. Hence one thing cannot change into another thing, absolutely having no relation to the nature of the underlying identity. The changes and modes must necessarily be determined by the nature of the persisting reality.

* When a particular mode changes into another mode, the former mode loses its characteristic and in its place another mode with a different characteristic appears, the underlying substance remaining the same

Otherwise there will be no order of uniformity in nature. When a seed is sown a white elephant may grow out of it. What is really an objection against your own doctrine, you falsely fling on us."

Again Makkala continues: "If the nature of the thing cannot be found in another, then how do you explain the presence of fragrance of a particular flower in the pot in which the flower is put?" Neelakesi points out that this is the result of a temporary transference of fragrance, which is the genuine characteristic of the flower, to the pot by mere contact. Fragrance, which is temporarily present in the pot, will disappear in course of time completely. Hence it cannot be a characteristic of the pot also. Next, Makkala criticises the Jaina conception of Moksha as narrated in Jaina cosmology. "If *Mokshasthâna* or heaven refers to a place, however eminent it be as a place, it cannot be different from any ordinary space, a dog kennel or a hell. These latter cannot have any merit merely as a definite situation in the scheme of cosmology. Similarly, the place called heaven; what is its peculiar merit which is not present in other localities, on account of which it is to be considered great and pure?" Neelakesi answers this by retorting in the same strain. "Buddha's residence Mahâbôdhi is just a place like our Mokshasthâna. The reason for which Mahâbôdhi is held to be a sanctified locality, is just the same reason for which our heaven is held to be a sanctified place."

Makkala says, "According to your own doctrine a soul which reaches heaven cannot come back to *Samsâra*. What is the peculiarity of heaven which prevents

re-birth in the case of those who reach the place?" Neelakesi's answer:—"This is not due to the place. Re-birth in *Samsāra* is the necessary result of Karma. The soul which reaches heaven or Moksha does so after complete annihilation of karma. This annihilation of karma puts an end to re-birth in *Samsāra*. Hence you are not right in suggesting that the place called Mokshasthāna prevents re-birth."

Mokkala continues:—"The liberated soul after attaining salvation reaches Mokshasthāna according to your doctrine. But this Siddha still has consciousness. He is conscious of himself and the other world. And then how can you say that he is free from karma?" Neelakesi answers: "The presence of consciousness and *Gnāna* is not necessarily an indication of *Karma-bhanda*. The liberated Ātma which is free from karma may still be associated with *Gnāna* which completely transcends the knowledge brought about by sense-perception. The latter is conditioned by karmas whereas the former is the result of the destruction of all karmas. Hence you are not justified in inferring that wherever there is *Gnāna* there is Karma. It is because of this false doctrine you describe Nirvāna as complete annihilation of personality and Atma." Mokkala similarly raises frivolous objection against Omniscience. When Neelakesi explains the nature of *Kevala Gnāna* and differentiates it from the ordinary knowledge obtained by sense perception, that this metempirical knowledge is infinite and is capable of comprehending the infinite world and that it is brought about by breaking all the barriers of karma which prevented this self luminous spiritual experience, Mokkala completely feels

disarmed and acknowledges defeat at Neelakesi's hands. Neelakesi smiles and says, "Are these the arguments employed by Kundalakesi when she defeated the Jaina teacher Nâthagupta?" Mokkala confesses his inability to maintain his position against Neelakesi's attack. He turns her attention to the very fundamental source of Buddhist doctrines. She is asked to meet Gautama Buddha himself at Kapilapura and obtain from him a satisfactory answer to the several questions for which Neelakesi demands an answer. Thus ends the great debate with Mokkala.

CHAPTER V.

Buddha Vada.

Neelakesi goes to meet the founder of Buddhism in his place Kapilapura. According to the description given in the book, Kapilapura is situated on a sea shore, which fact is sarcastically referred to by the author, as a convenient situation to get enough fish to eat. In describing the town, pointed attention is drawn to the fact of numerous meat-stalls and slaughter-houses, to meet the incessant demand from the Buddhist public. The place of residence of Buddha is described to be a castle, to be consistent with his own princely status. Neelakesi deplores the attitude of Buddha who preaches Ahimsa without condemning meat-eating. She points out that Buddha himself, as represented in the Jâtaka Tale, implicitly accepted the doctrine of *Kâranâthpâpam*, which doctrine is zealously contested against by his followers. The Jâtaka Tale, referred to here, is the story of the Serpent Dhrishti Visha. According to this story, Buddha was born in one of his previous births as a serpent which would kill others by mere sight. When he was dragged on cruelly by a hunter who caught hold of him, the Bôdhisatva, out of mercy, did not open his eyes, lest the hunter would die instantaneously; thus closing his own eyes, he suffered death at the hands of the hunter. This conduct of the Bôdhisatva, is a distinct illustration of the doctrine of *Kâranâthpâpam*; though the Bôdhisatva did not intend to kill the hunter, he avoided even indirect death of the hunter, which would

result by opening his eyes. This principle which he accepted by his own merciful conduct here, deserves to be extended to all living creatures, and if so extended, certainly the Buddhists must avoid contributing to the indirect death of the animals, which is the inevitable result of their own conduct. Neelakesi enters the castle and meets Lord Buddha himself. She finds him there seated on a pedestal in the midst of his congregation. There, he is preaching to his disciples the three Pitakas, Sûtra Pitaka, Vinaya Pitaka, and Abhidamma Pitaka. He has been expounding the *Panchaskanda* and their momentary nature. Though, from the ultimate point of view, there is no soul, from the *vivahâric* point of view, soul must be accepted. The ultimate reality is beyond description, *Arâchya*. Beyond the momentary existence of the *Skandas*, there is no ultimate reality. Everything is *Soonya*. These are some of the doctrines expounded by Buddha to his disciples. Neelakesi entering the audience hall, requests Buddha to give an exposition of his fundamental doctrines, in order to give her an opportunity to examine them and criticise them. Accordingly, Buddha describes the fundamental doctrines as preached by him. The ultimate realities are the five *Skandas*, *Rûpa Skanda*, *Vêdanâ Skanda*, *Vignâna Skanda*, *Sagnâ Skanda* and *Samskâra Skanda*. These are further sub-divided into various kinds. *Rûpa Skanda* is only of one kind. *Vêdanâ Skanda* is of three kinds. *Vignâna Skanda* is of six kinds. *Sagnâ Skanda*, similarly, is of six kinds. *Samskâra Skanda* is divided into *Kusala* and *Akusala*, which together form twenty different kinds. These are the main categories in my philosophy. All the physical objects otherwise called

Ashtaka, belong to the class called *Rûpa Skanda*. What is the nature of Ashtaka or a physical object ? Ashtaka is an aggregate, consisting of the four *Bhûtas*, earth, water, air and fire, with four sense qualities. Varna, Rasa, Gandha, Sparsa (Colour, Taste, Smell and Touch). A mass made of all these eight elements is, what is known as Ashtaka. These eight elements constitute the aggregate and are inseparable from one another. They together appear in one moment, and together disappear at the next moment, according to the momentary nature of reality. The sense elements of Colour, Taste, Smell and Touch are associated with the four *Bhûtas* in the Ashtaka. Of these, the earth element has the attribute of hardness, water fluidity, fire heat, and air circulation. These are the respective qualities of the four *Bhûtas* which are the ultimates. Again these four *Bhûtas*, have respectively four different kinds of action or Karma.

After explaining *Rûpa Skanda*, the nature of the *Vêdanâ Skanda* is taken up for expounding. *Vêdanâ Skanda* means the element of feeling. It is of three kinds, *Sukha vêdanâ*, the pleasure, *Dukha Vêdanâ*, the pain, and *Sama vêdanâ*, the neutral feeling. These are respectively caused by the three kinds of Samskâra, Kusala, right conduct, Akusala—wrong conduct,—and Samasamskâra—neutral activity. *Vignâna Skanda*, or element of knowledge, is of six kinds. The five sense-experiences together with Manas, form the six *Vignâna* elements. For the very same reason there are six kinds of *Sagnâ Shanda*. Lastly, the *Samskâra Skanda* are mainly of three kinds Mânasika, Vâchika and Kâyika, action according to thought, word and deed.

Besides these main divisions, activity is further capable of being sub-divided into various heads, according to right conduct or wrong conduct, Kusala and Akusala. These five Skandas again have this characteristic that they appear together and get destroyed together in a moment. Their behaviour is analogous to the flame of a light, a kind of Ashtaka Pinda. Here also, the eight elements, by momentary appearance and disappearance, maintain the continuity of the flame. Similarly, the five Skandas, by momentary appearance and disappearance maintain the series and produce appearance of continuity of things in the world. Besides these constituent elements—the Skandas—there is no such thing as a persisting thing. The idea of permanent substance, is due to ignorance of the nature of the reality. When you bend the fingers of your hand, you give it the name fist. But, where is the substance called fist apart from and independent of the five fingers? When you assemble the various building materials into a structure, you give it the name of house. But, where is the house apart from the building materials? To talk of a fist, apart from fingers, and to talk of a house apart from building materials, is to exhibit one's own lack of intellectual penetration into the nature of things. Similarly, apart from the five Skandas which constitute the Purusha, we do not accept the existence of any independent reality called Ātma. These five Skandas, which constitute the reality, are intrinsically characterised by the following, Anitya, Dukha, Asuchi and Anātma. These are momentary and vanishing; these are by nature painful and impure, and they are devoid of any underlying sub-stratum called Ātma. One who realises

the true nature of reality, will be free from evil, escape from Samsâra, and will obtain Môksha, Nirvâna. This, in short, is our creed of philosophy and religion. Hearing this exposition of his philosophy by Buddha, Neelakesi begins to examine the same critically in detail.

“You compare the *Pancha Skandas* to the five fingers which constitute the fist when closed, and to the building materials used to raise a house. But, still your analogy is incomplete. In the case of the five Skandas, you say, that they are inseparable, that they must die together and be re-born together. But this characteristic is absent in the case of the five fingers or the building materials. These latter are separable from one another, one element may get destroyed without the others being destroyed. But, in the case of the Skandas, which are distinct from one another, and yet which are inseparable from one another, you have to postulate some kind of force or a cohereing principle which keeps all the five together in a cluster whether they get destroyed, or whether they are re-born. Without such a postulate, the group appearance and the group destruction of the five Skandas which are in themselves distinct, would remain unexplained. Hence, in order to clearly explain the behaviour of the Skandas, you have to postulate an underlying permanent substance as the sub-stratum for these five Skandas, and that is exactly what we call Ātma, of which the five Skandas would be related as different Gunâs to a single Guni, the qualities inhering in the substance. You yourself maintain in describing four *Bhûtas*, that they have their respective qualities and their actions. How can you talk of quality and action apart from a thing to which the quality and

action would belong? You speak of earth being hard and inert; hardness and inertia must necessarily pre-suppose something possessing these characteristics. Similarly, the elements *Vêdanâ Skanda*, *Vignâna Skanda*, *Sagnâ Skanda* and *Samskâra Skanda* must pre-suppose a consciousness being capable of having these experiences. When you are prepared to admit the existence of earth associated with the characteristics of hardness and inertia, why do you fight shy of an exactly similar category. Ātma associated with the elements *Vêdanâ Skanda*, *Vignâna Skanda*, etc.? Do you say, "We do not recognise the existence of any substance beyond the quality and action even in the case of the four *Bhûtas*; similarly we are not bound to accept the existence of an Ātma in the case of these *Skandas*" "Even if this is granted for argument's sake, still there is a problem. You speak of quality and action in the case of each *Bhûta*, earth, water, fire and air. In each case, you deny the substance. Then, what is the exact relation between the quality and action? If action is the behaviour of the quality, then practically the quality becomes substance, and action becomes its quality. The relation between the two is just the relation between the Guna and Guni which you are not willing to accept."

Buddha challenges Neelakesi to point out what is this wonderful thing called Guni apart from Guna? "Show me the Jîva or Ātma apart from Gnâna. Neelakesi points out that non-existence cannot be inferred from inseparability of the same from its Gunâs. The fact that the Guni cannot be had apart from Guna, is no ground for the inference that the Guni is unreal. To

explain human behaviour both in knowledge, feeling and action out of the four Skandas, *Védanā Skanda*, *Vignāna Skanda*, *Sagnā Skanda* and *Samskāra Skanda*, it is quite necessary to postulate the existence of a consciousness, an Ātma whose characteristic is thus analysed into the four Skandas emphasised by you. After emphasising that the postulate of Ātma is quite necessary for the understanding of the human personality, Neelakesi begins to examine the nature of physical object according to Buddhism. The physical object, technically called *Ashtaka*, is an aggregate mass of eight distinct elements, the four *Bhūtas* and the four sense elements. Of the four *Bhūtas*, some are by nature contradictory, and cannot exist together such as fire and water. To talk of an aggregate mass of eight elements, some of which are incompatible with one another, would be untenable. Further, to maintain that these will all be present together inseparably would naturally imply this :—Earth perceived as real must contain in itself implicitly the other three *Bhūtas*, air, water and fire. Similarly, in the case of water which must contain the other three *Bhūtas*. According to this principle, the implicit water element must contain the other three *Bhūtas*, and the element implicitly present in this, must also contain the other three, and so on, *ad infinitum*. Such a description of reality, that one contains implicitly the other three and each of these again implicitly the other three and so on, would reduce the argument to absurdity. This would undermine the very foundation of knowledge which is based upon differentiation of things in nature, and apprehending them as such in knowledge. Again the inseparable, co-existent, incompatible elements in the

same thing, may result in mutual destruction and the ultimate result will be nothing—Nihilism.

Though the four *Bhûtas* are inseparable from one another in the Ashtaka, they may be differentiated from each other according to the dominant element present therein. Thus what is called earth has the earth element as the most dominant factor, and the other three being in subordination to this. Similarly, in the case of water, air and fire. Neelakesi says :—"Even this explanation won't do. Small quantity of water associated with the large mass of earth will get absorbed and disappear. Small quantity of fire in association with water will get completely extinguished; and small quantity of water in association with great fire will get evaporated. Thus there will be no chance for the elements existing together in a common mass of aggregate without mutual destruction. Thus your doctrine of Ashtaka that it is made of eight different elements co-existent together as an inseparable congregate, is impossible to conceive. When the different elements of Rûpa Skanda are found to be incapable of existing together, it is still more difficult to think of the association of Rûpa Skanda with the four conscious elements such as Vêdanâ Skanda, Vignâna Skanda etc. Rûpa Skanda is what is perceptible by the senses. And the four Skandas relating to consciousness are distinctly Arûpas and not evident to the senses. Then, how can you think of a combination of the Rûpa and Ashtaka Skandas? You might as well speak of the foot-prints of a jumping frog left in space."

"If knowledge leads to action, and if action leads to feeling of pleasure or pain, you must admit an inter-

connection between the three and this connecting thing is just what we call Ātma. But, if you maintain that these elements are unconnected with one another, then it is not necessary to believe that you must know before you act, and that you must act before you experience the result of action in the form of pleasure or pain. Action, may appear without knowledge, pleasure and pain may appear without action. Hence your statement that 'knowledge leads to action and action leads to pleasure and pain' need not necessarily be true."

"You speak of six kinds of Vignāna Skanda. Of this, only one can be at the focus of attention. What becomes of the others? How can you speak of these five when they are not present in consciousness? If it is said that these are submerged below the threshold of consciousness, how are they preserved in this latent form? If it is maintained that they are destroyed, then they can never appear again. The presence of the five kinds in a latent form below the threshold of consciousness, is intelligible only on the supposition that there is a persistent Ātma which serves us as a sub-stratum for all the Vignânās where one kind alone rises uppermost according to the context. You explain the appearance of Gnāna, as a result of contact of the objective stimulus with the corresponding sense-organ in the body. You even mention the simile of sound which is produced by striking a drum with a stick. According to this explanation, knowledge is the product of two different physical entities coming in contact with each other. If the contact of the external stimulus with the bodily organ is the adequate condition for the appearance of sense knowledge, then all the

six kinds of Vignâna must occur at once for the simple reason that the adequate stimuli are always present in the environment, and the sense organs of the body are also present together. Under such circumstances, why should only one be present at the focus of attention and the five being submerged below the threshold of consciousness? If you say that the appearance of one is determined by a particular interest or desire towards that object, then there must be similar desire in the other kinds of submerged Vignânâs. Hence, there is no reason why one should be present in isolation exclusive of the other five, when all have similar relation to the respective determinants. If, on the other hand, it is maintained that there is only one determining interest for all the six Vignânâs, and that it produces relevant Vignâna at the appropriate moment, then this persisting interest which plays a different role at different context, is exactly the same as Ātma which is accepted by us as the necessary condition of knowledge. The only difference is in name. If you say that it is inconsistent with your own doctrine of Kshanikavâda then you cannot explain the occurrence of Gnâna without this category of interest. If you reject the persisting entity called interest, and if you stick to the doctrine of momentariness of Kshanikavâda, then it is impossible for you to explain any occurrence in consciousness. For example, while milking a cow, if every drop of milk vanishes the moment it falls in the vessel, then there is no chance of having any milk at all in the vessel. Since there is no chance of getting milk under such conditions, there is much less chance for obtaining curd, butter, butter-milk etc."

Again, "you say that Ichcha or the relevant desire is the causal condition of Gnâna. Then, this must be antecedent to the effect, Gnâna. If this Ichcha is antecedent to Gnâna, wherefrom is it obtained? If it arises from the body, then you derive it from the material Achêtana thing. How can a conscious element Ichcha be produced from an Achêtana material? If you maintain that Ichcha is a conscious element, and as such obtained from consciousness, you will have a preposterous doctrine. While maintaining that consciousness is produced by Ichcha, you have to produce Ichcha itself from consciousness. But, if you say, that it is not produced by consciousness as Gnâna, but by consciousness as Ichcha itself, then the problem is not answered. It is merely transferred to this antecedent Ichcha, and this again to another antecedent of its own, and thus you will have an infinite regress which is no explanation. Since there is no satisfactory account as to the origin of Ichcha, its reality cannot be established. The result is no Ichcha, consequently no knowledge, and consequently no action, and thus everything must end in *Soonya*—Nothing. In order to avoid all these difficulties, you postulate Ālaya Vignâna as the basis of the several kinds of Gnânâs, the one at the focus and the five below the threshold. This Ālaya Vignâna, postulated by you, in order to explain the six kinds of Gnânâs is again a different nomenclature for the entity postulated by us as Ātma. This Ālaya Vignâna postulated by you cannot itself be a momentary existence, for, then it will not function as the basic principle for the six kinds of Gnânâs. It would also be inconsistent with your doctrine that knowledge is born of the contact between the body and the object.

In order to avoid persistent Ālaya Vignâna if you reduce this also to the effect of contact of the body and the physical object, then your position is indistinguishable from that of the Chârvâka. For him also, knowledge is the result of the combination of the four physical Bhûtas. If you maintain that the contact of the body with the physical object is sufficient causal condition for the production of knowledge, you must be able to obtain a similar result when there is a similar contact between the physical object and a dead body. If you reject this objection, on the ground, that the contact must be with the living sense-organs of the living body in order to produce knowledge, and if you maintain that the dead body cannot give rise to knowledge just as no sound can be produced by a torn drum, then you have to explain what you exactly mean Jivithêndriya or living sense-organs. If these living sense-organs and the Ālaya Vignâna which is the basis for these are considered to be distinct entities from the body itself, then you are unconsciously postulating a category of Ātma, though you are not willing to accept the name. If, on the other hand, you maintain that the Ālaya Vignâna and Jivithêndriya are identically the same with the body then you cannot escape Lôkâyatha point of view. Unless you interpret the category of Ālaya Vignâna in terms of Ātma, it cannot serve as a basis for knowledge. But, then you cannot maintain at the same time your doctrine of Ālaya Vignâna and Nairâtmavâda."

According to the Buddhist doctrine of sense-perception, smell, taste and touch, are produced by the actual contact of the objective stimulus with the corresponding sense-organs. In the case of sound and

vision, no such contact is postulated. But Neelakesi points out that even in the case of the ear, it must be maintained that sound is the result of a similar contact of the ear with the external stimulus. She explains her position by bringing in an argument which appears to be quite modern and scientific. In the case of the eye, the sensation is almost instantaneous. But, in the case of the ear, its stimulus takes certain duration to reach the ear before the sensation of sound is experienced. This is quite obvious, says Neelakesi, when you observe a washerman washing his clothes at the other end of a tank; you don't have at once the visual and sound sensation. You perceive sound much later than vision, which clearly implies that the interval is due to the time taken by sound stimulus to travel from the place of its origin to your ear. You are able to distinguish from sound, the distance of its origin. You can say whether it comes from near, or far off, you can determine its direction, whether it comes from your right, or left, or from front, or back; all these characteristics you can discern only because of the nature of the sound stimulus. Hence, sound must be analogous to perception of temperature or touch, and both must result from external stimuli. Further, this method of explaining sense-perception is incompatible with the metaphysical doctrine of Kshanikavâda. The contact of stimulus with the bodily sense-organs must necessarily pre-suppose certain time duration, however short. Only if this is granted, the sense-perception must occur as a result. For otherwise, the causal condition will disappear, and there is no chance for obtaining the sense-perception produced by such contact.

According to Kshanikavâda, not only sense-perception is impossible, no kind of knowledge can be had at all. Take the case of your name. Who will be able to pronounce the whole name if Kshanikavâda is true? The moment the first letter is sounded it will die out before the next letter is pronounced. Hence there is no chance of pronouncing the whole name of all the letters together. If he wants to make sure of the first letter then he will be repeating the same sound till eternity ; for he will have no scope of pronouncing the next keeping the first intact. If it is not possible for any one to pronounce a single name, how is it possible to read your Sâstras propounding the very same doctrine of Kshanikavâda? You modify your Kshanikavâda and say, though the five Skandas are momentary in existence, and though no persisting entity called Jîva is accepted from the absolutely real point of view, still such an entity must be assumed from the vivahâric point of view, for practical purposes. Admission from vivahâric point of view, is merely a polite way of denying the reality of such a category. Your own existence then, must be admitted from only vivahâric point of view, and not from the real point of view. To speak of Buddha himself as a Deva, and to worship him in that name, would be an act of ignorance.

You maintain again, that Sabda has no meaning and reference to objective things ; and yet you preach the three Pitakas, your Sâstras consisting of Sabdas. To be consistent with yourself, you have to maintain that the Sabdas which constitute the three Pitakas can have no meaning and can have no reference to real things. This would mean that you are preaching words

which have no meaning and your disciples learn the very same nonsensical sounds.

Neelakesi next demands a clear exposition of the six kinds of Sagnâ Skandas. The six kinds of Sagnâs are next enumerated. Just like Vignânâs, these Sagnâs also are six in number, being related to the eye, the nose, body, ear, tongue and the Manas. Thus the Sagnâs and the Vignânâs appear to be related to the same object of sense-perception. If the object for both is the same, then why talk of two different things as Vignâna and Sagnâ? But, if the objective elements are different, though present together in the same thing, then the objective element of Sagnâ will not be apprehended by Gnâna, because the latter will have its own objective element in the things. In this case, there is no chance for Gnâna to apprehend its proper objective element in the thing, because the thing will disappear the moment it is apprehended by Sagnâ. But if you maintain that Gnâna can also have its own apprehension of its adequate stimulus, then Sagnâ and Vignâna must appear together; but it is not so according to your own position.

Neelakesi next takes up for criticism, the classification of Samskâras, or moral conduct. Moral conduct is classified into three main heads. Killing, theft and lust—these three pertain to the body. Falsehood, backbiting, harsh words and useless speech, these four are related to speech. Desire, anger and false faith, these three are related to mind. Thus evil conduct, which is of three main heads, Kâyika, Vâchika, Mânasika is of ten different kinds. These ten kinds of bad conduct are morally condemned according to the Buddhist ethics.

Neelakesi points out, that, among the ten evils which are to be avoided, drink and avarice do not find a place. As regards evil in thought, it is maintained that desire is sinful. "If desire is considered to be an evil, why do you equip yourself with all the paraphernalia characteristic of the Buddhist Bikshus, such as umbrella, sandal, begging bowl etc.? You condemn desire and yet you acquire all these things. In the same strain, you may argue that there is no desire, even on the part of a rich house-holder, possessing all luxuries. The real truth is, that desire is not in itself, an evil. Its moral value depends upon the object desired. Desiring good, must be good, and desiring bad, must be bad. Instead of this truth, you maintain that desire is bad in itself. A pious Buddhist, may desire to accept you as his Lord, and desire to believe in your religion as truth. If your doctrine is true, desire in this case also, must be an evil to be avoided. You consider Krôda, anger, as an evil in thought. But you leave out other Mânasika evils such as Mâna, Mâya and Lôba. If anger, Krôda, is to be avoided there is equally good reason that the others also must be avoided. You have shown by your own conduct, that you condemn Mâna (self-conceit). When a king, out of self-conceit, would not pay obeisance to you until you accept his challenge of bending his bow, you accepted the challenge of "bending the bow" and discharged an arrow therefrom, thereby constraining him to accept you as his Lord, by casting away his self-conceit. Similarly, you removed the self-conceit from your own friends and relatives by performing miracles through your powers, *Yôgic Riddhis*. Similarly, in order to cure the evil of Lôba or avarice,

you went to the house of a miser to beg of him cakes, while he was eating his cakes in secrecy. What you yourself condemned as evil, you forget to include in the list of evils given in your code of morals. What you call false faith is not quite evident. If you merely state that your faith is true faith and all the rest false, then what you call false faith, is the result of mere prejudice. If, on the other hand, right faith is that which is based on ultimate truth, and wrong faith is opposed to this, then everyone will accept that false faith should be avoided. In this latter sense, you yourself preach false faith. For your Kshanikavâda will be in conflict with your own statement that you were born in a former birth as a hare. Speaking of an underlying identity during a period of two different births you preach Kshanikavâda. Of these two doctrines one must be true and the other must be false. Obviously, if the first is true, then the second must be false."

"You mention four kinds of evil speech, as things to be avoided :—untruth, back-biting, offending words, and useless words. Barring these four, every other form of speech is accepted as good. Then talking scandal about a person, may be truth-speaking. Instead of back-biting, you may insult a person to his face. You may offend an individual, though you do not use harsh words. All these courses of conduct which are ordinarily considered to be undesirable, would be outside the class of evil conduct, according to your own definition of moral evil. According to your philosophy, any object in the world is but an aggregate of eight elements besides which there is nothing called a thing. Yet, when the thing is referred to by the name, it would be

an instance of false speech, since the word is used when there is no corresponding object referred to by the name. Your peaching philosophy itself, would be a case of speaking untruth. There are many courses of conduct which are as bad as killing, and yet you don't condemn them. Instead of oneself killing, one may incite another person to murder, which is as bad as murder; and yet you admit killing only as Kâyika evil which would be applicable only to the actual deed of murder. If you say that useless speech is evil, then you have to maintain that speech with utility must be good. The course of conduct dictated by motive of selfishness and utility must come under acceptable course of conduct. Killing, theft, and lust, are described as evils in deed. How can you have these evils in deed, without a corresponding motive in thought? Hence the classification has no justification since the deed must necessarily pre-suppose the corresponding desire as motive. Why do you restrict evil in deed only to these three kinds? Are there not many other evils in deed, such as throwing thorns on the high way, destroying temples and sacred places? These are as much evils in deed as those condemned by you? Your definition of killing that it must satisfy five conditions would practically mean that there would be no evil of killing in the world because there would be no case of satisfying all the five conditions."

"The five *angas* of killing, as enumerated by you, are (1) that it must be a living being (2) it must be known to be a living being to the person who kills (3) there must be the intention to kill (4) there must be the act of killing and (5) as a result of this act,

the animal must die. Unless these five *angas* are present together, there can be no killing. It would be clear, therefore, that there can be no sin of killing as these five can never be found together. According to this definition, it would be no murder to kill a stranger under the impression that he is your enemy. If it is necessary to have all these five aspects to constitute the sin of killing, then why is it that King Kâlaha, when he attempted to attack the Bikshu Kshântipâla, was swallowed up by Avîchi hell? This story, indicates, that even the thought is sinful. That is certainly the proper attitude to be taken in the matter of killing, theft, and lust. One who has the intention of committing any one of these three, but could not realise his object for lack of opportunity, must be considered to be guilty of the act morally. Whereas, according to your elaborate definition of murder, every actual case of killing can be shown to be exempted from such a definition. Then, you say that mere enjoyment will not produce any karma. This is a dangerous doctrine. For, you can maintain, that drinking and whoreing, since they are mere enjoyment, cannot be condemned as moral evils. You can walk away with somebody's property under the mistaken impression that it is your own, and it will be no theft. Similarly, you can have sexual intercourse with some woman, not your own wife, with the belief that she is your own wife." All these exceptions are pointed out in order to prove the defective conception of moral ideal enunciated by the Buddhists. Thus far the criticism of the five Skandas.

Next, the four Āryasatyas are examined by Neelakesi. "You maintain that everything is painful, "*Sarvam*

Dukkam." Technically, this would mean the other three Satyas are also Dukkhas. Then, there will be only one class of Aryasatyas, that everything is Dukka. While preaching that everything is Dukka, you talk of three kinds of Vēdana, pleasurable feeling, painful feeling, and neutral feeling. If everything is Dukka or pain, what justification is there for speaking of pleasurable feeling, and neutral feeling? The doctrine, that "*Sarvam is Dukka,*" must imply that all karmas must be sinful. There can be no *punya karma*, good action, for, if there were any such, its result must be happiness and not misery. When all is misery, it must be the fruit of sinful karma and that is the only kind of karma found in life. If that be so, what is the use of preaching Dharma to others, if there is no chance for any good action taking place? Hence, "*Sarvam Dukkam.*" doctrine, ends in self-contradiction. Similarly, the doctrine of "*Sarvam Asuchi.*" If everything is impure, what is the meaning of wearing garlands of flowers, and using scents and sandal paste. If everything is impure, these will not be different from filth. You say "*Sarvam Asuchi,*" and yet hold that your scriptures and the code of morals and what you eat are all pure. Is this not wanton indulgence in contradiction? Your disciples, ignorant of the significance of this doctrine "*Sarvam Asuchi,*" find fault with us for saying that it is no use trying to purify the body, for bodily purity is no purity, and the body being by nature impure, can never be purified permanently. If nothing is pure, then religious discipline will not lead you to any path of purity. Hence it is no use to practise it. If there is no real difference between the scented sandal and dirty filth, why is it that you prefer

the former and reject the latter? And then you say "*Sarvam Anitya*," everything is vanishing, and has only momentary existence. This would also formally reduce all categories to one class of '*Anitya*.' Your metaphysical doctrine "*Sarvam Anitya*" is contradicted by the behaviour of men in society. The Buddhist interpretation of the doctrine of "*Sarvam Anitya*" would mean that at every moment your property and other possessions get destroyed, but people lament the loss of their property only when it is confiscated by the King, or carried away by a robber, or destroyed by fire. No one believes in the loss of property as a result of this metaphysical doctrine. If "*Sarvam Anitya*" is true, there is no meaning in offering religious worship or practising charity towards the needy. Your own suffering as *Bôdhisatva* in previous births, will be equally aimless and absurd, if *Kartha*, the actor of good, is not *Bôktha*, the enjoyer of the fruits thereof; is it because of the consciousness of this that you made a gift of your own sons as slaves without any compunction of consciousness? Is it because there is nothing which you call your own, that you did not care for the lamentations of your wife when your sons were gifted away? You talk of love and mercy to human creatures, and your mercy is often misplaced. When it is pointed out, that, according to your *Kshanikavâda*, there can be no society of human beings, no human personality, no Scripture, no action, and no fruit thereof, you try to meet these objections by postulating what you call *Santâna*, a series of conscious states and *Vâsana*, a kind of inter-connecting link between the various elements of the series. But the *Santâna* and *Vâsana* are in direct

conflict with your doctrine of *Anitya*. Again, you talk of “*Sarvam Anâtma*.” You maintain that, neither in the objective things, nor in human personality, there is any persistent entity ; and yet, you accept, from viva-hâric point of view, some kind of Jîva or Ātma. This, also, is self-contradiction. If you say that the name Ātma is merely a conventional one for Santâna itself, then the series cannot be called Ātma or Jîva. You say, that you deny Ātma from the absolute point of view, and concede its reality from the vivahâric point of view, then you adopt the line of argument characteristic of Anekânta Vâda which means that you summarily quit your own point of view. It is impossible for you to explain Pratyabhigna experience without postulating some kind of persisting Ātma. Pratyabhigna-recognition of former experience—must necessarily imply the common entity, from the time of past experience upto the present moment when recognition appears in consciousness. You cannot dismiss recognition as merely illusory. To dismiss it as Brânthi knowledge, would be inconsistent with your own words, “I was born as a hare in a former birth etc.”

Next Neelakesi explains that reality must be explained by its *Nâma*, *Sthâpana*, *Dravya* and *Bhâva*, (name, image, substance and mode respectively). The Buddhist identifies reality with the last Bhâva or modification. He does not recognise the other three having any relation to reality. Neelakesi tries to establish that by these three factors also the reality of Ātma can be inferred. Taking name and its relation to the thing, Neelakesi emphasizes the fact that, only in the case of an existing thing, a name can be given. Hence the

name Jīva must be interpreted existentially as referring to a real thing. To this, you raise an objection by saying that, similarly, the name of *Akāśa Pushpa* must be given existential import. But, what is the real object corresponding to *Akāśa Pushpa*? Neelakesi answers:—The name which has an existential import, means a primary name. *Akāśa Pushpa*, is only a secondary name, obtained by combining two primary names *Akāśa* and *Pushpa*, each of it has its own direct reference to a corresponding real. Hence, your objection based upon a secondary compound name, is pointless in the case of the primary name. The compound names may refer to such chimera; while the primary individual names must be interpreted existentially. The name *Ātma*, being such a primary individual name, has an existential import. Similarly, its reality can be inferred from its nature and form as revealed by introspection. If you deny the reality of *Ātma*, then what right have you to maintain your own reality as Buddha? If you say that even in the case of Buddha, the reference is only from the *vivahāric* point of view, and that there is no real *Ātma* even in the case of your own personality, what becomes of your own religion and Scripture? How could these escape unreality and illusoriness when their source itself is dismissed as unreal? Thus, the doctrine of the four Satyas, the five Skandas, and the momentariness of things, all these disappear at the approach of critical reason. What more have you worth presenting and worth believing? In spite of defects in these doctrines, Buddha says that everyone must respect his moral discipline, and the path of salvation which certainly must be accepted by all.

Neelakesi points out even here, that Samsâra and its cause, Môksha and its means, can have no meaning to one who maintains Kshanikavâda. All these will have to disappear as vanishing unimals and the so-called glory of your path will be unfounded. Nevertheless, Neelakesi wants to know what is meant by Samsâra and Môksha? Samsâra means a series of development similar to the life of a plant beginning with a seed right to the full-grown plant. This continuous development from seed to plant, is given as an analogy to series of Samsâra, and just like a seed which is burnt will not sprout and grow into a plant, so also Môksha means putting an end to the seed of Samsâra and thus ending the series itself. Karma and Karma-phala, action and its fruit, are similarly explained analogically. Though you talk of Karma and Karma-phala, you don't believe in the existence of an actor, or an enjoyer. According to Kshanikavâda, you maintain that everything is vanishing, and yet you praise moral discipline of Vratas and Sîlas and you praise charity and love. Of what avail are these if there is no Ātma? You speak of a good action leading to a happy result, and bad action leading to evil and pain. This talk of Karma and its fruit, would be meaningless, without postulating a persistent Ātma who is responsible for his action and who is bound to enjoy the fruits of his action. You say that such postulates are not necessary. Without such persistent entity, the series itself is sufficient. In a particular Chitta Santâna, (the series of consciousness) if there is an element of good, it will lead the series to happiness, if there is an element of evil, that will inevitably lead to pain and

misery. This behaviour of Pancha Skanda is quite analogous to the behaviour of Ashtaka aggregate. If you have two pomegranate seeds, one coated with black shellac, and the other with the red shellac, and if the seeds are planted in the ground, they grow into two pomegranate trees. The seed coated with black shellac produces black flowers in its tree, whereas the other has red flowers. The black shellac and the red shellac exactly correspond to bad element and the good element in the Chitta Santâna which karmas produce as their respective fruits of misery and happiness. Since Samsâra and its attendant misery or happiness, are fully explained in this form, it is not necessary to postulate Âtma. Pancha Skanda series or Purusha Santâna, if associated with Kusala or good conduct will go to heaven, and if associated with Akusala or evil conduct will go to hell. In the case of the seed, there is nothing beyond the Ashtaka Pinda. The eight elements constitute the seed, and there is nothing more. Similarly, in the Purusha Santâna, there is nothing apart from the five Skandas.

Neelakesi points out that the whole argument is based upon false analogy. "Shellac with which you coat the pomegranate seed is an external thing, and not one of the components of the Ashtaka, whereas Kusala and Akusala which are to produce the happiness and misery, are distinctly internal to the Purusha Santâna series, and are included in the five Skandas. Again, the flower whether black or red, must appear in the tree grown out of the seeds. If the plant dies there is no chance of the flower appearing at all. There must be unbroken continuity of the series from the seed to the flower. But, in the case of Purusha Santâna, it is just

the opposite. Kusala, the element of good conduct, or Akusala the element of evil, present in Purusha Santâna can produce the happiness in Swarga, or misery in Hell, only after the death of the individual. If the tree dies there is no chance of a flower. Whereas, in the case of man, unless the man dies there is neither Swarga happiness, nor Hell misery. Your analogy would be quite valid if you show that action, good or evil, done at the time of childhood produces their corresponding fruits at the time of old age in the life of the same individual. To talk of Karma in the life of man, and to talk of the result in another individual or a Deva the inhabitant of heaven would be inconsistent with your doctrine of Anâtma."

"According to your analogy the colour of the shellac used to coat the seed appears as colour in the flower. Similarly, the karma done by a man must appear as such in its fruit, that is, a person performing *tapas* in this world, must continue to be as such a *tapasi* even when he is born in Swarga, and not as a Deva enjoying happiness. The analogy will be relevant only if you prove that the red colour of the shellac produces something other than the red colour of the flower, say sweetness in the fruit. Then, you can infer on the analogy that, performing *tapas*, or undergoing spiritual discipline in the world, will produce as its fruit happiness in Swarga. Further, the analogy is defective in this way. While the causal element shellac which is supposed to produce the colour in the flower is distinctly a foreign factor to the seed, Kusala and Akusala samskâras which have the efficacy of producing their respective results are

inner elements in the series of consciousness, Chitta Santâna.

Speaking of Kusala and Gnâna—conduct and knowledge—you describe them as Dharma and Dharmi. But you don't admit the same relationship of Dharma and Dharmi—quality and substance—in the case of Gnâna and Ātma. When Dharma and Dharmi relationship is accepted in one case, what objection is there to apply the same to another similar case? If chitta and action are considered to be entirely different and unrelated to each other, then action may occur independent of Chitta. This would mean that action or karma may occur apart from mind. Action unrelated to mind or consciousness, can never be known to us. Since we have no experience of such action, we cannot even talk of that as such. One must perceive you, know your nature, have Bakhti towards you, before one can offer worship to you. Perception, knowledge, devotion, and worship must all be experienced one after the other by the same individual if he is to perform worship to you; and this will be in conflict with your own doctrine Anâtma-vâda. A persistent entity who is capable of having all these different experiences will be identical with the Jaina conception of Ātma. You stoutly reject the Jaina view that pleasure, pain, experience, may also lead to Karma and Karmabhandha. But you don't realise the sequence of your position. If pleasure experience, is incapable of producing karmic bondage, then even sexual intercourse must be considered to be incapable of producing any karma, and hence must not be condemned. In answer to this, you say, that since there is yearning for this object even in this enjoyment, this intense desire for

objects, necessarily leads to karma. If this desire for the object is considered to be independent of Kusala or Akusala, action good or bad, and if it produces karma, then, it is the same thing as enjoyment producing karma. If this desire is same as Gnâna then mere knowledge of another woman must be considered as adultery. If this desire is merely another mode of feeling, then it means that the affective element, the pleasure—pain aspect of consciousness will also lead to karma and this would be in conflict with your own doctrine, that enjoyment will lead to no karma. If it is maintained that only action, in association of Chitta or consciousness will lead to karma then every experience is a kind of mental activity and hence must lead to karma. You have to give up your doctrine that mere enjoyment is ineffective.

Another analogy is introduced to explain the relation between the seed and the fruit, actor and the enjoyer, karma and its effect. Just as in cultivation, the seed harvested is used for the next season of sowing, and the harvest of that for the next, and so on, similarly karma will lead to fruit, and that to another action, and that to its fruit, and so on. This kind of inter-dependent causal series based upon your analogy of cultivation and harvesting will not hold good because it will be in conflict with your doctrine of Kshanikavâda. When you stick to your Kshanikavâda and Anâtmavâda then there is no meaning in your preaching of Dharma and Dharmanârga as a path to salvation, as means of attaining happiness in Swarga. Neelakesi repeats her objection that since there is no continuity between man and Deva the former analogy will not hold good. This objection is brushed

aside. The presence of an interval or gap does not affect the argument. Even if there is no continuity and even when there is a gap between the cause and effect, the effect may nevertheless be produced. For example, a fruit by sight may produce its characteristic taste in a person who sees that; a machine may by a mere turn of a handle quit its own place and reach another destination, or face seen in the mirror, the reflection of man seen in a pot of water are also real effects though there is no continuity between the cause and the effect.

Neelakesi rejects even these instances of analogy. In all these cases, the object producing the result, must remain in tact. There will be no reflection in a mirror or in water, unless your face is in front of the mirror or the moon in front of the water surface. If the object is removed there will be no reflection at all. Further, even when the object is in front of the reflecting surface there must be something issuing from the moon and coming in contact with the reflecting surface in order to produce the corresponding reflection. Thus there must be real continuity. Otherwise, you cannot explain the absence of reflection when there is some obstruction for the light from the moon. You have to maintain that light coming from the moon is a kind of matter, however subtle, and that it must come in contact with the water surface in order to produce the reflection. Your objection that you cannot catch it by hand, is beside the point when it is considered to be very subtle and as such imperceptible to the sense of touch. Again, the analogy does not hold good, because for the appearance of Deva in Swarga man must die here in the world. Whereas

when the moon sets, it will produce no reflection in the water surface. You can talk of reflection only when the moon is present, whereas when a man is alive there will be no Deva appearing in Swarga.

This second analogy of the object and its reflection is the same as your former analogy of the colour of the shellac in the seed and both these cases of analogy become irrelevant when you remember that there must be distinct breach between man and Deva whereas any such interval in the analogy will lead to no result. You explain Santâna or continuous series of different elements thus: You give us examples of continuous series, a stream of wind, a flame, a flowing river, or series of ants. In all these cases, you have a number of elements one in touch with the other, and thus forming continuity of series. In the case of aggregate of five Skandas, such an explanation won't hold good. According to your doctrine of Kshanikavâda, no two elements can exist together, the previous one must entirely disappear before the next is born. Hence the conception of Santâna or series, in this case, is quite different from the continuous series employed in your illustrations. In the case of the illustrations of a stream of a river or a flame, the elements must co-exist and be in contact with one another; whereas in Purusha Santâna of Pancha Skandas co-existence of elements is denied. Again, in the case of Samsâra, cycle of births and deaths, you maintain that it is a continuous series having no beginning but ending in Môksha, Nirvâna. If it is so continuous, how can you explain the interval of unconsciousness brought about by some disease or swooning? If the Purusha Santâna is considered to be

continuous, even during the intervals of unconsciousness, there should be present mental activities of perception and feeling, a conclusion not borne out by fact. Continuity of series would have meaning only if Kshanika-vâda is set aside. Then only Pancha Skanda aggregate appearing as a child can grow into full manhood, and become subject to decay at old age ; because the continuity of growth would necessarily imply a permanent life throughout the changing series.

According to your Kshanikavâda, a Deva born in Deva Loka, must completely disappear immediately and yet you speak of Devas enjoying happiness in Swarga for several periods or kalpas. If you say that this is possible, because the series of Devasantâna will continue for several kalpas, then what is the cause of the continuity of the series ? If the first element of consciousness in Deva's birth is taken to be the cause for the following elements, then since this first element of consciousness in Swarga is the necessary result of Punya or good conduct done in the world below, this first element appearing in Swarga as happiness, must be credited with causal efficiency to produce a subsequent element and this should continue in series. This will be in conflict with your doctrine that the enjoyment is effectless ; If you say that the real causal factor producing the Deva Santâna in Swarga is the last active element in Purusha Santâna in man's life here in the world, then this one factor must be considered the potent cause for the whole series of Deva Santâna. This again is in conflict with your other doctrine, "one cause one effect." Further the element of good conduct in man, would be dead long long ago and cannot be

quoted as the cause of the Deva Santâna series. Concept of series is impossible if one element utterly disappears before the next is born. What is born will be absolutely new ; then the newly born will have no causal connection with the prior one. Any other explanation will be inconsistent with your creed of Kshanikavâda.

You say that Kshanika should not be interpreted as the absolute destruction of one element before the birth of the next one. Even when the prior element disappears it must be considered to leave behind it a kind of potency or sakti or vâsana, just like a flower leaves its fragrance in the pot even when the latter empties all its contents. This doctrine of vâsana or residual efficiency after the disappearance of the thing, would naturally constrain you to adopt the doctrine of Nitya and Anitya which you fight shy of. The thing disappearing expresses the aspect of Anitya, and the residual vâsana expresses the aspect of permanent, Nitya. And when you have both these aspects associated with the thing, then the nature of the thing must admit both change and permanency which is just the Jaina view of substance. You cannot consistently postulate vâsana while maintaining your doctrine of Kshanikavâda. In the case of the flower residual vâsana in the pot is the result of co-existence of the flower and the pot for some time. Otherwise there could be no fragrance caught by the pot from the flower. But according to your Kshanikavâda such a co-existence is impossible. One element in the series must die before the second appears. Hence to talk of vâsana being left in the second by the first would be impossible. If really some aspect

of the first stays on even after the death of the first, then, there can be no complete destruction of the first element, for the residual *vâsana* left behind must necessarily be considered as an aspect of the element which is supposed to be dead. Disappearance after leaving an element behind is no complete destruction. Hence the doctrine of *vâsana* will not fit with your doctrine of *Kshanikavâda*. If the *vâsana* also is to be interpreted as momentary, not capable of persisting, though it is able to leave behind another *vâsana* having the necessary causal efficiency, the explanation will only end in infinite regress and the old criticism will stand unanswered. If the *vâsana* is not dismissed as momentary, then it must be a persisting element throughout the series. Then it would merely be another name for *Ātma*.

You interpret *Môksha* as *Nirvâna* or as cessation of the series, which means complete destruction of the series itself. Your doctrine of *Kshanikavâda* will make *Môksha* an extremely common affair within the easy reach of everyone accessible even to a villain, who need not undergo any rigorous moral discipline to obtain the goal. For, according to your conception of series of *Chitta Santâna*, which constitutes *Samsâra*, one *Chitta* must appear before the destruction of another *Chitta*. Every moment there is destruction of element in the *Samsâra* and hence a full stop to the series which means cessation of *Samsâra* and occurrence of *Môksha*. If *Samsâra* is interpreted as the appearance of one series after complete destruction of the former series, then you might as well believe that a woman dead long long ago has given birth to a son now. But you say that such

an absurd result will not follow, for there must be a temporal proximity or contiguity. Without this temporal contiguity, one series cannot be considered to be the cause of the other. Even this will not be a satisfactory explanation. If emphasis is laid on temporal contiguity, then suppose that immediately after Buddha's Nirvâna there appears a Chitta series in hell. Then, are you prepared to say that this latter Chitta is merely the continuous existence of Buddha in Samsâra even after obtaining Mukti ?

You bring in another analogy to express the relation between the two elements, cause and effect in the series ; the disappearance of one element and appearance of the next are compared to the up and down movements of a lever balance. When one end of the lever goes up, the other automatically goes down. Similarly, the appearance and disappearance of the Chitta series. Neelakesi rejects this comparison, because the ends of the lever are present together in the rod. Otherwise there can be no up and down movement simultaneously. But in the case of the Chittas there is nothing holding together the two chittas. Again you mention the comparison with sleep. The ending of sleep and the appearance of conscious awareness correspond to the disappearance of one element and the appearance of the other element in the Chitta series. This is also rejected as a false analogy ; because, according to your conception, it is the disappearing element that is the cause of the next and not the act of disappearance. Similarly, you have to prove that sleep is the cause of awakening, to make the analogy applicable to the case. If you say that sleep is the cause of awareness, it

would be absurd. The real truth is that birth and death are inapplicable to non-existent things. There is no meaning in describing the size and shape of crow's teeth or donkey's horns; and yet you say according to the doctrine of Anitya, that if there is no Ashtaka Pinda there can be no lever or balance, without the two ends of the lever no lever, without up and down movement there are no two ends, and so on. This meaningless statement is as incoherent as a baby's babblings. Up and down movements of the two ends would be absolutely meaningless without the lever rod. Your analogy will be true and applicable only if birth and death, appearance and disappearance, are inter-related to each other by a permanent connecting link and that is exactly what you deny. When you say that there is no rod without the up and down movements of the two ends it is flatly contradicted by the fact of actual experience. We see the lever rod balanced without the up and down movement of the ends.

Finally you interpret Santâna or series in a more intelligible way. When paddy is sown, you will reap what you sow; you must harvest paddy when paddy is sown, and chola cannot be had at the harvest. Hence the seed and fruit must be identical, otherwise, the harvested grain need not necessarily be the paddy sown at the cultivation season. But, in spite of this identity between the seed and the fruit, there must be a real difference between the two. Otherwise during the harvest season you will just have the paddies sown and nothing more, and the whole act of cultivation and the growth of the paddy and harvesting will be unnecessary. Hence it cannot be maintained that the

seed and the fruit are absolutely identical. You have to adopt therefore a *Via Media*, neither they are different, nor are they absolutely identical. Similarly in the case of Purusha Santâna. Kartâ and Bhôktâ, the actor and the enjoyer, are neither absolutely different nor absolutely identical. A middle course of Madhyama point of view must therefore be adopted.

By this Madyama point of view, you will necessarily be shifted out of your own position. This Bhêda-Abhêda doctrine, both aspects applicable to the same personality, will drive you to your opponent's camp. You will have to quit your Kshanika camp and take refuge in the camp of Anêkântavâda and implicitly accept the Jaina doctrine of Bhêda-Abhêda. As a matter of fact, no absolute point of view or Ekântavâda is logically possible. If you maintain the "Sarvam Anitya doctrine" then even the person speaking must be Anitya and there will be no time for him to preach his doctrine, no knowledge is possible for him, either to have or to impart. Hence there can be no philosophy at all. So also when "Sarvam Nitya" is held. Then everything will be unchanging and permanent, and in the world of unchanging permanency there will be no mental activity, no experience, and no acquisition of knowledge, and no imparting of the same, for, all these imply activity and change. Hence the doctrine of "Sarvam Nitya" will have neither philosophy nor religion. The only logical course for a thinker to adopt is to recognise the truth of Anêkânta view, to accept that the reals have different characteristics from the different points of view. You can predicate different characteristics as you adopt different points of view.

Hearing the presentation of this Anêkânta view, Buddha confesses the importance of this point of view and recognises its importance for building up a code of ethics. Religious discipline and religious goal would have meaning only when you admit the existence of a permanent entity throughout the series and changes due to growth and development. Hence he is prepared to give up his doctrine of Anâtma and acknowledge the truth of Ātma which is capable of becoming Paramâtma through ethical discipline and performance of *tapas*. Thus ends the discussion with Buddha resulting in Neelakesi's victory.

CHAPTER VI.

Ajivakavada.

Leaving Kapilapura, Neelakesi the aerial traveller, begins to sing the hymn of praise to Lord Jina, who conquered the four inner enemies, who is the ocean of knowledge and who revealed the twelve *angas* containing fundamentals of all religions, and the Pûrvas in which are incorporated all the courses of ethical discipline found in other religions. No greater bliss for us than worshipping at his feet, nothing greater to bear at heart than the feet of the Lord, the self-luminant. After worshipping Lord Jina thus, Neelakesi arrives at Kukkutanagar. Entering the settlement of the ascetics there, Neelakesi desires to know who the residents are. She is informed that it is the place of the Ajivaka teacher by name Pûrana. He is highly learned and is capable of answering all criticisms and doubts. Here are his followers also, the famous Ajivakas who are not to be mistaken for Digambaras though they resemble them in outward appearance: Neelakesi enquires of the spokesman, "Who is your Lord, the founder of your religion? What is your Āgama? What is the nature of reality and its modifications according to your faith?" She gets this answer:—"Maskari is our Lord. Our scripture is the group of works called nine rays of light. The reals are five in number. These are the five different kinds of atoms, Earth, Air, Water, Fire and Life. What exists cannot be destroyed, and what is not, cannot be born. Submerging and floating con-

stitute the behaviour of the reals. Submerging means becoming latent, and floating up, means expressing or evolving out. Our Lord being perfect in knowledge, free from all karmas, will neither act nor speak. He is always characterised by inaction and silence; maintains silence lest he should injure the minute living beings that cram the space all around. Besides silence and inactivity, he is also characterised by the absence of old age and decay. His appearance is unintelligible and inexplicable, as the rainbow in the sky. When he disappears it is equally without any cause or explanation. Possessed with unblemished knowledge, our Lord is called the Pûrana, or the Perfect. The sacred scripture consisting of "*the nine rays*" describes the causelessness of appearance and disappearance, of the five kinds of reals which are Moorthas spacial entities. Such Moortha categories, as already mentioned, are the atoms, Earth, Air, Fire, Water, and Life. These five kinds of reals have different natures but no qualities. Real is characterised by touch, taste, colour and smell. But it is devoid of sound. Water has the characteristic of coldness, Fire heat, Air sound, Life awareness. These are the essential characteristics of the five different kinds of atoms which constitute the reality. In spite of this distinct nature possessed by different atoms, the atomic aggregates of Earth, Air, etc., have no *gunas* or qualities. These aggregates are capable of disintegration and co-integration. One kind of aggregate like earth, can absorb the other, but still they are not capable inter-penetration. Though we speak of moments, we do not recognise the category of time as such. These are the real *tattvâs* for us. As far as our

ethical code is concerned it is distinctly epicurean. But do not sneer at us because of our pursuit of pleasures. Our philosophical position is certainly impregnable."

Listening to this exposition of Ajivaka philosophy, Neelakēsi points out that all the four doctrines, Āpta, Āgama, Padārtha, and Pravritti, (the Lord, the Scripture, the Reality and its behaviour) all these are unsupported by pramānas, by the Pratyaksha or Anumāna—sense perception or inference. Taking the founder of the religion first, his silence is unintelligible and purposeless. Is it due to an aversion to mankind that he does not open his mouth? One who knows the real truth must, out of love and sympathy towards the ignorant masses, speak out and reveal to them the paths to happiness and salvation. If the founder of your religion keeps strict silence, wherefrom have you obtained your scripture and the nine rays of light? You say that these are revealed by two Dēvatās, Okkali and Ōkali. If your scriptures are really revealed by these two Dēvatās are they equipped with perfect knowledge in order to exercise the privilege of revealing the gospel? If they are really Omniscient, they must also stick to the vow of silence exactly like your Lord Maskari. If they speak then they cannot be perfect. And since they are not perfect, what they preach need not be ultimate truth. If Maskari's silence is due to fear of Samsāra, and if speaking would tie him to the cycle of births and deaths, then you can also by observing perfect silence become a minor God. If you say that the Āpta, though silent, is in possession of perfect knowledge, which privilege is not available to the ordinary mortals, then of what benefit is he to the world while being equipped with

perfect knowledge? We ordinary householders though in possession of imperfect knowledge, are certainly more useful to the world because we are able to impart our knowledge though imperfect to those that seek our advice and help. Thus our service to the world will be more valuable than that of your Āpta whose perfect knowledge is completely shut up from the world because of his perfect silence.

You speak of causelessness, and maintain that appearance and disappearance of things in the world have no sufficient reason. This principle, you apply to your own Āpta, whose appearance is compared to the sudden appearance of a rainbow. But since your Lord has a body and sense organs just like an ordinary mortal, he must have been born in a similar way. Then why do you assume that his appearance has no cause, and that it is as inexplicable as a rainbow? You are not accurate even in your simile. Are you not aware of the fact that the rainbow is the effect of sun's rays falling on a layer of clouds in the skies? Just as a rainbow is the effect of a sufficiently adequate cause, so also the origin of Maskari Deva must be the result of an equally adequate cause. If the Omniscient being adopts a vow of perfect silence, how do you know then that he is possessed of perfect knowledge? If it is inferred from the silence then a similar conclusion would be quite justifiable in all cases of absence of speech like babies, deaf-mutes and even trees and hills. If speech is avoided in order to avoid action or karma, then all kinds of activities must be avoided. Do you mean to say that your Lord has not got even movement of his limbs? If he is so motionless, how do you know that

he is living at all? Such a religious imposter must certainly be exposed. He talks of the five kinds of tattvas, preaches the doctrine of causelessness, practises the vow of silence lest he should be bound by karma, and yet has activity enough to make a living of his profession, activity even to the extent of sexual intercourse.

Colour, taste, smell and touch are said to be elements of the nature of earth. Hence this should not be associated with the other three Bhûtas, Fire, Air and Water. If these are really devoid of sense qualities peculiar to the earth how are they perceptible to the senses? As a matter of fact, these sense qualities are also found in the other Bhûtas and therefore these also must be brought under the same class of earth. Then you have only two classes of reals, Earth and Life; and yet you speak of the five kinds of realities. Your classification of categories leaves out of account, darkness, which is also perceptible to the senses, and hence it must be considered as an aspect of reality. You speak of several aspects of sense qualities of the reals and yet do not admit *gunas* or qualities for the real thing. The elements of reality, the aspects of nature which you mention, in reference to these Bhûtas, are just *gunas* and the reals themselves constitute *guni* even though you do not accept this truth. You reject this suggestion by saying that the nature and thing are but identical and hence you cannot talk of *gunas* apart from the thing. You infer the absence of *gunas* from the fact of their inseparability from the things. But you must realise that the inseparability of the *gunas* from the *guni* is no tenable argument for denying the realities of *gunas* or qualities.

Next the doctrine of Avichalita Nitya is taken up

for examination. According to this doctrine no change is admitted in reality. Reality is characterised by an absolute permanency. It admits of no change ; and yet in ordinary life, change is a very common thing. A person hale and strong becomes sickly ; things grow, decay and die ; and yet you talk of an absolute unchanging permanency. Do you mean to say that even in your state of Mōksha you preserve in-tact all your characteristics as Samsāra Jīva ? You unhesitatingly admit that it is so ; that your nature of Samsāra Jīva with all its weakness is present in your Mōksha state but entirely submerged. You bring in the example of sun-rise. “ When the sun rises, planets and stars completely disappear. Though it is not easy to perceive them during day light you cannot infer that they cease to exist. They, nevertheless, do exist, continue their movements and produce their characteristic results according to the principles of astrology. Similarly, even in the Mōksha state, Samsāra is preserved. It is submerged and not destroyed.” According to this contention that the samsāric characteristics are submerged and not destroyed even after the attainment of Mōksha, you must admit that the nature and activity of the previous births in Samsāra which are present in the latent form must have the chance of occasionally appearing explicitly even in the perfect state. Hence you must also contain in yourself though in a submerged form the nature and characteristic of your previous Varāha Avatāra ; it means that in spite of your perfection you may have to behave occasionally as a Varāha.

Your doctrine that nothing is created and nothing is destroyed will lead to absurdity. Even in the case

of food eaten by you there must be present already the refuse and excreta which is going to result from your food. If everything is unchanged and if there is no value resulting from conduct, what is the use of performing *tapas* or exercising moral discipline? For, there will be no *Punya* resulting therefrom. Even when you renounce the world and become an ascetic you still believe yourself to be a householder and behave also as such. That is why your ascetic career is merely an incessant pursuit of pleasures.

If "what exists cannot die and what is not cannot be born" then how do you account for the fire produced by ghee? If you say it is latent in ghee, how can ghee exist concealed in semi-solid state? Due to the fire present in it, it must always be melted and remain as liquid. Further, you must admit that even in the case of a small girl there must remain her future child in the womb. You speak of submerging and floating of the reals. But what is the reason of such disappearance and appearance? Since you admit no cause for such changes, such occurrences must be considered to be quite unacceptable and hence irrational. If a horse and its trotting are considered absolutely identical, then the horse must be found trotting or galloping even when he is quiet, eating grass in the stable. This is certainly a wonderful truth which must necessarily be revealed to all for their enlightenment. If colour and other characteristics are identical with the thing, and if the thing never undergoes any change, then how do you explain the presence of green colour in the date fruit when it is unripe and the change in the colour when the fruit ripens? Similarly if shape is the

thing and if it never changes, how can you have a boat dug out of a square block of timber? How can you have a bowl beaten out of a flat piece of metal? The flat metal beaten into a hollow bowl must, according to your doctrine, be present in a sub-merged form even in the hollow bowl. The flatness of the piece of metal becomes latent and the hallowness of the bowl becomes explicitly present. If latency and explicitness, disappearing and appearing, are considered to be quite different, one coming and the other going, then you are caught in the snare of Kshanikavâda—the doctrine of momentariness. Your much boasted doctrine of Avichalita Nitya, unchanging permanency, has been cast to the winds. The only escape for you is to adopt the doctrine of change in a permanent substance, the metal remaining the same, the flatness is changed into hollowness when the metal is converted into a bowl. Here you have change only in the shape of things, the thing itself remaining identically the same. Your doctrine of Avichalita Nitya is belied even by grammatical changes in the word. In the formation of compound words, the parts undergo change according to the rules of grammar; hence even the language which you employ is in conflict with your doctrine of unchanging permanency.

Then, you recognise the four aspects of organic growth, or becoming :—

1. This will become that.
2. This becomes that, through a definite process of growth.
3. This will grow up to that.

4. This will become that after a lapse of definite period of time.

(Inevitability of growth, the necessary manner of growth, the limit and maturity of growth, the time taken for full growth; these are the four aspects of growth recognised by the Ajivakas). It is illustrated in the case of a child. A female baby must inevitably grow into a full-developed woman. This growth into womanhood must be due to proper feeding and bringing up. Womanhood is the limit of growth and this full-developed womanhood will occur only on the 12th year of the age. If your doctrine that reality does not undergo any change is true, then how can you account for these four aspects of growth or development? A child must remain a child and should never become a developed woman, just as a seed will remain a seed and never grow into a tree. How can you talk of becoming at all? How can you say that everything must grow to its full stature? Growth is not compatible with the doctrine of Avichalita Nitya. You maintain that what is not cannot become; and in the case of development of a child your doctrine may be alright. In a child, the hands and feet, the little limbs of the baby already in existence, become developed hands and feet when the child attains womanhood. But what about the fresh and new development of breast, etc., appearing in the woman due to adolescence? Do you say that these also were present in the baby, and the baby had the implicit presence in her of the full grown womanhood from the very beginning? This would be absurd. You must then also maintain that the six feet stature of the grown-up woman was already present in the 1½ foot

baby. According to your Avichalita Nitya doctrine, whatever happens must imply its prior existence; for, what is not, cannot occur, is the truth. Then every female child must contain in herself, her future female child, and that its future child, and so on. And this is entirely a ridiculous conclusion. In any case, this doctrine of prior existence of whatever happens cannot fit in with your doctrine of becoming. Similarly, the other aspects of growth. If growth is conditioned by appropriate instrumental facilities such as feeding etc., then it implies adequate casual conditions to produce the effect. But you don't recognise any such cause. Again if becoming implies maturity, which would be an ideal to be realised later on, then this would be in conflict with your doctrine that nothing new can happen. Since this attainment of full and mature growth implies a time duration you must recognise the reality of time duration to give scope for growth. But time, as a category, has no reality for you. Hence you cannot have both the doctrines at the same time unchanging permanency, and becoming. Such a combination is possible only in Jaina philosophy, which permits both change and permanency in a real thing, according to the point of view adopted.

You describe Life as a thing of blue colour (the colour of the Palai fruit) occupying sufficient space sidewise and of five hundred yojana in height. You speak of innumerable Jivas of this type existing in abundance in this world. This is sheer metaphysical madness. If Jiva is Moortha Dravya, corporeal entity then how is it that it is not evident to sense perception even when a large number of them are found

together. To speak of life as having spacial magnitude, of such proportion, would naturally imply that it cannot be limited to its own body. The body is always of modest dimension. Hence it must extend beyond the body. If it is spread over space beyond the body, then its essential activity of knowing and being, must be discernible in space around the body. If the characteristics of life are found beyond the body of the organism, there would be no intelligible demarcation between things living and non-living.

If life is considered to be a corporeal substance like a pumpkin, with length, breadth, and height, then it is liable to be cut into several pieces just like a pumpkin. If you maintain that life is Amoorta and so it cannot be cut into pieces, then it is against your scriptural doctrine that all reals including life-atoms are Moortha Dravya. You postulate innumerable Jīvas present in abundance in the world spread over the whole space. You believe that if all the Jīvas are lucky enough to obtain Mōksha, then there would be none left in the world, and the spring of Samsāra will dry up. Hence in order to maintain the world of life in tact here, you have invented the wonderful doctrine of "Mandala Moksha" according to which even Jīvas which have attained Mukti will come back to Samsāra in order to keep the latter going. This doctrine is the result of your ignorance as to the nature of infinite number. Infinite number is of quite different nature from ordinary numbers. Out of an infinite number, any amount however large, may be taken away and yet it will remain infinite. Hence the world of infinite Jīvas will never become deplete in spite of innumer-

able Jīvas attaining Mōksha. Hence it is not necessary to invent the absurd doctrine of Mandala Mōksha.

According to your doctrine of the five reals Jīva and Fire have the characteristics of going upwards, Air has the characteristic of going round about, and Water and Earth going downwards. If this is true, Fire and Life must always be going up without stopping ; then we should knock against Chandra Māṇḍala in the distant sky. We sometimes find burning fire which is a modification of matter falling downward. If Jīva is to go upwards always what becomes of it when it is born as lower animals due to the bondage of karma? Here the career of Jīva must be described as going round about and not going upwards. In the case of winds you notice the changes of direction due to season, south winds blowing towards north, and north winds blowing towards south, according to different seasons. Are the south winds and north winds the same or quite different? If you say that they are the same though different in direction, then your doctrine of Avichalita Nitya goes. Again, you forget to notice that air may also go up as when blown from bellows upwards. It may also go downwards as in the case of gas formed in the body due to the acidity of the stomach. These instances are in conflict with your view that winds have the nature of going round about. You say that earth and water always go downwards. But when it rains how did the water get up the clouds? You speak of movement in the five kinds of reals ; and yet you don't recognise the reality of time. Motion without time is unthinkable. You believe in Avichalita Nitya and yet you speak of growth and all

things changing place in motion. You enjoin Vratas and moral discipline and yet maintain that there is neither cause nor effect. And then what is the use of undergoing moral discipline? This is an intellectual malady for which you know no remedy. "Hearken unto me. I also suffered from a similar malady. But a great soul offered a cure for that. I had the good fortune of obtaining from a great person, the ambrosia of Dharma, as the only cure for this intellectual disease. I would recommend the same to you. If you accept the same you will certainly be saved from all these ills of Samsâra. Samsâric malady consists of birth, disease, old age and death. The cause of this malady is Karma. Karma consists of false faith, false knowledge and false conduct. The remedy for this evil of a triple nature is the triad of Dharma, the three jewels of "Right Knowledge, Right Faith and Right Conduct."

The Ajivaka teacher listening to these truths expressed a desire to know more about this excellent remedy. He wanted to know how to appreciate the truth and how to practise it. In order to illustrate the doctrine that change and permanency can co-exist together in the same real, Neelakesi by closing her fingers pointed out the particular state of the fingers constituting the fist, then opened her fingers and showed the change. The closed fingers constituting the fist, and the straightened fingers representing the open hand are merely changes in the position of the fingers, the fingers remaining the same. This obvious truth is present in all real things which from the point of view of substance must be considered permanent, and from the point of view of modifications must be considered

changing. Apparently conflicting characteristics are present in the nature of the reals thus from different points of view. Your doctrine of Avichalita Nitya emphasises one aspect and neglects the other. Similar must be the interpretation of Nitya, Anitya, Asti, and Nâsti. This truth is revealed by Lord Jina. He has obtained *Kêvala Gnâna* which infinite knowledge is the result of the removal of all karmic obstacles just like the bright sun shines after the dispersal of clouds. He is the truly perfect in knowledge and his knowledge is without blemish. Accept his gospel and live up to that ideal. If you follow that *Moksha marga* you can also become liberated and attain Mukti. Thus Neelakesi has offered the Ratnatraya, the three jewels of the Jina Dharma for the benefit of Ajivakâs before taking leave of them.

*

*

*

Before taking leave of the Ajivakâs let us try to know more about them. Ajivakâs, as a sect of religious mendicants, are referred to in the Buddhist and Jaina scriptures. The founder of this community Maskari Putra or (Mukhali Putta in Pali) was a contemporary of Buddha and Mahâvîra. Buddhist scriptures refer to this Mukhali Putta as the leader of one of the Eight religious communities which were prevalent about the time of Buddha. The term Ajivaka was originally meant to stigmatise Maskari Putra and his followers as professionals. Dr. Hoernle, in his article on "Ajivakâs" Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, mainly relies upon Bhaghavatisûtra, a Svetambara Jaina work for his information about Ajivakâs. According to this Svetambara version, Makhali Putta Gosala, was sometime

a disciple of Mahāvīra, with whom he had quarrelled before he set up an independent religion of his own. Gosala was very different from the founders of Buddhism and Jainism. He seems, by natural disposition, to have belonged to a baser sect of mendicants, to put on the garb of a religious mendicant as a pretext for idle and self-indulgent career. In one of the Jātaka Tales, a mendicant belonging to this sect, is described among other things, as carrying a bamboo staff which shows that he must have belonged to the class of mendicants who are known as Ekaḍandins or Maskarys. Dr. Hoernle admits that this particular mendicant community is identified as Ajivakā's by later commentators. Thus it is clear that the term Ajivakas was a term of reproach in the Buddhist vocabulary to Ekaḍandin or Maskari. Though Buddhist literature refers to Ajivakās with this sinister compliment, the Buddhists never make the mistake of the confusing the Ajivakās with Jainas. The term used to denote Jainas is Nigrantha, the un-fettered ones. In a further reference to the Ajivakās in the Buddhist Majjiminikaya, the Buddhist condemns the Ajivakas living in incontinency Abrahmacharyavāsa. Whenever there is any reference to the Nigranthas in Buddhist literature, the Jainas are spoken of with some amount of respect in spite of the difference of philosophical doctrines. While Buddha charged Maskari with incontinency, Mahāvīra is equally emphatic. He accuses the Ajivaka leader of teaching "that an ascetic commits no sin if he has intercourse with woman." He charges his followers with being the slaves of women, and that they did not lead a life of chastity. Dr. Hoernle notices certain important

doctrinal differences between the Ajivakâs and the Nigranthas.

Besides the references contained in Buddhist and Jaina literature, we have some references to the Ajivakâs contained in inscriptions. In the inscriptions on the walls of caves on Barbari Hills near Gaya, there is one of the Asoka inscriptions. It runs as follows:—"King PiaDasi in the thirteenth year of his reign bestowed this cave on the Ajivakâs." The next mention occurs in one of the pillar edicts of Asoka. It runs as follows:—"I have arranged that some censors of the law of piety especially occupied with the affairs of the Buddhistic Order, as well as the Brahman ascetics, the Ajivakâs, the Nigranthas, and in fact, with all the various mendicant communities, etc." After this we do not come across with any mention of Ajivakâs till we come to the Sixth century A.D. Varâhamihira, in his Brihat Jâtaka, mentions them as one of the seven classes of religious mendicants, the Sâkyas, the Ajivakâs, Nigranthas, Thapasas, Bikshus, Vudasakhas and the Charakas. Even in this list, the Ajivakâs are mentioned as a separate community from the Bauddhas and Nigranthas or Jaina monks. The Jaina writer, Kâlakâcârya of the Svetâmbara sect, who lived about a century earlier than Varâhamihira, names the same seven classes of ascetics with one exception that he identifies Ekadandins with Ajivakâs. Batotpala, the commentator of Varâhamihira's works, adds that the Ekadandins or Ajivakâs are devotees of Nârâyan, that is, of Vishnu. The writer of Neelakesi evidently accepts this tradition, because he also identifies Ajivakâs, as the devotees of Nârâyan. In spite of such overwhel-

ming evidence in favour of the view that the Ajivakâs were an independent community existing side by side with the Bauddhas and Jainas from very early days, Dr. Hoernle depending upon certain Swetanbara works of doubtful value, makes certain astounding statements which cannot be left unchallenged. He wants to make out that the Ajivakâs were practically the Digambara Jains. In order to achieve this result he makes certain unfounded assumptions. He assumes that there is a doctrinal difference between Mahāvīra and His predecessor Pârsva. He says to quote Hoernle, "to understand the position we must realise that Pârsva the precursor of Mahāvīra had enjoined only four vows or Vratas on his followers. These were, 1. not to injure (Ahimsa), 2. to speak the truth (Satya), 3. not to steal (Asthēya), and 4. not to own property (Aparigraha) that is, Pârsva enjoining the vows of kindness, truth, honesty and poverty. To these Mahāvīra added the fifth view of chastity, Brahmacharya. His reason for making this addition is explained in Uttaradhyayanasūtra. Before Mahāvīra it had been understood that chastity was implicitly enjoined by the four vows. But in reality, they left a loop-hole, the wife being accounted a species of property, marriage was forbidden by the vow of poverty, adultery by the vow of honesty. But the case of fornication was left over; on this specious ground, laxity of morals crept in among the intellectually weaker members of the Nigrantha community founded by Pârsva. Mahavira's fifth vow of chastity was designed to reform that evil. On this point, he encountered the opposition of his assosiate, Gosala Mokhala Putra." Again, Hoernle says, "Some ascetics like

Pârsva permitted the use of wrappers, others permitted only the irreducible minimum of Pudic cover (Kaupîna) while others went about absolutely naked. That the second class appear to have belonged to the Nigranthas or the immediate followers of Mahâvîra; though conceded to the Nigranthas the use of loin cloth, for himself Mahâvîra discarded the use of all clothing. On this point, there was no difference between him and Gosala. Both were mendicants of the Achêlaka, or clotheless class. At first, when Mahâvîra adopted the ascetic life he attached himself to the clothed community of Pârsva. It was only in the second year of that life that he adopted the strictest observance of absolute nakedness." From these stray quotations, it is clear that according to Dr. Hoernle, there is a fundamental difference between Mahâvîra and his predecessor that the latter did not enjoin among his ascetic followers Digambarism or Nigrantha Mudra. This information, evidently, was acquired by Dr. Hoernle from the Swêtâmbara texts and probably from his Swêtâmbara friends. If it were accepted as historically genuine, it would give Swêtâmbara sect historical precedence over the Digambaras. Evidently that was the aim of the later Swêtâmbara writers like Sîlânka in propounding such a wonderful theory. What becomes of the historical fact then, that a break up of the Jâina community into Swêtâmbaras and Digambaras occurred at the time of Bhadrabâhu as a consequence of twelve years famine? According to Digambara traditions, the first of the Thirthankaras, Rishaba as the founder of Jainism, enjoined Nigrantha *tapas* discarding everything even clothes as unnecessary and useless encumbrance. Some

of his followers who could not bear the stringency of these rules relating to *tapas* were said to have fallen back and his successors never interfered with the fundamentals of the five Vratas. These Pancha Vratas are not only important among the Jaina ascetics and householders, but they are also mentioned as such in Patanjali's Yôga Sûtra. There also the Pancha Vratas figure as important means of Yôga discipline. Under these circumstances, it is not clear why the Swêtâmbarâs should speak of only four vows as enjoined by Pârsva? It is not certainly complimentary to either the religious leader or his followers to say that they were not quite serious about personal sexual purity. It is rather surprising that the Swêtâmbarâs should try to have the historical priority of their sect even at the cost of greater principles. Dr. Hoernle is entirely mistaken in assuming that these things have historical validity. He ought to have attached greater importance to Buddhist traditions and the rock inscriptions of Asoka. As to his estimate of the Ajivakâs, his insinuation that the Ajivakâs were a section of the Digambara Jainas, is entirely due to a prejudice acquired by him from one-sided acquaintance with the Swêtâmbarâ literature. There is no Digambara evidence for any such conclusion. On the other hand, there is distinct evidence enough against that assumption, both doctrinally and historically, as is evident from the chapter on Ajivakâs in this work, Neelakesi.

According to the Digambara tradition one who has a piece of cloth—a Kaupînadhâri is a Srâvaka—a householder and not a Yati or Muni. No Mahâmuni can wear even a piece cloth. Hence

it is not true to maintain that Lord Pârsva had clothes.

The term Nigranthas used by the non-Jaina writers always means Digambaras, because it is used as synonymous with "Achêlakâs" by Buddhist writers. In the Tamil literature also, "Nigandavâdi" always means Digambaras. It is because of this sense that Digambaras believe that women are never to assume asceticism according to Digambara Mudra. Hence Dr. Hoernle is not justified in identifying the term Nigranthas with Swêtâmbarâ Jains, for the term Nigranthas used by the Jainas and the non-Jainas, distinctly means unfettered including even clothes. Further wherefrom does he obtain the information that the Digambara ascetic when he renounces the world is equipped with a staff? It is simply ridiculous to suggest that an ascetic who discards even his clothes as unnecessary will have to equip himself with the stick which will be useful only for offensive or defensive operations. I am not aware of any Digambara text which contains that information. Anyhow, it must be said, in fairness to Dr. Hoernle, that he collects very valuable information about Ajivakâs from Buddhist and non-Buddhist texts. But it is unfortunate that he is led to a false conclusion as to the identity of these Ajivakâs. All that can be said without any violation of the canons of historical criticism is that the Indian school of Ajivakâs, which is referred to by early writers of Indian philosophy must distinctly have been an independent group, unconnected with either Buddhists or Jains, and probably became extinct either by being absorbed by other schools of thought, or by elimination of the adherents who became fewer and

fewer till the movement itself died out. No other conclusion is warranted by the evidence so ably marshalled by Dr. Hoernle himself.

Note.—"Lastly, in the 13th century we have in certain temple records, a mention of the Ajivakās as a sect then actually existing in South India. These records are inscriptions on the walls of the Perumal Temple at Poygai near Virinchipuram (S. I. Inscr. i. 88, 89, 92, 108). They refer to grants of land to the temple together with "tax on Ajivikās" made by the Chola King Rajaraja in the years A.D. 1238, 1239, 1243, 1259. By the Editor of the inscriptions these Ajivikās are, on the authority of Modern Tamil Dictionaries identified with the Jains. This, of course, means the Digambara sect of the Jainas; for it is this sect whose principal seat in those times was in Southern India, and colonies of them are still to be found there.....The older Tamil literature (teste Dr. Pope) certainly uses the terms Ajivikā in speaking of the Jains (*i.e.*) the Digambaras. There can be no doubt, therefore that since the 6th century A.D. when Varahamihara used the term, the name has signified the Digambara sect of the Jainas." Ency. of Ethics and Religions page 266. A. F. R. Dr. Hoernle.

"Further evidence in the same direction is afforded by the subsequent revival of the Tarasiya trouble within the Niggantha community, and by the retention to this day of the distinguishing mark of the staff among the Digambaras. On admission we are told, the novice is supplied with the articles allowed to an ascetic by the Jain Scriptures, a black rod or *dand* about five feet long, &c. and the sadhu or professed monk, always carries his staff (*dand*). B.G. ix. ph. i. page 107 *ibid* 267.

It will be evident from the following quotation from Manimēkalai, where it is distinctly maintained that the sect of the Ajivakās, was quite distinct from the Jaina sect of

Digambaras since the two sects had fundamental differences between them in matters of religion and philosophy.

“மற்கலி நூலின் வகையிது வென்னச்
சொற்றடு மாற்றத் தொடர்ச்சியை விட்டு
நிகண்ட வாதியை நீயுரை நின்னாற்
புகழுந் தலைவன்யார் நூற்பொருள் யாவை”

மணிமேகலை. ௨௭. சமயக்கணக்கர் தந்திரங்கேட்ட காதை

(௧௬௫—௧௬௮)

The inscriptions referred to by Dr. Hoernle are given below :—

Inscriptions of the Perumal Temple at Poygai near Virinchipuram.

These inscriptions (No. 59 to 64) are dated during the reign of a king called *Tribhuvanachakravartin* Rajaraja-deva. His twenty-second year corresponded to Saka 1160 (Nos. 59 and 60), his twenty-fourth year to Saka 1161 (Nos. 61 and 62) and his twenty-eighth year was current after the expiration of Saka 1165 (No. 64). Accordingly, the first year of his reign corresponded to the Saka year 1137–38.

The inscriptions record that the Kerala merchant ¹ Adi-Rama, an inhabitant of “the Hill-country,” ² i.e., of Malayalam, granted three villages, which he had bought from a certain Sambuvarayan, to the temple, on the walls of which the inscriptions are found. The temple had two names : 1. Arulala-Perumal ³ of Poygai, alias Rajendra-Chola-nallur, 2. Chitra-meri-Malaimandala-Vinnagara. The technical meaning of *Chitra-meri*, “the beautiful plough-tail,” is not clear. The remainder of the second name means “the Vishnu temple ⁴ of the Hill country.” Probably the donor Rama himself had founded the temple and called it after his native country, viz., Malayalam.

1. No. 63, line 2 ; No. 64, line 21.

2. No. 61, lines 6f ; No. 63, line 1.

3. i.e., “the merciful Vishnu.”

4. This translation of Vinnagara rests on an ancient inscription of the Vaikuntha-Perumal temple at Kanchipuram, in which the Sanskrit Vishnugriha corresponds to the Tamil Vinnagara, which might, however, also mean “the celestial city.”

The full name of Sambhuvarayan, from whom Rama bought the three villages which he granted to the Poygai temple, was Sangeni-Virasani ¹-Ammaiappan (or Ammaiappan) Aragiya-Soran, *alias* Edirili-² Sora-Sambuvarayan.³ He seems to have been a vassal of Rajaraja-deva.

No. 59. On the base of the north wall.

This inscription is dated in the twenty-second year of Tribhuvanachakravartin Rajaraja-deva in the Saka year 1160. It records the gift of the village of Kumaramangalam, which was situated east of Korra-mangalam, north-west of Aimbundi—which lay to the north of Poygai, *alias* Rajendra-Chola-nallur—and south of the Palaru. Aimbundi is the old name of the modern village of Ammundi; it occurs also in an Ammundi inscription, which will be noticed, in Part III (No. 131). The palaru is the well-known Palar, the chief river of the North Arcot District.

TEXT.

(1) ஸ்ரீ ஸ்ரீ ஸ்ரீ [II*] சகரெயாண்டு ஆயிரத்]தொரு
னாற்றறுபது செல்லானின்ற ஸ்ரீ திரிபுவனச் சக்கரவத்திகள்
ஸ்ரீ ராஜராஜதே வற்குயா—

(2) ண்டு இரு[ப]த்தி[ரண்டா]வ[து]தை.....
பொய்கெ ஆன இரா—செந்திரசொழ நல்லூர்ச் சித்திரமெழி
மலைமண்டல விண்ணகரா—

(3) ன அருளாளப் பெருமாளுக்குத் திருவிடையாட்ட
மாகக் குமார மங்கலம் [I*] மெல்பாற்கெல்லை கொற்ற மங்க
லத்து எல்லை ஆசறுதியினட்ட திருவா[ழி]க் கல்லுக்கு குழக்—

(4) கும் [I*] தென்பாற்கெல்லை பொய்கையான இரா செந்
திரசொழ நல்லூர்க்கு வடக்கான ஐம்பூண்டி கயக்காலுக்கு
வடக்கும் [I*] கி[ழ்]பாற் கெல்லை ஐம்பூண்டி எல்லை ஆசறுதியில்
நட்ட தி—

(5) ருவாழிக்கல்லுக்கு மெற்க்கும் [I*] வடபாற்க் கெல்லை
பாலாற்றுக்கு தெற்க்கு மி[ந்]தனாற்ப் பாற்க்கெல்லைக்கு முட்

1. i.e., “the thunderbolt to heroes.” 2. i.e., “the unopposed.” 3. No. 64, lines 24 f.

பட்ட மெ[னெக்கி]ன மரமும் கிணெக்கின கிணறும் நஞ்சை புஞ்சை கடமை குடி[ன]—

(1) ம உள்பட வெட்டி தனி ஆள் ஆயம்பாடி காவல் சில்வரி பெருவரி காந்தினை(க) அரிசி காந்தினைப் பச்சை மற்று முள்ள பலகா[சாயம்]களும் தறி இறை கடை—இறை தட்டார் பாட்டஞ்செ—

(7) க்குக்க[ட]மையும் ஆசிவ[க்]காக எப்பெற்பட்ட அனைத் தாயங்களும் ஆய¹ ஈனார் சிறை இராமன் கெரளன் பக்கல் பொன்ன[றக்கொண்டு மண்ணறப் பொய்கை அருளாளப்—பெருமாளுக்குக்]—

(8) திருவிடையாட்டமாக சந்த்ரா² தித்தவரை செல்வ தாகவிட்டென் செங்கெணி விராசனி அம்மை[ய]ப்பன் தனி னின்று வென்றான் தன் வசி காட்டுவான் அழகிய சொழுவன எதிரி[லி].

TRANSLATION.

Hail! Prosperity! (In the month of) Tai of the twenty-second year of the illustrious Tribhuvanachakravartin, the illustrious Rajaraja-deva, which was current during the Saka year one thousand one hundred and sixty,—I, Sengeni-Virasani-Ammaiyappan, who has gained victory standing by himself, who shows his sword, Aragiya-Soran, *alias* Edirili, after having received gold from Rama the Kerala, a slave (i.e. worshipper) of Aya-inar³,—gave to the Vishnu temple of Chitra-Meri-Malai-mandala, *alias* (the temple of) Arulala-Perumal, (at) Poygai, *alias* Rajendra-Soranallur, (the village of) Kumara-mangalam, as exclusive property,⁴ to last as long as the moon and the sun;—the boundary on the western side is to the east of the tiruvari⁵ stone put up

1. ஆய looks like ஆயி. 2. Read சந்திரா.

3. This is probably a name of Vishnu. It might mean: "he who is without a mother," and correspond to the Sanskrit Aja, "the unborn." Or could it be a corruption of ஐயனார், a forest deity of the Tamil districts?

4. See page 69, note 2 of S.I.I.

5. According to the Dictionairre Tamoul-Francais, திருவாதி means "a royal seal."

at the extremity of the boundary of Korra-mangalam; the boundary on the southern side is to the north of the channel of Aimbundi, which lies to the north of Poygai, *alias* Rajendra-Sora-nallur; the boundary on the eastern side is to the west of the tiruvari stone put up at the extremity of the boundary of Aimbundi; the boundary on the northern side is to the south of the (river) Palaru;—the trees overground and the wells underground, the wet land and the dry land, included within these boundaries in the four directions; including taxes and rights; (the revenue for) one Vetti, ¹ tolls (ayam), the small taxes (and) the large taxes for the village-police, the rice in Karttika, the unripe (fruit) in Karttika, and all other revenue in money; the tax on looms, the tax on shops, the tax on goldsmiths, the tax on oil-mills, the tax on Ajivakās ² and all (other) revenue.

No. 60. On the left side of the east wall.

Of this inscription only the date remains, which is the same as in No. 59.

TEXT.

- (1) ஸ்ரீ ஸ்ரீ [II*] சக்ராயண்டு.
- (2) ஆயிரத்தொருநூற்றறுபது செல்லா—
- (3) நின்ற திரிபுவன சக்ரவர்த்திகள் ஸ்ரீராஜ—
- (4) ராஜதேவற்கு யாண்டு இருபத்து இரண்டா—³

TRANSLATION.

Hail! Prosperity! In the twenty-second year of Tribhuvanachakravartin, the illustrious Rajaraja-deva, which was current during the Saka year one thousand one hundred and sixty.....

1. See page 82, note 3 of S.I.I.

2. The Ajivakās are the Jainas. Instead of ஆசிவக்காசு we read ஆசுவக கடமை in three other Poygai inscriptions and ஆசுவிகள் பெர்க்கடமை in the Padavedu inscription No. 78.

3. Read இரண்டாவது.

No. 61. On the base of the south wall.

This inscription is dated in the twenty-fourth year of Tribhuvanachakravartin Rajaraja-deva, and in the Saka year 1161. It records the gift of the village of Puttur.

1. ஸ்ரீ ஸ்ரீ [II*] சகரையாண்டு ஆயிரத்தொருநூற்
றறுபத்தொன்று செல்லா நின்ற ஸ்ரீ (சு) புலனச் சக்கர
வத்(திக)ள் ஸ்ரீ ராஜ(ராஜதெ)வ(ற்)கு (யா)ண்டு இருபத்து
நாலாவது.

2. தைம்மாஸம் முதல் பொய்கை(க)யான ராஜேசு
சொழ நல்லூர் சித்திர மெழிமலை மண்டல விண்ணகரான அரு
ளாளப் பெ(ப)ரு(மாளுக்கு புத்தூர்) நா(ற்பாற்)கெல்லைக்கு முட்ப
பட்ட மெனெ—

3. (க்கி)ன மரமும் (கி)ழ் நொக்(கி)ந (கி)ணறும் நன்
செய் புன்செய் நாற்பாற் கெல்லையு முட்பட்ட கடமை (சுடி)
மைகளு(ம்) ஆயம்பாடி காவல் சி[வரி எடுத்து]க் கொட்டி
அரி முக்கை—

4. (யுட்)பட்ட பல நெல்லாயங்களும் கார்த்திகை அரிசி
கார்த்திகைக்காசு கார்த்திகைப் பச்சை(சு) வெலிப்பயறு நிர்நிலக்
(க)ாசு தறிபிறை கடையிறை காலகதப் பாட்ட(ம்) (த*)—

5. ட்டார்ப்பாட்டம் ஆசுவக கடமை செக்குக் கடமை
எரிமின் காசு இரவரி வகைந்த காசு பட்டொலைக்காசு மற்றுமெப்
பெற்பட்ட பல காசாயங்—

6. களும் அந்தராயமும் வெட்டி தனி ஆளு(ட்) பட்ட
அனைத்து நெல்லாயங்களும்¹ உட்படத் திருவிடை ஆட்டமாக
மலைமண்—

7. டலத்து ஆய ஈயனார் சிறை ராமன் கெர(ள)ன் பக்கல்ப்
பொன்னறக்கொண்டு மண்ணற விட்டென் விராசநி அம்மை
யப்பன் (அப்பர்) அழகி—

8. ய சொழனா எதிரிவி சொழ சர்புவராயன் நென் (II*).

The inscription No. 62 (lines 21 f) reads நெல்லாயங் காசாயங்களும்.

Hail! Prosperity! From the month of Tai of the twenty-fourth year of the illustrious Tribhuvanachakravartin, the illustrious Rajaraja-deva, which was current during the Saka year one thousand one hundred and sixty-one,—I, Virasani-Ammaiyappan Aragiya Soran, *alias* Edirili-Sora-Sambuvarayan, after having received gold from the Kerala, a worshipper of Aya-inar (and an inhabitant) of Malai-mandalam,—gave to the Vishnu temple of Chitra-meri-Malai-mandalam, *alias* (the temple of) Arulala-Perumal, (at) Poygai, *alias* Rajendra-Sora-nallur, (the village of) Puttur as exclusive property:—the trees overground and the wells underground, the wet land and the dry land, included within the boundaries in the four directions; all the revenue in paddy, excluding tolls, and the small tax for the village-police, and including the three handfuls of paddy (?); the rice in Karttika, the money in Karttika, the unripe (fruit) in Karttika, velipayaru¹, the money from water and land, the tax on looms, the tax on shops,.....² the tax on goldsmiths, the tax on Ajivakâs, the tax on oil-mills, the money from (the sale of) the fish in the tank,³⁴, the money for documents, and all other revenue in money; the antarayam;⁵ including all (other revenue) in paddy and revenue in money, including (that for) one Vetti.

This inscription is a duplicate of No. 61. At the end some words are lost.

1. ஸ்ரீ ஸ்ரீ ஸ்ரீ (II*) சகரபாண்டு ஆயிரத்—
2. தொருநூற்றுப்பத்தொன்று —

5. This seems to be the name of some sort of revenue (aya).

3. சல்லா நின்ற ஸ்ரீ திரிபுவனச் சக்கர—
4. வத்திகள் சிராசராச தெவற்கு யாண்டு
5. இருபத்து நாலாவது தைம்மாதமு.....
6. பொய்கையான ராசெந்திர சொழநல்—
7. லூர் சித்திர மெழிமலை மண்டல விண்—
8. ணகரான ஆருளாளப் பெருமானுக்கு பு(த்)
தூ(ர்*)நா—
- 9.ற்பாற் கெல்லைக்கு முட்பட்ட மெல்லொ—
10. க்கின மரமுங் கீணெக்கின கிணறும் நஞ்(சு)—
11. ய் புன்செய் நா(ற்*)பாற் கெல்லைக்கு முட்பட்ட
12. கடமை குடிமைகளும் ஆயம் பாடி காவல்
13. சல்வரி எடுத்துக்கொட்டி அரிமுக்கை உட்—
14. படப்பல நெல்லாயங்களுங் கார்த்திகை அ—
15. ரிசி கார்த்திகைக் காசு கார்த்திகைப் பச்சை வெ—
16. லிப்பயறு நிர்நிலக்காசு தறியிறை கடையிறை கால—
17. க்கப்பாட்டம் தட்டார்ப்பாட்டம் ஆசுவக(ட)மை டெ—
18. சக்குக்கடமை எரிமின்காசு இனவரி வகைக்—
19. தக(ர*)சு பட்டொலைக்காசு மற்றுமெப்பெர்ப—
20. (ட்)ட பல காசாயங்களு மந்தராம்¹ வெட்டிதனி—
21. (ய)ராளுட்பட அனைத்து நெல்லாயங் காசாயங்—
22. களுமுட்ப்படத் திருவிடையாட்டமாக ம(லை)மண்—
23. டலத்து ஆய(சு)னார் (சி)றை இராமன் கொளன்
பக்க(ல்)

No. 63. On the base of the east wall.

This short inscription refers to the gift of the village of Puttur, which is also recorded in the two preceding inscriptions.

TEXT.

1. பொய்கை அ(ருளாள)ரை புணைந்து புத்தாரும் ஐய்ய
மற கொண்டு அவர்க்கு ஊராக்கினுன் செய்ய மலர்மாதியார்
நின்ற மலைநாட்டு வாழ்.

2. வணிகர் ஆதி இராமன் கொளந் உ

1. The inscription No. 61 reads அந்தராயமும்.

TRANSLATION.

The merchant Adi-Rama the Kerala, who lived in Malainadu, where the goddess with red flower (Lakshmi) resides, having decorated Arulalar (of) Poygai, and having acquired as exclusive property (the village of) Puttur, made it his (the god's) village.

No. 64. On the north wall.

The inscription is dated in the 28th year of Rajaraja-deva, which was current after the expiration of the Saka year 1165. It records the gift of the village of Attiyur.

TEXT.

1. ஸு ஸ்ரி ஸ்ரீ (II*) சகரை யாண்டு ஆயிரத்—
2. தாருதாற்றறுபத்தைஞ்சன்¹ மெல் செல்லாநி—
3. ன்ற ஸ்ரீ ராஜராஜ தெவற்கு யாண்டு உயி வத².
4. கற்கடக நாயறு முதல் சித்திர மெழிமலை மண்—
5. டல விண்ணகரான பொய்கை அருளாளப்—
6. பருமாளுக்கு அத்தியூர் தெவதானந் திருவி—
7. டை ஆட்டம் பள்ளிச் சந்தந் துக்கைப்பட்டி
8. பிடாரிப்பட்டி பட்டவிருத்தி வயித்திய விருத்தி
9. நில நிற்கல் (நிக்கி) நார்பாற் கெல்லையு முட்ப—
10. ட்ட மெல்லெனக்கின மாமுங் கிணைக்கிய கிண—
11. றும் நஞ்செ புஞ்செய் வெட்டி தனியாள் ஆ—
12. (ய)ம் பாடிகாவல் கண்காணி கணக்கவரி எடுத்து—
13. க்கொட்டி அ(ரி)முக்கை உள்ளிட்ட நெல்ல(ர)ய—
14. ங்களும் வெ(ட்டி)ப் புடவை முதற் திரமம் வகை—
15. ந்த காச பட்டு(டா)லைக் காச முள்ளடி சின்னம் டெ—
16. வலிப்பயறு தாப்படி அரிசி அச்சதறி சாலிகைத்—
17. தறி தூசகத்தறி (ப)றைத்தறி செக்கு(க்) கடமை

1. Read சின்.

2. Read உயி-ஆவது.

18. வக கடமையு முள்ளிட்ட காசு கடைமையும் மற்ற—
19. று மெப்பெ(த்¹)பட்ட நெ(ல்)லாயந்நாளுக்காசு—
20. றாயங்களு முட்பட்ட ஆயகனார்² சிறை இராமன் கெ—
21. (க)ரள செட்டியார் பக்கல் பொன்னறக் கொண்—
22. டி மண்ணறப் பொய்கை அருளாளப் பெருமா—
23. ளுக்குத் திருவிடை ஆட்டமாக மண்ணற விட்—
24. டென் செங்கெணி விராசனி அம்மை அப்பன் அ—
25. முகிய சொழினா எதிரிலி செ(ரழ)ச் சம்புவராய
நெ(ன்) (II*)

TRANSLATION.

Hail! Prosperity! From the month of Karkataka of the 28th year of the illustrious Rajaraja-deva, which was current after the Saka year one thousand one hundred and sixty-five (had passed),—I, Sengeni-Virasani-Ammaiappan Aragiya-Soran, *alias* Edirili-Sora-Sambuvarayan, after having received gold from the Kerala merchant Rama, a worshipper of Aya-inar—gave to the Vishnu temple of Chitra-meri-Malai-mandala, *alias* (the temple of) Arulala-Perumal (at) Poygai, (the village of) Attiyur as a divine gift (devadana) and as exclusive property:—the trees overground and the wells underground, the wet land and the dry land, included within the boundaries in the four directions excluding the land (called) Pallichchandam, ³ Tukkai-pattai, Pidaripatti, ⁴ Bhatta-vritti and Vaidya-vritti; ⁵ the revenue in paddy, excluding (the revenue for) one Vetti, tolls, and the tax for the overseer of the village-police and the accountant, and including the

1. Read ஈ.

2. Read ஆய ஈனார்.

3. Pallichchandam probably means “temple-land,” just as palli-gramam “a village belonging to a temple.” In the inscriptions Nos. 67 and 68, Pallichchandam seems to be used in the sense of palligramam itself.

4. Patti means “a measure of land sufficient for a sheep-fold;” compare Kuttadi-patti in No. 42, above.

5. i.e., (the land) enjoyed by the Bhattas and enjoyed by the Vaidyas.

three handfuls of paddy (?); the taxes in money, including (that for) cloths of males and females,..... the money for documents,..... veli-payaru, the gleaned rice,the tax on oil-mills and the tax on Ajivikâs; including all other revenue in paddy and revenue in money.

It is evident that the Editor Dr. Hultzch makes an unfortunate mistake in translating ஆசுவக்கடமை as the tax on Ajivikâs. *A priori* it is absurd to suggest that any finance minister would propose levying a tax on wandering mendicants who have to beg for their daily food. Levying a tax by any Government must necessarily imply the possibility of collecting the same. Hence it is impossible to think of a tax on religious mendicants who can call nothing their own excepting their own body. Further from the context it is clear that the term refers to some kind of professional tax since it occurs in the midst of words relating to professional tax, "the tax on looms, the tax on shops, the tax on gold-smiths, and the tax on oil mills and ஆசுவக்கடமை translated as the tax on Ajivikâs." Probably the term ஆசுவக்கடமை refers to the tax laid on Bronzesmiths who made moulds for casting vessels and other objects of bell-metals. The Tamil term ஆசு is generally used synonymously with mould. Hence it can only mean a tax on moulding and casting. It is not for us to determine exactly what it means. It is enough for our purpose to state that it does not and cannot mean tax on Ajivikâs and the rendering given by Dr. Hultzch is evidently wrong. Hence Dr. Hoernle's conclusion based upon the ancient Tamil literature and the Poygai inscriptions is further removed from the truth. He cannot claim as evidence for his conclusion anything more than the Swêtâmbara work which he takes as his authority. The reader can very well judge for himself as to the validity of his conclusion.

CHAPTER VII.

Sankhya Vada.

Neelakesi, as directed by Pûrana, goes to Hastinâpura to meet the Sâṅkhya teacher who is engaged there in preaching his doctrines to his disciples. He has been expounding to his disciples the doctrine of creation, destruction, and preservation as the characteristics of Paramâtma who is Omnipresent. Neelakesi has requested the Sâṅkhya teacher Parâsara to explain his philosophy which he does accordingly. "We recognise 25 *tattvas*, Ātma, Prakriti, Mahat, Ahankâra, five Gnânêndriyâs, five Karmêndriyâs, Manas, the five Tanmâtras and the five Bhûtas. Āpta, or the Lord of the Universe, according to us, is free from all activities, has no *gunas*, is always an enjoyer, does not undergo any modifications, is not bound by any karmic shackles, is eternal, all-pervading, all-perceiving, all-enjoying existence. Similarly, Prakriti, is an unchanging reality which is also all-pervasive—Amoorta—imperceptible to the senses, inactive, unitary, and unmanifest. It is from this Prakriti that Mahat is born ; from Mahat Ahankâra ; and from Ahankâra are born Manas, the five Tanmâtras, the five Gnanêndriyâs and the five Karmêndriyâs. From the five Tanmâtras are born the five Bhûtas. These are the 25 *tattvas* for us. We recognise no reality beyond these 25." Neelakesi listening to these has remarked that the illustration of these *tattvas* does not speak well of the founder. The Sâṅkhya teacher was enraged at this remark ; he has challenged her to offer any criticism which she thinks fit and proper. In

response to this challenge, Neelakesi offers her criticism of the Sâṅkhya tattvas.

You maintain that Ātma is actionless. Do you consider yourself an Ātma or not? If you are one, how do you explain your own activity which is quite evident even in your preaching and other associated movements? Hence in the very beginning your own conduct belies your doctrine. And if you say that you are not an Ātma, that would be in contradiction to all experiences. If Ātma is described as non-active in every way, what is the purpose of preaching this doctrine to others, who being inactive by nature, will not be able to carry out your injunctions? Ordinary experience reveals the nature of Ātma as an active conscious entity whose activity manifests itself in perceiving, knowing, acting; and yet you maintain that it is absolutely inactive. In order to get rid of this difficulty, you speak of three kinds of Ātmas, Paramâtma, Antarâtma and Karmâtma. Activity is denied only to the first; the other two are considered as active. This device is not going to help you out of the difficulty. You first describe Ātma in general as non-active. Then you postulate two kinds of other Ātmas which have activities. This will be self-contradictory. If Antarâtma and Karmâtma which are credited with activity are considered to be the active entities in human personalities, of what use is it postulating the Paramâtma who has no activity of his own and yet who is always an enjoyer? If this Paramâtma is absolutely Amoorta and actionless, how is it possible for him to have any relation to the body, and how can he exercise perceiving, knowing, and enjoying through such a body? What is that misfortune, on

account of which, such a Paramâtma, who is all-perceiving and all-knowing, is brought down to the level of Samsâra? Unless the Paramâtma is credited with change and modifications, it is not possible to bring him into relation with changing conditions of Samsâra, conditions determined by Āntarâtma and Karmâtma in association with the active manifestations of Prakriti. Modifications capable of having intrinsic activities, are always associated with Prakriti. Activities generally associated with human personality, are in reality due to the active manifestations of Prakriti. On account of these modifications, a Purusha or Ātma, is apparently credited with all those activities just as a piece of crystal appears red, when a red flower is placed behind it. In itself absolutely colourless, the crystal appears full of colour due to its association with the coloured flower behind. Self-conscious experience, such as "I," and "Mine," properly belong to Ahankâra which is born of Mahat which itself is the modification born out of Achêtana Prakriti. Mahat being born of Achêtana Prakriti, must be considered to be itself an Achêtana entity. Ahankâra proceeding from this Mahat must also be considered Achêtana; and yet it is capable of having conscious experiences of self and self possession. How is it possible to obtain conscious entities from a non-conscious reality? This is a primal contradiction in your philosophy. Do you consider this Mahat as an independent self-determinant entity apart from Prakriti, or is it merely a modification of Prakriti? If it is born of Prakriti, you cannot escape from the conclusion that what is born of Achêtana Prakriti, must itself remain Achêtana. No kind of conscious activity, therefore,

can be derived from such an Achêtana entity. If you consider that as an independent entity unconnected with Prakriti in order that you may obtain from it activities of consciousness, then your own doctrine that out of Prakriti appears Mahat, will be nullified.

You describe Prakriti as Amoorta and Akârana, non-corporeal and non-casual. Out of this you obtain Mahat which is described to be corporeal and causally effective. You might as well derive physical objects out of space, which is also Amoorta and Akârana. Thus Prakriti and its modifications appear according to you to be mutually contradictory. Then you speak of five Gnanêndriyâs, and Karmêndriyâs, and Manas. If these are considered as independent *tatvas*, the other members of the body are equally entitled to be considered as independent *tatvas*. Hands, feet, excretory organs, genital organs, and vocal organ are considered to be five Karmêndriyâs or active senses. What is the purpose in calling these "Indriyas" since there is no object perceived by these? If they are called Karmêndriyâs, because they have got their characteristic activities, why do you leave out the other members of the body such as the lips, the tongue and the teeth which also have their characteristic activities and hence which are entitled to be included among the Karmêndriyâs? Some of the things which you include in Gnânêndriyâs have also some kind of characteristic activities. For example, the eyes are capable of moving, and hence must be called Karmêndriya. Hence there is no logical principle in your classification of two groups of Indriyas, one called Gnânêndriya and the other called Karmêndriya. The five Tanmâtras are Sabda (sound), Sparsa

(touch), Rûpa (colour), Rasa (taste), and Gandha (smell). These sense qualities are associated with physical objects and yet you derive these Tanmâtras from Ahankâra. If Ahankâra is taken to be self-consciousness how is it possible to obtain these Tanmâtras which are characteristics of physical objects of the Pancha Bhûtas? Your doctrine that sound is the characteristic of Ākāśa is self-contradictory; Space is Amoorta, Achêtana, and all-pervasive unity. Out of this, sound cannot be born because sound or sabda, is the result of concussion of physical bodies with one another. Hence your doctrine of evolution which derives Mahat from Prakriti, Ahankâra from Mahat, and from Ahankâra the sixteen Gûnas, and from the five Tanmâtras the five Bhûtas, is not quite convincing and acceptable.

You explain the relation between the Ātma and physical body by bringing in a comparison, a lame man riding on the shoulders of the blind, the lame directing, and the blind carrying. But this comparison won't do because, according to your own doctrine, both Prakriti and Ātma are described to be non-active. Both being incapable of activity, by mere combination, they cannot obtain the activity to move. Hence your comparison is not quite accurate. Hence it is impossible to postulate activity by mere combination of two inactive entities. Prakriti and Ātma cannot give birth to Mahat and other objects of the concrete world. You might as well say that two eunuchs may be able to bring forth a child by intercourse. Prakriti and Ātma are described by you to be all-pervasive. Thus, they must have contact from eternity, and yet you speak as if they come in contact with each other for the first time and

out of this contact, you derive the whole evolution of the cosmos. The ultimate reality for you is One Ātma who creates, destroys, protects, performs *tapas*, and obtains Mōksha. Since you do not maintain the doctrine of Plurality of Ātmas, you think that this criticism is applicable only to the Sāṅkhya Pluralist. Neelakesi points out that the Sāṅkhyan Paramātmā is not free from defects. If you hold to your Ekātmavāda, then you cannot offer any decent explanation for your conduct in preaching your doctrine to others who are your disciples and in criticising the doctrine of your rivals. Teacher and the disciple, the critic and the rival, have meaning only when you recognise Plurality of Ātmas. Otherwise it would be a meaningless game of self-delusion. If you stick to the doctrine of Ekātmavāda, then all lower animals are merely aspects of His nature. Then sacrificing animals in Yāga, and eating them, would amount to killing oneself and eating oneself.

Neelakesi next criticises the doctrine of creation. If creation implies that created things had no existence before they were created by the Paramātmā, how does the Creator derive his own existence? If in His case, existence needs no creation, similarly, may be the nature of the whole world. You maintain that there is no activity in the world besides His activity. Then all that happens in the world must be attributed to Him; for the act of killing and murder must be attributed to Paramātmā, as much as the activity of *tapas*. All good, and all evil, therefore, must be attributed to His activity; killing and eating animals, at the same time creating and protecting them, if attributed to the same person, would make His activity unintelligible and meaningless.

This doctrine of Saêswara Sâmkhya is really wonderful in its contradiction. It makes the preacher as well as the listener identical. The animals that are killed, the flesh that is obtained, and the person who eats, all are identically the same individual. The persons who are suffering from disease, the physician who cures the sick, are identically the same ; the killer and the killed are the same ; the destroyer and the destroyed become identical. The whole philosophy is self-contradictory, and reduces itself to *reductio ad absurdum*.

You also hold the doctrine of Avichalita Nitya, unchanging permanency ; and yet you talk of growth and development. Growth or development, is incompatible with the doctrine of unchanging permanency. If this doctrine is true, going to sleep after eating, waking up after sleeping, learning a new thing, a child growing and becoming an old man, forgetting a thing which was experienced, memory, recognition, enjoying the fruit of one's own karma, a samsâra jîva adopting a good course of conduct and obtaining Môksha, all these things would be absolutely impossible. If Avichalita Nitya is the truth, the palm tree which grows out of its nut must be present in the nut in full-grown form. If it is maintained that the tree as such is not present in the nut, but that the nut contains in itself the capacity to grow into a full tree later on, then this will not fit in with the doctrine of Avichalita Nitya. The growth of the tree from the nut would imply that the tree is not present as such in the nut, but appears as the result of growth. This would be explained only by the doctrine of Asti-Nâsti and not by the doctrine of unchanging permanency. The ultimate entities of Chêtana and

Achêtana are described by you as 25 tattvas. What you call Paramâtma is identically the same as our Siddha Paramêshti. Instead of trying to derive consciousness and Gnâna from Achêtana Prakriti, admit them to be the characteristics of Jîvas, which must be considered to be active also, in addition to his being the perceiver and the enjoyer. If you recognise that the Âtma is an active agent endowed with consciousness of perception and enjoyment and capable of being an architect of his own destiny, then your philosophy will be acceptable. Thus you will be in possession of a true Darsana.

Neelakesi thus offers her own Darsana to the Sâmkhya teacher and blesses him with the Môksha Mârga constituted by the three jewels, Ratnatraya. Thus ends the Sâmkhyavâda.

*

*

*

Before taking leave of this chapter we have to enter an explanatory note. The chapter in Neelakesi dealing with the Sâmkhyavâda relates to Saêsvara Sâmkhya according to the commentator. The Sâmkhya teacher, who is met by Neelakesi in Hastinâpura, is one named Parâsara. This requires an explanation. Traditionally the Sâmkhyasy stem was founded by the great Kapila Rishi, and transmitted through a line of Sâmkhyachâryas such as Asoori, Panchâsika, Vindyaavâsi, Iswara Krsna; by these the system has been taught in successive ages. The authoritative work "Sâmkhyakârîka" by Iswara Krsna is quoted by the commentator of Neelakesi. The text of Neelakesi, which must be several centuries older, properly speaking, must refer to the Kapila school of the Sâmkhyas which is generally

known as the Nirîswara Sâmkhya. The term Saeswara Sâmkhya is ordinarily applied to the modification of the Sâmkhya school of Patanjali in his Yôga Sûtras. The Yôga system associated with Patanjali preserves in tact the whole of the metaphysical system of the earlier Kapila school with this one modification of an Iswara as the ideal to be contemplated upon by the yôgis. From the information given above the Sâmkhya system criticised in Neelakesi evidently refers to another school which, while retaining the metaphysical system of Kapila, grafted on it a sort of Theistic Monism. Probably this Monistic school of Sâmkhya is the precursor of the later Vedanta school represented by Brahma Sûtras which is commented upon by Sankara, Râmanuja and Madhwa. The name of the teacher and the place are significant. Hastinâpura is hallowed by Mahâbhârata tradition, and the name of Parâsara is probably a wrong reading of Parâsariya, son of Parâsara which is the name of Vyâsa, the reputed author of Mahâbhârata. In the Santi Parva and the Anusâsana Parva of Mahâbhârata you have a presentation of the Sâmkhya school with the Monistic colour, and most probably the author of Neelakesi had in his mind this particular school of Sâmkhya described in the Mahâbhârata. This suggestion is corroborated by the fact that there is a chapter on Vyâsa system in "Sarvasiddhânta Sangraha" of Sankarâchârya. This book, besides the chapters on Sâmkhyâ, Yôga, and Vedânta, has a separate chapter on Vyâsa Matha which distinctly indicates that about the time of the author of Sarvasiddhânta Sangraha this Vyâsa Matha or Parâsariya Matha was considered an independent school and

continued to be so even after the appearance of the Vêdânta school as an independent system. In his able introduction to this work Professor Rangacharya maintains a similar opinion. Speaking about Vyâsa Matha as distinguished from Vêdânta Matha he says "that the former of these two Mathas is said to be based upon the religious and philosophical teachings contained in the Mahâbhârata, while the latter is declared to rest upon Baghavat Pâda Govinda's explanation of the Vêdânta Sûtra held to have been composed by Vyâsa." If we assume that in Neelakesi Parâsara is a wrong reading for Parâsarîya and the system here refers to the Sâmkhya school of the Mahâbhârata we should offer an explanation why there is no mention of the older and the more famous Kapila school. The absence of the later Vêdânta School in the work may be easily explained by the fact that about the time of the composition of the Neelakesi probably the Vêdântic school had not come into existence as an independent school of thought and religion. Such an explanation is impossible in the case of Sâmkhya school of Kapila and represented by his successors. As a matter of fact, the Kapila school of Sâmkhya is admitted to be the oldest of the six so-called orthodox Darsanâs. His system is referred to even in the Upanishadic literature. In the description of the Sâmkhya school in Mahâbhârata, Kapila is prominently mentioned. He is referred to with the honorific title Mahâ Rishi. It would be right to presume that such an important school of thought was not known to the author of Neelakesi. The fact that he distinctly refers to the Sâmkhya school in this particular form (Saêswara Sâmkhya) for the purpose

of criticising, naturally implies a thorough knowledge of the other system also. In fact, some of the philosophical ideas belonging to the Kapila school, which form the philosophical basis of the particular Theistic Monism which is criticised here are not spared from criticism; and yet the author of Neelakesi does not directly mention the Kapila school as a system to be rejected. If we assume that the system was known to him and that he was not disposed to condemn it, then there is only one explanation for such a course of conduct in the author. About the time of the composition of Neelakesi in South India, there must have been present in the Tamil Nâdu not only the Jainas and Bauddhas but also Sâmkhyas belonging to the Kapila school. Probably the Sâmkhyas and Jainas must have had a good deal of common ground between them. Both the schools are definitely opposed to animal sacrifice enjoined in the Vêdic Literature. Both are uncompromisingly pluralistic in metaphysics and both the schools are vehemently opposed to the doctrine of the creation of the world by an Iswara. These three points of identity must have made them work in co-operation in fighting their common enemy; hence the author of Neelakesi did not think it worth his while to criticise such a friendly system as the Kapila school of Sâmkhya in his work. This is the only explanation that can be thought of as to the absence of criticism against Kapila.

This suggestion is further corroborated by the fact that there is an atmosphere of Ahimsa prevalent in the Tamil classics Kural and Silappadikâram. There are two Mâtaras one in Tamil Literature and another in Sanskrit. The former is a prominent

figure in "Silappadikaram" and the latter is the commentator of Iswara Kṛṣṇa's "Sāṅkhya Kārikas." Probably they were different persons living in different ages. But it is clear that both were believers in the doctrine of "Ahimsa." This can be inferred from their views expressed in the respective works. Mātara in Silappadikaram meets the Chera King on two or three occasions while in the course of his ramblings over the country and communicates to the King the important information about the fate of the Hero and Heroine of Silappadikaram, Kovalan and Kannaki. But the point that is relevant to us in this connection is that this Mātara praises the Chera King for introducing important religious reformation. He praises the King for getting rid of "Maravēlvi" and introducing "Aravēlvi" which can only be interpreted as getting rid of cruel Yāga involving animal sacrifice and introducing the right Yāga based upon Ahimsa Dharma. No one would deny the fact that the whole work Silappadikāram was written from the point of extolling Ahimsa. Hence this is the only interpretation that we can have of Mātara's praise of the Chera King. In another place he praises the Chera King for introducing "Poopali" in temple worship. This term is interpreted by the commentator as worship by offering flowers at the feet of the God in the temple. All these references clearly point to the fact that this Mātara (who was a follower of Sāṅkhya probably) was about that time a great champion of the doctrine of Ahimsa and worked in co-operation with the Jaina teachers in the South with the object of purifying religion from animal sacrifice and also purifying temple

worship from any contamination of blood stain. That the Jainas and Sâṅkhyas did work in co-operation with this object is not merely a figment of imagination is further borne out by the fact mentioned in another Tamil classic known as Perungadai—a Tamil rendering of Guṇâdya's Brihat Katha. In this work throughout the career of Vāsavadatta, Udayanâ's Queen, she had been accompanied by a family attendant who is referred to as Sâṅkhya Thai, Sâṅkhya Mother, probably implying a female ascetic belonging to the Order of the Sâṅkhya. This Perungadai is a Jaina classic in Tamil, the Jaina author of that work was a Prince of the Ruling Family of Kongu Dêsa. He considers Udayana as a follower of the Jaina faith and certainly would not give Vāsavadatta as her friend and adviser a female ascetic belonging to the Sâṅkhya Order if the latter were considered by him as a rival school to his own. This mutual sympathy and co-operation between the two schools will be cleanly appreciated when you notice the views expressed by Mâtara the commentator on Sâṅkhya Kârîka. Commenting on the second stanza he passes the following remark, about Vedic sacrifice (Mâtara Vritti of Sâṅkhya Kârîka printed in Chowkamba Sanskrit Series Pages 7 & 8).

“*Śrautôgnihoṭrâdikâḥ svargasâdhanatayâ tâpatrayapratikâra hêturuktaḥ sôpi drshṭavat anaikântikaḥ pratikâraḥ. Tathâ hi ‘Madhyama pindam putrakâma patnî prâśnīyât,’ ‘Ādhatta pitarô garbham’ iti Mantrêna. Tadêvam vedavachasâ bahûn pindân paraśśutânaśnâti yâvadêkôpi putrô na jâyatê. Tathâ ‘Paśyêmasaradaśśatam Jîvema śaradaśśatam’ iti śrutâvasti. Param garbhasthô jâtamatrô bâlô yuvâpi kumârô mriyate. Kim chânyatsa śrautô hetuḥ. Avîsuddhaḥ*

*paśuhimsâtmakatvât. Kshayayuktaḥ punaḥ pātāt. Atisaya
Yuktaḥ tatrâpi svâmibhṛtyabhâvaśravanât. Uktam cha.....*

*Shaṭ śatâni niyujyantê paśûnâm madhyamêhani, Asva-
mêdhasya vachanâdûnâni paśubhistṛbhiḥ.*

*Paśuvadhô gnishtômê mânushavadhaḥ gôsavavyavasthâ
sautrâmanyâm surâpânâṃ randayâ suha svêchhâlâpaścha
rtvijâm. Kalpasûtre anyadâpi akṛtyam bhûri kartavyatayô-
padiśyatê.*

“Rituals like Agnihôtra are prescribed in the Sruti as means leading to heaven and as effective remedies of the three types of pain. Even this remedy, prescribed by the Sruti, happens to be in the same boat as the remedies accessible to sense-perception. The remedy is neither sure, nor certain. For instance, it is said, “that in a certain ritual if a wife swallows the central ball of sacrificial ablation she will get a son.” Putting faith in this text, “hundreds of balls of rice have been swallowed, and yet not even a single issue has been born.” Once again, in the Sruti, there is the benediction, “let us enjoy a hundred winters, let us live for a hundred winters and so on.” But even the phenomenon is quite familiar, that a baby dies immediately after its birth, young men and those in the prime of life die.

Further the remedy proclaimed in the Sruti, as the cause of destroying the three types of pain is impurity-ridden, because the remedy involves the killing of animals.

Further the remedy does not confer any permanent immunity. Even supposing the performance of sacrifice leads one to Heaven, the Agent again falls from Heaven when the stock of his sacrificial virtue is exhausted.

In addition, even in the matter of heavenly enjoyment, increase and decrease, inequality in status as between master and servant, and similar differences are heard. It is said in the sacrifice of Aswamêdha 597 animals are killed on the central day. Thus the killing of animals in the Agnishtôma sacrifice, and killing of men in Gôsava sacrifice, the drinking of wine in the Soutrâmani ritual, and lewd unbridled talk of the sacrificial functionaries with prostitutes, these and other equally reprehensible acts are laid down in the Kalpa Sûtras."

Kincha

*Yathâ pankéna pankâmbhaḥ
surayâ vá surâkṛtam
bhûtahatyâm tathaivémâm
na yajnairmarṣhtumarhati.
Na hi hastâvasrgdigdhau
rudhirênaiva śudhyataḥ.*

'Tadyathâ smin lôkê manushyaḥ paśûnaśnânti tathabhîbhunjata évamamushmin lôkê paśavômanushyânaśnanti' iti śrutiśataśravanât.

Anyaccha—

*Vṛkshân chhitvâ paśûn hatvâ
kṛtvâ rudhirakardamam
yajnaishchêd gamyatê svargô
narakah kêna gamyate.*

Ityaviśuddhiyuktah sarvathâ srautô duhkhatrayaḥpratikârahêtuh.

*Atha 'Apâmasômamamṛtâ abhûma' iti prâguktam
Atrêdam pratyuttaram.*

“Again there are the following texts. ‘It is as useless to wipe out this sin of animal slaughter by (the performance) of sacrifices as it is to wash away dirt with dirty water or to cure drunkenness with more drink ; for blood-stained hands cannot indeed be purified with blood.’ A Sruti text also declares ‘Just as in this world men eat animals, so also in the other world do the animals feed upon men who consumed animal food.’ There is also another text which says “If heaven is obtained by cutting plants and killing animals and making (the Earth) a cess-pool of blood, what is that (atrocious, pray tell us) which takes one to hell.’ Hence the Vedic remedies for the annihilation of the three-fold sorrow are unclean in every way.

As to the text of the Sruti ‘We have drunk Sôma and we have become immortal’ we give the following reply.”

Here Mâtara ridicules the idea that persons who perform Yâga for obtaining sons very often do not get what they want ; and even when they are lucky enough to obtain a child it may die very early in spite of their offering sacrifice according to the Vedic rituals. The only obvious result is the cruelty inflicted on the animals in the name of religion. He spiritedly asks if persons who inflict cruelty on animals in the name of Yâga attain Swarga who else will go to Naraka, Hell ? Even an over-zealous Jaina writer cannot express his antipathy to animal sacrifice in any stronger words than Mâtara's. Similarly his condemnation of the Creation Theory is strong and unmistakable. Pages 75 and 76 beginning with ‘Isvarakaranamiti and Acharya bruhata and ending with ‘Kalonama na kasya

padârthosti, Vyaktam, Avyaktam, Purusha etc., Treyeva Patharthaha.'

Īśvarakâraṇamiti kēchidāchāryâ bruvatē.

Uktancha—

Ajnô janturanisô yamâtmanassuhadukkayôh

Īśvaraaprêrito gacchetsvargam narakamēva va.

Vêdavadhinah punaritttham kâraṇamâhuh.

*'Purusha évêdam sarvam' ityatah purushah
kâraṇamâhuh.*

Aparê svabhâvâmahuh. Svabhâvah kâraṇamiti.

Tathâ hi.....

Yêna śuklîkṛtâ hamsah

sukâscha haritîkṛtâh.

Mayûrâschitritâ yêna

sano vṛttim vidhâsyati.

Atra Sânkhyâ vadanti. Īśvarah kâraṇam na bhavati. Kasmât nirgunatvât. Īmâssagunâh prajāh. Satvarajastamâmsi trayô gunâh, techa prajāsu santi. Tâmscha gunân drshtvâ sâdhayâmah. Prakṛterimah samutpannah prajah. Yadīśvarah kâraṇam syâttatô nirgunâdīśvarānnirgunâ éva prajāh syuh. Nachaivam. Tasmâdīśvarah kâraṇam na bhavati. Ēvam purushôpi drashtavyah. Svabhâvô nâma na kâschitpadârthôsti. Yatah prajānâmutpattisangatih syât. Tasmâdyô brûte svabhâvah kâraṇamiti tanmithyâ. Kechit kâlam kâraṇatayâ varṇayanti.

Kâlah sṛjati bhûtâni

Kâlah samharati prajāh.

Kâlah suptêshu jâgarti

tasmât Kâlâstu kâraṇam.

Tadapi Sâmkhyo nirâkurutê. Kâlô nama na kaschitpadârthôsti. Vyaktam Avyaktam Purusha iti traya êva padârthâh. Tatra Kâlôntharbhûtah. Êvam pradhânam hitvâ nâstyanyat kâranam."

"Some teachers say that Isvara is the cause of the world. It is said this Finite Self, ignorant and powerless to determine and control his own pleasures and pain, goes either to Heaven or Hell impelled by God.

Those who rely on the Vêdas (Vêdavâdis) describe the cause differently. In view of the texts 'as everything is Purusha they say the Self itself is the cause.'

Others maintain that Svabhâva, or nature, is the cause. For instance, that Agency which has made swans white, the parrots green, and the peacocks multi-coloured, that Agency will also give us bread. In this connection, the Sâmkhyas argue thus:—"Isvara cannot be the cause. Why, because, he is devoid of qualities, or free from the taint of the three gunas. But the human beings are all, in greater or lesser degree, affected by the three gunas. The three gunas are (1) Satva, (2) Rajas, and (3) Thamas. These three permeate the entire creation including man. By observing the *gunas* we reach the following conclusion, namely, that these human beings should have originated from the Prakriti which is made up of the three *gunas*. If Isvara free from the influence of the three *gunas* is considered to be the cause, how is it that from a source free from the influence of the three *gunas*, human beings spring up exhibiting the influence of the said *gunas*? If Isvara had been the cause, human beings also should be free from the influence of the *gunas*. It is not so. Therefore

Isvara is not the cause. This argument *Mutatis Mutandis* will apply to Purusha as well.

Further, there is no distinct entity or category called nature or Svabhâva. In the absence of that category it appears illogical to explain the origin of human beings as due to the operation of Svabhâva. Hence it is erroneous to maintain that nature is the cause of humanity.

Yet others believe that Time is the cause of the world and human beings. For instance, "Time creates beings, Time destroys them, Time is awake, when others are sleep. Therefore Time is the cause. This policy also is repudiated by the Sâmkhya, because as in the case of Svabhâva a distinct entity or substance like Kâla or Time is not accessible. There are only three entities known to Sâmkhyas (1) the Vyakta, Manifest Universe (2) Avyakta, that is, Prakriti and (3) Purusha the sentient subject. Kâla or Time is to be subsumed in the previous lists. It is thus clear that there is no other cause than Prakriti or Pradhâna."

*

*

*

From this passage quoted from Mataravritti it is clear that he rejects the doctrine of creation by Isvara, that He is responsible for all activities here. He rejects the other Vedântic theory that everything is of the nature of the Purusha, that Purusha is the cause of the world. He also rejects the third view that the cause of the world is Nature or Svabhâva. After rejecting all aspects of the creation theory he states the Sâmkhya view of evolution as the only possible explanation. These three doctrines are also the fundamental doctrines of Jaina Darsana—Opposition to Vedic sacrifices as involving

Himsa, emphasising the plurality of Ātma, Purushanā-
 ōatva, plurality of souls and criticising the doctrine of
 creation as illogical and untenable. Hence on account
 of this fundamental identity in doctrines, these two
 schools were probably actuated by the same ideals and
 methods and were working in co-operation for some
 centuries during their existence in the South. This is
 the only possible explanation why the author of Neela-
 kesi chose for his criticism under the heading, "Sāṅkhya
 Vāda" only that school of Sāṅkhya Monism found in
 the Mahābhārata.

CHAPTER VIII.

Vaiseshika Vada.

Neelakesi next goes to the Asrama of the Vaisêshika teacher named Lokajit, who is as great as Kanâda himself the founder of Vaisêshika Darsana. He recognises at once in Neelakesi a desire and willingness to engage in debate. Therefore the teacher begins to explain the fundamental doctrines of his system in order to give her an opportunity to examine the same. "My system consists of six Padârthas, or categories—Dravya, Guna. Karma, Sâ mânâya, Visêsha and Samavâya, (Substance. Quality, Action, Genus, Species and Coherence respectively). Dravyâs are the five Bhûtas, Dik, Manas, Kâla and Jîva, the five elements, spacial direction, mind, time and life respectively. Thus the Dravyâs are nine in number. Gunas are the qualities of Dravya and karmas are the activity of the same. Sâ mânâya or the universal is of two kinds, Mahâ Sâ mânâya and Avântara Sâ mânâya. These two are otherwise called Para Sâ mânâya, and Apra Sâ mânâya. The first Mahâ Sâ mânâya refers to existence in general, Satva or Vastutva. The second Sâ mânâya refers to the universal element in Dravya. Guna etc. Hence the first is called the higher universal the second the lower universal. This universal element Sâ mânâya is an eternal and all-pervading category which is responsible for the presence of similarity in things. Just as Sâ mânâya produces similarity in things, its opposite category Visêsha or particularity, produces variety or differentiations among things. The category

of Samavâya is said to be responsible for bringing about the conjunction of things with their qualities or action. Gunas and karmas are taken to be entirely distinct from substance or Dravya. The inherence of qualities or karma in a particular substance is brought about by this category of Samavâya which is an active principle of association that unites particular gunas with their appropriate Dravyâs. In the first three Padârthas there is the element of existence present in common ; whereas this existential aspect is absent in the other categories Sâmanya, Visêsha and Samavâya. If an existential element is postulated in these three categories such as Sâmanya etc., then there must be another existential universe postulated in this, and another in the second and so on which will lead to a meaningless regress. Dravya, Guna, and Karma are entirely distinct from one another, and their association is the result of action of Samavâya. This is the position of the Vaisêshika system.

Since Neelakesi was rather indifferent to this exposition, the teacher asks her why she has been so indifferent. " If it is due to the unsatisfactoriness of the doctrine, you are quite at liberty to state your criticism " said the teacher.

Accepting this invitation, Neelakesi begins to state her objections to the Vaisêshika system. The four Dravyâs, beginning with earth, are physical entities. Hence they may all be put under one class instead of four. Further they are transmutable, one to another which would imply that they are ultimately one in nature. But if you justify the four-fold classification on the principle that they are so accepted by common

sense, then on the same principle you can sub-divide each into so many classes as common sense recognises different kinds of earth, water, fire and air.

You say, sound is the quality of Ākāśa or space. But sound is produced by the concussion of physical molecules with one another. If this physical phenomenon of sound is reduced to the quality of space, then you may as well refer other physical phenomena as properties of space. If it is said that sound has nothing to do with physical molecules, and hence it is not a physical phenomenon, how can you account for the production of sound when a bell metal is struck? How can you explain the fact that sound is perceived by the senses if it is intrinsically non-physical? Hence it is not accurate to describe sound as a quality of space. For, there is a fundamental difference in nature between sound and Ākāśa. Ākāśa or space is non-physical, indestructible, all-pervading, whereas sound is just the opposite, being a physical phenomenon, temporary and ephemeral in duration, occurring in a particular locality in space. The quality and substance must be so related that one cannot exist without the other. Where one is, the other also must be, where one is not, the other also cannot be. If such is the relation between quality and substance in general, Ākāśa or space must share the nature of sound and it must be a temporary phenomenon confined to a particular locality just like its quality sound. When sound dies out, space must also share the fate of its quality and it must also die out of existence. If you rely on the doctrine of *Spota* and maintain that Sabda is non-destructible and permanent, even then your view is untenable. For, even in the

case of an articulate sound, the general characteristics of sound are present. Though there is a sort of uniform relation between words and their meaning, still the articulate sound produced by human being while speaking, is pronounced by a person at a definite place, at a definite time, as determined by the context. Since here also sound is produced at a particular place and time like all other sounds, this also is confined to a particular locality, has a finite duration and dies out at the end.

Your category of Dik, or direction, is given an independent status of a Dravya in your system. But you must realise that Dik, or direction, is merely a relation of space determined by the position and movement of other objects like the Sun. Since it is merely a spacial relation determined by sun-rise, or sun-set, Dik is said to be four, or eight, or ten or even many, according to the point of view of the speaker. There is no justification therefore to speak of Dik as an independent Dravya side by side with Ākāśa. That Dik, or direction, is merely a spacial relation determined by a particular object in a particular position, is obvious from the following illustration. Suppose a person is standing in a place, and that he is surrounded by a number of men forming a circle around him. If he asks the men around him, "In what direction am I standing with reference to you" the answer in each case will mention a different direction. One will say "You are standing to my left." The other will say "You are standing to my right." One will say "You are to the East," and so on. All the answers if taken together will practically enumerate all the possible

directions of the compass. Can it be maintained that the person in the centre is really present in all these directions that he is really spread over the whole of space? Such an interpretation would be absurd and yet all the answers are correct. Hence, direction, is merely a relation with reference to another object in space, and not an independent Dravya or substance. This illustration further elucidates the many-sided nature of Dravya, Anêkânta aspects of Dravyâs. Dravya may be said to have different predicates according to different aspects or relations. You will do well to realise this ultimate truth.

Manas or consciousness is really an activity exhibited by Ātma when it is embodied. Hence Manas cannot be given an independent status of a Dravya. If Manas is given an independent status of Dravya, then the five kinds of sensations similarly produced may also be given the same privilege; and then the Dravyâs will be not merely nine but fourteen.

Again you mention that Kala or Time is an independent Dravya. But you must realise that it is also a relation brought about by the movement or modification of physical bodies in space. Time duration, and time intervals, will have no meaning apart from objects moving in space.

If Guna and Karma, quality and action, are entirely distinct from Dravya, then life must be considered to be devoid of knowledge and intelligent action. Life's qualities and Karmas are united to life by the action of Samavâya. Hence life by itself before its union with qualities must be inanimate and un-intelligent entity. What is gained by calling it life? How could such an

inanimate entity be taken as the foundation of our own personality? If qualities are quite distinct from corresponding Dravyâs, and if the substance acquires the qualities as a result of conjunction brought about by a third factor, Samavâya, then what guarantee is there that a particular Dravya will have its own appropriate qualities united to it by Samavâya? It may be quite possible that a substance is joined to qualities incompatible with its own nature; and as a result of coming together of qualities and substance, contradictory in nature both may get nullified. It may lead to complete Nihilism. You say Guna and Guni are absolutely distinct from each other, and their union is brought about by Samavâya. But Samavâya is said to have no existential import. Hence it must merely be a fiction. Though a fiction, it is credited with an important function of bringing about union of quality and substance. How can a fictitious entity perform such an important function? Further this fictitious entity Samavâya must be credited with a selective intelligence to bring about the union of appropriate qualities with their corresponding substance. If qualities and substances are really distinct, there is no ground even for speaking of certain qualities as properties of certain substances, and certain substances, having their own appropriate qualities. Independent and floating qualities may be associated with any available substance. Similarly in the case of knowledge and speech, which are considered to be quality and action of life. If Guna and Karma are different in themselves from Jîva and if their union with Jîva is brought about by Samavâya, the Jîva in itself before the union must be considered to be an

inanimate entity. And similarly Gnâna and Karma will cease to be Gnâna and Karma before the union. If Samavâya is responsible for the union of guna and guni which remain different and distinct, then the quality of fire, heat, may be tacked on to the substance water, and the quality of coldness of the latter may have the chance of being united with fire. If you defend your position by saying that the qualities are found in association with their respective substances from time immemorial, then you have to admit the same with reference to life and its relation to Gnâna and Karma. Knowledge and activity may be present in Jîva from time immemorial and need not be considered to be the result of a union brought about by Samavâya. If Guna and Guni are considered to be so identical and existent together from time immemorial then that is just the ultimate truth. Then the wisest thing for you is to accept this Paramârtha and give up your own pet theory that Guna and Guni are separate and independent.

If they are identical then you say there is this difficulty. When the Guna disappears the Guni also must be gone, both being identical. Hence the two must be considered to be different. Otherwise it cannot be explained how chameleon should continue to live when one of its colour quality changes into another. Similarly it is impossible to explain how a person could live when his quality of youth disappears and old age takes its place. Similarly in the case of a serpent lying in coils. When the coil disappears and when the serpent runs straight you have the appearance of one quality, and the destruction of the former quality, while the serpent remains the

same. You say all these cases naturally suggest that qualities are different from substances and so you postulate the reality of the hidden sub-stratum a Dravya which is a hidden permanency. If, in order to escape from this difficulty, you postulate Dravya quite independent of the changing qualities then you cannot speak of the substance itself undergoing change. Then you cannot say in the case of a man why he was young some years ago, and now that he has grown old. A Dravya without qualities must be a mere myth. Such quality-less fiction cannot produce knowledge in us, and cannot be perceived by us as an object of experience. If Gunâs and Karmas are really distinct and self-subsisting they may be put on a par with Dravya itself. There is no necessity to consider them as qualities and karmas since they are entitled to be called Dravyâs as they are credited with a self-subsistent independent nature of their own.

You must perceive the true nature of Guna and Guni, quality and substance. Quality and substance, from one point of view may be considered distinct. Otherwise you cannot call the one quality, and the other substance. Guna and Guni, if absolutely identical, may be called by the same name and need not be considered as two ; and yet Guna and Guni in another way must be considered identical ; otherwise there will be no uniformity of relation between a thing and its quality. Now a thing may be in association with one quality and now with another. But such is not the nature of reality. There is a uniform relationship between a thing and its quality. Hence Guna and Guni, quality and substance, must be considered to be indential. That is, the nature

of reality is an identity in difference. It is because of this identity in difference, you have to admit that Guna and Guni are indential in one sense, though different from another point of view. It is because of such a uniformity of relationship between Guna and Guni, that it is possible for us to differentiate one substance from another, one person from another. A person is described as being intelligent, another as able, and a third as good, according as their different natures are exhibited in different qualities. Quality is just an expression of the nature of the thing itself. Similarly gold is different from clay because each has its own essential qualities. The qualities of gold cannot be shifted to clay, nor the qualities of the latter to the former. It is this inseparable identity, that is the differentiating mark among things. Again, it is because of this uniformity of relationship, that things and qualities have an intrinsic value of their own. A person is commended because of his good quality, another is condemned because of his bad quality. If quality does not express the nature of the personality, there will be no justification either for praising or blaming an individual on the strength of his quality. Similarly, the quality of whiteness which is present in silver, as well as in a crane, may by itself have no value. But since whiteness of silver is the expression of the nature of that object, it is considered to be more valuable than the white colour of the bird.

Similarly, in the case of action also. Good conduct or bad conduct, as a basis of moral value of personality, must be considered to be the action of the individual. If the individual person is considered to be quite distinct

from his particular conduct or action, then there is no justification for passing moral judgment on the individual on the basis of an activity which is entirely alien to his nature, but associated with him by an accident due to the activity of a third factor. Every action will be valueless and it can have no meaning. Samsâra and Môksha and Môksha Mârğa will all be meaningless shibboleth, if activity is considered to be quite distinct from personality. If a dancing girl and her dance, a horse and his gallop, be not one and the same, there is no reason why there should be praise and reward in their case. If action is entirely distinct from the thing acting, cessation of activity must leave the Jîva inert. Acting and dancing must completely disappear when the person leaves the stage. If action so dies out how can the individual reproduce the same when he enters the stage next time. It is necessary to maintain therefore that the disposition to act is somehow preserved and retained by the individual and this disposition enables him to reproduce it in future whenever necessary. Otherwise there is no ground for memory at all. There is no guarantee that a learned man will be able to remember and reproduce what he once learnt. Hence it cannot be consistently maintained that action is an alien thing conjoined to the individual by the force of a third something.

According to your position Guna and Karma are independent entities unconnected with Dravya, but united to the latter by the action of Samavâya; before such a union is brought about by Samavâya what is the nature of Guna and Karma? Are they existing reals or non-existent fictions? If they are non-existent

like sky-flower, then Samavâya cannot bring about the union of Dravya with the non-existing qualities and functions. If, on the other hand, Guna and Karma are considered as existing prior to their union with Dravya, in what form do they exist? If they exist as qualities and Karma, they must exist in association with some other Dravya. For example, the qualities of Jîva, such as intelligence, before their union with Jîva, must have been present as qualities of something else. If they were present as qualities in something else, then their presence in that substance must be due to the unifying action of Samavâya, or due to their own nature. If their connection with some other Dravya before they are brought together with Jîva, is due to the action of Samavâya, then Samavâya could unite the qualities of intelligence etc., with Jîva itself in the very first instance. Again it is open to Samavâya to unite Jîva with Achêtana qualities appropriately belonging to inanimate objects. If the qualities of intelligence etc., are considered to be attached to some other thing before their unification with Jîva by Samavâya, then Samavâya must be credited with two functions separating a quality from one Dravya and uniting the separated quality with another Dravya. According to your description of Samavâya it only performs the latter function of unification. To forcibly wrench the quality from a thing is beyond its scope. If you maintain that this function also is within its capacity then it is theoretically possible that some day Samavâya can similarly take away the qualities of intelligence and action from life and offer them to something else. If you maintain that such a thing is impossible because

the qualities of intelligence etc., are in the Jīva because they inhere in the appropriate Dravya then you need not talk about the union of qualities with the thing being effected by Samavāya. Straightaway it may be maintained that qualities are inherent in their own Dravya and they do not require the aid of a third something to bring about this relation between qualities and things.

The category of Sāmānya or the Universal, is supposed by you, to be the factor that produces similarity among things. Various things belonging to a class are said to be similar to one another because of the presence of the class Universal or Sāmānya in all of them. If Sāmānya were not present in things then there will be no similarity. This contention is not corroborated by evidence. There is no such Padārtha called Sāmānya present in things. Things belonging to the same class, no doubt, exhibit a similarity among them. But this similarity in things is not due to the presence of Sāmānya in them. It is due to the positive common nature of things and hence must be considered as the result of common characteristics or qualities. In order to explain this similarity which is merely the quality of things it is not necessary to postulate the presence in them of a separate category called Sāmānya; if such a category as Sāmānya, an independent entity by itself were responsible for class-similarity among things, then all kinds of similarity must be traced to its presence. The common characteristics existing in all things must also be traced to the presence of this Sāmānya. Had it not been for this Sāmānya the common characteristics existing in the nature of all

reals will turn out to be mere fictitious. What gives these fictions existential aspect is Sāmānya. Sāmānya or the Universal, is thus given an extraordinary function of elevating even non-existing qualities to the class of the existing reals by its own presence there, by its mere association with those fictions. All fictions and chimera may be so converted into reals by the mere presence of Sāmānya.

But it must be realised that similarity among things is not due to any such important metaphysical magic performed by the so-called category of Sāmānya. Similarity among things is due to positive common characteristics present in their very nature. If Sāmānya is a distinct category in itself, and if by its mere contact with all Dravyas is able to bring about similarity among them, then this function can very well be performed even by Ākāśa. Space, because it is in contact with several things, and because it is an independent category like Sāmānya, can also play a similar part. Similarity among things, may then be traced to the presence in them of space. If space cannot produce similarity, nor can Sāmānya.

But if it is different and distinct from Dravyas, and if it is able to produce likeness in things by its very presence in them, then it must undergo all the changes characteristic of Dravya. If clay becomes a pot, there is change in the Dravya. Similarly there must be a change in the Sāmānya. Hence clay-hood must also change into pot-hood. If the pot is broken to shells, similarly, the Sāmānya present in the pot, must be broken to bits and the pot-hood must be changed into many kinds of shell-hood. If one Dravya is destroyed,

the Sāmānya present in it must also be destroyed. If another thing appears, then the corresponding Sāmānya must also come into existence. But you don't admit of such changes in the nature of Sāmānya. Since this independent category Sāmānya is never perceived apart from the Dravya it is merely a philosophical fiction which is given the status of an independent category like Dravya. If Sāmānya is taken to be identical with similarity in things, and not as different entity by itself, then it is merely a quality of Dravya, resting upon the common characteristics present in the nature of Dravya. Sāmānya, in this sense, is quite acceptable and intelligible. It means merely the common quality in things, and as such it cannot exist independently of, and apart from things. Being identical with the common characteristics of Dravya it would be an aspect of the nature of the Dravyas themselves. Sāmānya, then, as a universal element present in things of the same class, would express the essential nature of such things. It will disappear when the Dravyas disappear and re-appear when they come into existence again. In short, Sāmānya or the universal element in things, would behave just like other qualities of things. Hence we conclude that it need not be taken as an independent category, a padārtha existing side by side with Gunas or qualities.

But you object to this conclusion. You maintain that Sāmānya cannot be identified with Gunas because there is a fundamental difference in their nature. We speak of degrees of excellence, in the case of qualities. But there is no such gradations, or degrees of excellence, in the case of Sāmānya. For example, in the case of sense quality of sweetness, we recognise different grades

of sweetness. One thing is sweeter than the other, and among the number of sweet things, you may pick up one as the sweetest. But in the case of the class Universal, you cannot speak of degrees. Identity in things is a unitary fact, incapable of admitting grades or degrees.

But your assertion, in this case, is unfounded. Just as there are degrees of excellence in qualities, so also there may be degrees of excellence in the class Universals or Sāmānya. For example, take the case of the class, called horse. There are different kinds of horses; and the classification may be based upon degrees of excellence. If degrees of excellence is the basis of difference between the qualities and of Sāmānya, then the differentiation cannot stand because even class universals admit of such degrees. Since this reason is present in both Sāmānya and Gunas they must belong to the same class and both must be considered as qualities. Even among the categories which are considered to be Gunas, or qualities, sometimes there is a difference of degrees in their inherence. For example, the quality of whiteness, cannot be separated from the white things whereas the quality of fragrance must certainly go out of its own thing in order to be perceived. Thus, there seems to be an important difference between the quality of whiteness and the quality of fragrance. According to your own logic then, smell cannot be included in the class of qualities; and it must be given an independent status as a separate padārtha and then there would be seven Padārthas in your system instead of six.

Next, Visēsha. This category Visēsha is also

considered by you as an independent Padârtha. Its function is to differentiate Dravyas from one another. The former category Sāmānya by its presence produces similarity in things. This category Visêsha by its presence in things, makes them different from one another. Now, take the case of Jīva Dravya. This has a characteristic manifestation of intelligence. Is the category Visêsha which is supposed to differentiate one thing from another the same as the manifestation of intelligence, or is it different? If Visêsha is quite different from such a manifestation of things, then what is its exact function? Is the Visêsha responsible or not for the manifestation of intelligence by Jīva? If Visêsha is not responsible then you have to postulate some other thing as the cause for the manifestation. Then the category of Visêsha becomes quite useless. But if it is the cause of manifestation, then by manifestation of things we mean qualities like intelligence in Jīva, and qualities like colour etc., in the physical objects. These qualities associated respectively with animate and inanimate things must be considered real, since they are the qualities of the real and existent things. But Visêsha according to your own description has no such existential aspect. They are devoid of Satta or existential reality. How can a non-existent padârtha be able to produce manifestations in things, manifestations which are existential effects?

As a matter of fact, Visêsha which is considered by you to be an independent category responsible for the diversity among things is nothing but the qualities of things themselves. Just as class similarity, results from Sâdharma qualities positive common character-

istics in things, so also the diversity among things results from Vaidharma qualities. Similarity depends upon essential qualities, diversity depends upon the accidental qualities of things—qualities present in individuals and not forming part of their common nature. But both Sāmānya and Viśeṣha in spite of this difference are qualities of things. Hence they need not be considered as separate Padārthas.

Lastly the Padārtha of Samavâya. You say that Guna and Karma cannot be united to Dravya except by the unifying Padārtha called Samavâya. It is this category of Samavâya, that is capable of conjoining qualities and karmas with things. But you must notice that this Samavâya in itself possesses different qualities. It has the characteristic nature of joining qualities with things. While functioning thus, it exhibits specific characteristics of its own; for it is able to unite the qualities of intelligence with Jīva and not with matter to unite the quality of heat with fire and not with water, to unite the coldness with water and not with fire. All such characteristics of selective association must be the manifestation of this category Samavâya itself. Thus you have Samavâya as an entity with its own specific characteristics, mentioned above. How are these characteristics united to Samavâya itself? You cannot postulate another Samavâya to perform this function, for that will result in infinite regress. Again, you have to recognise that the qualities themselves are characterised by further qualities and so also karmas. Intelligence is taken to be the quality of Ātma. But this intelligence itself may be right or wrong, keen or dull, and therefore these predicates are the qualities of

intelligence which is itself the quality of Jiva. Similarly colour is a quality of the physical objects. But it may be in so many ways qualified by its own attributes. So also the other qualities of taste and smell. Thus we have qualities of qualities. Similarly we have qualities of action. You may characterise a man's conduct either as good or bad, cruel or merciful. Not only in moral valuation action has qualities; even in ordinary activities such as gait, in walking, it may be considered beautiful or ugly. How are these subsidiary qualities attached to the original qualities or action? Is the union in these cases also brought about by Samavâya? If the aid of Samavâya is invoked in all these cases, then Samavâya itself must seek the aid of another Samavâya to get united to its own qualities and functions. If you maintain that in the case of Samavâya, it is not necessary to postulate another Samavâya, because Samavâya by itself is capable of uniting its own qualities and functions to itself, the same may be the case with other Dravyas also. Each Dravya, on its own account, may get united to its own qualities. What is possible to one category must be equally possible to another category. If the union of Samavâya with its qualities does not need the aid of a third party the union of Dravya with its qualities may also be effected by themselves without the aid of a third factor. It is not at all necessary to postulate the category of Samavâya for this purpose.

If the presence of a quality in a thing is the result of the action of Samavâya, then the whiteness in the stork, and pungency in ginger, must be the effect of unifying action of Samavâya. Then it is theoretically possible that Samavâya could join the quality of

blackness to the stork, and sourness to ginger. Such a contingency is not altogether impossible. Hence you may have a black stork, and a sour ginger as a result of the unifying potency of Samavâya. If you reject this suggestion as impossible on the ground that the conjunction of qualities with Dravya must be based upon the appropriateness of the quality, what do you mean by appropriateness of qualities? Is the appropriateness of qualities, united to a particular Dravya, determined by Samavâya or by some other object, or by the nature of the thing itself? If the appropriateness is determined by Samavâya itself, and if it has made the white colour appropriate to the stork, it might as well make the black colour an appropriate quality to the same bird. Logically, there is nothing against such a possibility. But if appropriateness is determined by the nature of the thing itself to which the quality is attached, then it implies that the quality is already related to the nature of the thing in some way and it need not wait for Samavâya to bring about its union with the thing. Again, this unifying function itself which is present in Samavâya from the very beginning, must be the result of another factor uniting the function with Samavâya. If you say that this function is there in Samavâya, based upon the nature of Samavâya itself, and hence it is not due to another unifying factor, then it may be maintained in a similar way, that all qualities and functions are present in the nature of things and they need not require the aid of Samavâya to be so united to their appropriate Dravyas. All this criticism is applicable to Visêsha also because the differentiating qualities of things are also rooted in the nature of things.

The difference of one thing from another need not be attributed to separatistic activity of Visêsha; each Dravya has its own intrinsic qualities different from those of the others. It is this intrinsic difference in the nature of things that you credit to the activity of an independent category called Visêsha. Gold is gold, and clay is clay, and one is different from the other, because of the intrinsic difference in their nature. Hence the correct view to maintain is that Guna and Guni are inseparably present together—no qualities apart from the thing, and no thing apart from its qualities. If separated both will disappear. Qualities cannot exist without the sub-stratum, and the sub-stratum without qualities will be a fiction.

The so-called unifying factor Samavâya, is said to be devoid of *Sat* by you. Hence it is not an existential factor. This and everything else will become unreal, if things are, as described by you.

You hold that Guna and Guni must be really distinct from each other for the following reasons. (1) Dravya is unity, Gunas are many. If they are to be identical the unity of the Dravya will go. The things united will get dissipated in the multiplicity of qualities. Conversely, the qualities are many, and Dravya is one; and if the qualities and Dravya are identified, the qualities being merged in the thing, the multiple qualities will also merge in the unity of the thing and all the qualities will become one. Thus, by the identity neither the Dravya will retain its unity, nor the gunas its multiplicity. Secondly, Dravya is permanent entity and the qualities are changing facts. Hence such diverse factors cannot be identified. You

reject identity between things and qualities because of these two reasons.

But the ground for your rejection is not quite adequate. A Dravya which is supposed to be a unity is very often described by such qualities that it is white, large, sweet, etc., in order to differentiate it from other things which may have different qualities. Thus the unitary Dravya is analysable into a number of elements according to the emphasis on the different characteristics. This analysis of the unity must certainly imply multiplicity of its nature and characteristic. If it is able to preserve its unity even with the analysis of its nature, it may be able to preserve its unity in spite of its union with diverse qualities, because qualities are just a manifestation of its nature. Analysis of the unitary Dravya into different elements just means that the unitary Dravya manifests its nature through diverse and multiple qualities. This result need not be considered a calamity to Dravya. Similarly, the multiple qualities, which are diverse when viewed in abstraction are really inseparable from the thing with which they are identical; because of this union with the thing and because they are the various aspects of the manifestation of a single Dravya the diverse qualities so present in the thing exhibit the underlying unity of the substratum. Thus the multiple qualities become one, being the expression and manifestation of the unity of the Dravya. Even in this case, there need be no anxiety about the fate of the qualities. The ultimate unity of the thing must somehow be present in all its qualities and the qualities in spite of their difference must be identified with one another, being the qualities of the

the same thing. Thus the unity of the thing is quite compatible with the diversity and multiplicity of qualities and the diversity of qualities is similarly compatible with their unity. This is the great truth that the nature of the real is a unity in the midst of diversity, since the qualities, diverse in nature, are but the expression of the underlying unity. This is the ultimate truth of metaphysics. Hence, instead of fighting shy of the result, it must be welcomed by all thinkers as the adequate solution as to the nature of reality.

The distinction between Guna and Guni is further elucidated by Neelakesi. The Dravyas, such as Jiva, Ajiva, Man and Deva among the living things, such as earth, water, milk and ghee among the inanimate things, are considered distinct from one another as Dravyas because their intrinsic natures are different. When they are looked at as illustrations of Dravyas, their respective qualities get merged into their different natures and thus get pushed to the background whereas their natures as Dravya become prominent. Again when the qualities of the Dravyas are attended to, the things themselves which manifest through these qualities, get submerged in the qualities themselves and do not obtrude as independent entities besides the qualities. In this case, the quality becomes prominent and the thing is pushed to the shade, thus becoming indirectly interesting as the basis of qualities. Thus it is merely from the point of interest that emphasis is laid on Dravya aspect now, and on Guna aspect at another time, both being the different aspects of the same reality and not different entities brought together by a third unifying factor as is assumed by you. If you object to this position by saying,

that when you attend to the Guni, the qualities disappear, and when you attend to the qualities, Guna disappears and therefore both will ultimately disappear, then I can only say that this criticism is based upon misunderstanding. It cannot be maintained that when the Dravya aspect is emphasised the Gunas disappear, and when the Guna aspect is emphasised, Dravyas disappear. What is intended is, not destruction, but removal from the focus of attention due to the change of interest. When you attend to the Dravya aspect, the Gunas constituting the nature of the Dravya, merely get submerged in the emphasised aspect and do not get destroyed. Similarly, when the Guna aspect is emphasised, the Dravya being fully expressed in the qualities, gets merged in the qualities themselves as these are emphasised dominant factors. Thus the shifting of interest shifts the centre of gravity, so to speak, now to the Dravya, now to the qualities. Besides the difference of emphasis, nothing else is mentioned. Thus, according to different aspects of view, reality may be described by different predicates, its unity from the point of view of Dravya, diversity from the point of view of qualities or Guna, while Dravyas and its Gunas are organically united together. The one cannot be separated from the other except by intellectual abstraction. What may be so abstracted by the intellect, cannot be taken to be existentially independent. It is this doctrine of unity in multiplicity, identity in difference, organic union of Dravya with qualities, that is the fundamental doctrine of the Jaina philosophy, whereas your Vaisêshika system postulates abstractions as independent entities. If you restore these abstractions to

the nature of reality, and if you realise that these are abstractions and as such cannot be taken as separate categories, then you will be able to realise the true nature of reality.

Listening to this presentation of truth, the Vaisêshika teacher admits that his categories are abstract fictions, and becomes convert to Neelakesi's faith. He thanks her for the presentation of the philosophical truth in a clear way. Neelakesi takes leave of this teacher and proceeds further.

CHAPTER IX.

Veda Vada.

After travelling several miles Neelakesi reaches the town Kâkanti. There is a college of Vêdic scholars presided over by the learned Brahman teacher named Bûthika. She enters that Vêdic college where she perceives a number of scholars studying the Vêdas, others getting their doubts cleared and explained by the teacher. She questions the teacher Bûthika to explain his system for her benefit. The teacher, at once, realises that Neelakesi is on a mission to examine alien system of thought. In response to her request, he gives the fundamentals of his creed.

The scripture for us is the Vêda, which is time-less and self-subsistent. Based upon our Vêda, we have a number of philosophical systems, Sânkhya describing 25 tattvas, Vaisêshika describing six padârthas, Srishtivâda describing the doctrine of creation, Brahma Vâda describing the nature of Brahma, and other systems such as Vaishnava, Mâhêsvara, Pâsupata, Pancharâtra and Parivrâjika. There are a number of sub-sects in these. All of these are based upon the Vêdas. Neelakesi referring to Vêda Vâda, or Mîmâmsaka system, tells the Brahman teacher, that after all, his system is but a Nâstika creed, in as much as it does not recognise the reality of an Omniscient Purusha, Sarvagna. " You

boast of a number of systems born of the Vêdas, and you still cling to your Mimâmsa doctrine which is distinctly Atheistic. If, in your opinion, later systems are more acceptable, give up your own view and accept the later systems."

At the mention of the word 'Nâstika,' the Brahman teacher Bûthika gets enraged. He retorts by saying "You don't understand the importance of our Vêdas; you don't recognise the significance of A-Pourushêya, that the Vêda is not produced by any person. It is not possible for you to understand the Vêdas. Hence, you are not qualified to criticise the same. After all, you are a Sûdra. Hence you have no knowledge of the Vêdas." When Bûthika concluded his rebuke, Neelakesi, in her turn, gets offended because of this insult. She begins to defend herself from this unwarranted insult from the Brahman teacher. "Why prate about my incapacity to understand your Vêdas? When it is possible for out-caste creatures to understand and expound the Vêdas, certainly it is quite possible for me to examine and criticise the same. Remember the antecedents of the great men who were responsible for building up your Vêdic literature. Remember the antecedents of Vashishta, Agastya, Sakti, Parâsara, Vyâsa and Sukha. Vashishta and Agastya were Brahma's sons by Thilottama, a dancing girl of Indra's court. Vashishta's son Sakti was born to a *chandala* woman. This Sakti's son by Swapâki was Parâsara, and this Parâsara's son Vyâsa, was born to a fisher woman, and Vyâsa's son by Thilottama was Sukha. With these antecedents for your great Purushas, you dare to insult me because of my birth. Evidently you have

forgotten the following verses contained in your own scriptures:—

1. Vyasa, born of a dancing girl, became a great Rishi :

Hence, it is *tapas* that makes the Brahman, and not his birth.

2. Sakti, born of the chandala woman, became a great Rishi :

Hence, it is *tapas* that makes the Brahman, and not his birth.

3. Parâsara, born of a Swapâki, became a great Rishi :

Hence, it is *tapas* that makes a Brahman, and not his birth.

4. Vyâsa, born of Matsyagandi, a fisher woman, became a great Rishi :

Hence, it is *tapas* that makes a Brahman, and not his birth.

These lines are uttered by your own great men and yet, out of ignorance, you emphasise birth. Scholarship which you obtain by hard work and exercise is easily accessible to anybody by the same means of study and hard work." Then Bûthika challenges Neelakesi to express her critical opinion about the Vêdas if it is possible for her. "Hearing your criticism I shall answer all the points and establish the supreme importance of the Vêdas."

Neelakesi accepts the challenge of the Brahman teacher and enumerates the following defects in the Vêdas.

- (1) Vêda distinctly bears the mark of having been produced by somebody.

- (2) It bears the mark of recent production.
- (3) Vêda is incompatible with experience.
- (4) It contains a number of false statements.
- (5) It promotes inordinate desire for worldly things.
- (6) It promotes undesirable conduct.
- (7) It creates confusion of the intellect.
- (8) It contains self-contradictory doctrines.
- (9) It instigates man to cruelty, and ultimately leads him to degradation of life.

After enumerating all these defects she begins to establish these respectively by quoting evidence in favour of her criticism. First, Vêda bears the mark of being produced. Just like ordinary literary work, Vêda consists of sentences constituted by words, which in their turn, by letters. Since there is no fundamental difference between the language of the Vêdas and the language of the ordinary literary works, both must be considered as having been produced by some intelligent person. If, in spite of this similarity, it is maintained that the Vêda is *Apourusheya*, not produced by anybody, a similar claim may be advanced in favour of the Buddhist Scripture—the Three Pitakas. Then, the Three Pitakas also might be considered *Apourusheya*. Next Neelakesi quotes the lines from Brihadâraṇyaka Upanishad relating to the origin of the Vêdas beginning with words “Mahato Boothasya Niswasitham.” These lines clearly indicate that the Vêdas had been produced by Mahatho Bootha. Further, she points out the derivation of the word Taitiri meaning Vêda, which means what is taught by Titiri. Here also there is a reference to the person

Titiri. Hence your doctrine of *Apourusheya* is contradicted by the statements contained in the Vêdas.

Bûthika answers this objection by saying that the persons named here, are not to be considered as the authors of the Vêdas. They are merely teachers transmitting their knowledge of the Vêdas to their disciples, Vêdas themselves, being timeless and self-subsistent; whereas your illustration of the Three Pitakas is beside the point, because the Buddhist tradition itself admits the fact that Buddha is responsible for the three Pitakas. But, in the case of the Vêdas, there is no such tradition. No one can say when the Vêda was produced or by whom.

Neelakesi retorts by saying that this inference is fallacious; merely from the fact that you do not know the origin of a thing, when it was produced, or by whom, you cannot infer that its nature is timeless and self-subsistent. There are a number of proverbs occurring in the language of a people. Nobody knows when these proverbs were composed, or who composed them. From this ignorance of time and authorship, you cannot elevate the proverbs to the level of the timeless and self-subsistent Vêda. Just as proverbs and other wise sayings are compiled by a later person for the benefit of the scholars, so also were the Vêdic Mantras compiled by Vyâsa for the benefit of Vedic students. Your doctrine of *Apourusheya* is equally applicable to the compilation of the proverbs, and the Vêdas must stand or fall with the proverbs, since their nature is identical. Thus Neelakesi establishes that the Vêda is produced just like any other modern literary work. The first two items are thus disposed of.

Next, she takes up the third—how the Vêda contradicts concrete experience. She enumerates a number of statements and beliefs which are in conflict with our ordinary experience. It contains statements relating to the birth of a person from an ant-hill, from a pot, from the ground, from a fish, from an animal. It believes that a Brahman could be born from the womb of a *chandala* woman. It narrates the story of Indra and Surya, having intercourse with Aruna, a male who is said to have brought forth as his sons Vâli and Sugriva, the two monkeys. It narrates the story of Indra who lost his generative organ and who cut the penis of a ram and had it tacked on to himself. It describes Ātma as eternal and all-pervading and still it speaks of the same as going about from one place to another. It describes the birth of Karna, with kavacha and kundala, through the ear of his mother Kunti. All these statements refer to events which are quite impossible and in conflict with ordinary experience.

Next, what are the false statements contained in the Vedas. There you have the description of “a blind man picking up jewels lost; a man without fingers stringing them together into a garland; and a man without neck wearing it as an ornament.” Such statements, since they refer to absolutely impossible and absurd conditions, must be considered to be false statements. Further, the Vêda, in the Gnâna Kânda, emphasises the fact that everything is of the nature of Brahman, and that multiplicity and diversity in the world are unreal; and yet in the Karma Kanda enjoins the performance of Agnihôtra sacrifice, by those that desire Swarga. These contradictory

teachings must also be considered as a kind of falsehood.

Next Vêda creates desire for worldly things. The Purohit accepts gifts of houses and lands, gold and silver, cows and goats, horses and elephants. Even Yagnavalkiya, confesses to Janaka, that he is actuated not merely by the desire to know the Brahman, but also by the desire to obtain numerous Dakshinas. This hankering after gifts, merely results in augmenting the desire for more. Neelakesi in support of this, narrates a story, of a purohit who obtained as gift from a landlord half of his lands which belonged to the share of his dead son. The Brahman purohit who obtained the gift of land settled down as an agriculturist. Since he had only half the portion of his lands, he expressed to his friend that if the other son also died, the landlord would give away the remaining portion to him and thus he could enjoy all the lands as his own. This perverted desire is merely the result of the praise showered upon gifts by the Vêdas. Why should religious scripture encourage this kind of desire for worldly goods?

That it promotes wrong conduct is evident from the encouragement of drinking, meat-eating, and sexual intercourse. That it encourages drinking, is evident from the description of Soutramani Yâga which contains the dancing of the purohitis intoxicated after drink, that meat-eating is encouraged is quite obvious since the sacrifice always involves destruction of animals and eating the meat so obtained. It encourages even illicit sexual intercourse indirectly as a result of the doctrine of "*Aputhrasyu Gathir Nasti*" and directly licentiousness is encouraged as enjoined in Poundriga Yaga.

Next the Vêda creates confusion in the mind of the reader because sometimes it makes Vishnu the ultimate God to whom everybody else offers worship ; and sometimes Iswara is made supreme who is worshipped by Vishnu and the other Gods ; the only result in the student is a confusion as to who is the Supreme Being. Again, many statements of great significance in the Vêdas are ambiguous and are interpreted in self-contradictory ways by different schools of Vêdic scholars. Neelakesi takes up the statement " Ajena Yashtavya " where the Aja is interpreted by some as referring to goat, and by others as referring to old grains incapable of germinating. In support of this she narrates the story of Uparicharavasu contained in the Mahâbhârata section 345, Santi Parva.

Story of Uparichara Vasu.

The story of Uparichara Vasu referred to in the Vêda Vâda chapter in Neelakesi is contained in Mahâbhârata, Santi Parva, Chapter 345.

Yudhishtira asks Bhishma, " Why is it the great King Vasu who has been devoted to the Lord is made to go to the nether world ? " Bhishma gives the story of King Vasu. " It arose out of a controversy between the Rishis and Devâs. Once upon a time, Indra with the object of performing a Yâga came down to the world after obtaining proper Diksha, the necessary qualification for the performance of a sacrifice. Brihaspati, the Deva Guru, acted as purohit. At the time of offering animal sacrifice the officiating priest Brihaspati entered the courtyard and said ' Bring in here flour for making the animal.' Hearing these words all the Devatas ran to Brihaspati the great Brahman Rishi and

complained to him thus each separately. "It is enjoined in the Vêdas, Ajena Yeshtavyam—sacrifice must be with Aja. The term "Aja" must be understood to mean 'Goat.' But here we do not see any such animal and we all desire to have the flesh of the goat as of old." But the Rishis replied "It is said in the Vedic Sruti '*Bijai Yegneshu Yashtavyam*' in the yâga grains ought to be offered as sacrifice. Hence the term Aja in the Vêdic mantras means only grains and hence it is not proper to slaughter the goats. That is not the Dharma for great men. In this noble Yuga slaughtering of animals is not proper. When this controversy between the Rishis and the Dêvatâs was going on, there appeared in his aerial vehicle the great King Vasu. Both the parties, as soon as they saw him, agreed among themselves to refer the matter to this great King in order to clear the doubt about the interpretation of the Vêdic mantra. This great King who had performed a number of Yâgas, who is the source of gifts, the protector of all animals, must be our arbitrator. His word should be our Pramana. Thus the parties addressed the King, "Oh King, what is the significance of the mantras "*Yashtavyam Ajena*." But the King cleverly asks "What is exactly the interpretation put by each party?" Then the Rishis said, "we interpret the word 'Aja' as grain" and the Dêvatâs said, "it means goat." King Vasu was prejudiced in favour of the Dêvatâs and gave his verdict in favour of the Dêvatâs and interpreted the word 'Aja' as goat. Thereafter the Rishis were enraged, at the King's verdict due to partiality. The King was cursed by the Rishis on account of which he lost the power of travelling in air; his aerial vehicle

fell down to the ground from the sky when the earth opened and swallowed him. This is the fate of Vasu who interpreted the Vêdic mantras erroneously against the doctrine of Ahimsa which was upheld by the Rishis.

This story with a slight modification also occurs in Jaina literature. According to the Jaina tradition the Vêdas had been for a long time based upon the Ahimsa doctrine, and the Vêdic rituals had been performed only with the help of the grains and flour made of grains. After this controversy resulting in the perverse interpretation of the mantra '*Ajena Yashtavya*,' goat sacrifice was introduced and then followed all the other animals such as horses. When thus Vêdic sacrifices had been made corrupt by this mischievous interpretation of the term '*Aja*' the Jainas had to reject the Vêdas as inconsistent with the higher and purer doctrine of Ahimsa. Whether this Mahâbhârata story and the Jaina tradition are based upon an original historical fact, it is not easy to decide. This much can be inferred that from the very earliest days there must have been a section among the Aryans staunchly opposed to animal sacrifice in religious rituals.

Neelakesi strengthens her criticism against *Apourusheya* doctrine by mentioning some more facts of evidence, from the Vêdic literature. You have there: statements like "*Yagnavalkya Uvacha*"—"Yagnavalkya said thus"—"*Janako Vaideho*"—Janaka of Videha said thus—and so on. These instances clearly indicate that some persons were considered as authors of statements contained in the Vêdas. Again, she strengthens her contention that contradictory statements occur there

by quoting from the Vêdas. In one place you have "*Na Himsayât Sarvaboothani*—Do not kill any living being—" and in another place you have "*Sarvamedhey Sarvam Hanyat*—in all sacrifices all kinds of animals may be sacrificed—" In spite of these innumerable defects you maintain that all Darsanas which do not recognise these Vêdas are erroneous. But you yourself maintain "*Anantâvai Vêda*"—Vêdas are infinite and boundless—" Then why should you assume that the other Darsanas do not have Vêdic basis? Your own Vêdas may be but a fraction, and that, an erroneous fraction of the infinite and boundless Vêdas. Probably a major portion of this is lost, and what is preserved by you is quite insignificant and unimportant by your own statement.

Then Bûthika turns round and asks Neelakesi, "Do you mean to say that your own God Arhan is mentioned in the Vedas?" "Yes," answers Neelakesi, and cites a number of examples from Rig Vedic Texts relating to the praise of Arhan. "*Arhan bibarshi Sayakani Danvan, Arhantu Viswaroopam, Arhat Brahmi, Arha Eva Itham Sarvam, Eth Bootham Yach Abavyam Ya Yevam Veda etc.*" Here you have innumerable references to Arhan, Jinendra. Again, just as we recognise a Sarvagnya Omniscient Purusha as the author of Agamas, so also there are passages referring to the reality of such Sarvagnyas. For example, "*Savetti Viswam, Na Hi Thasya Vetta Thamahu ragriyam Purusham Mahantam and Hiranyagarbasarvagnaha etc.*" You, in Gnâna Kanda, condemn the doctrine of the creation of the world as Mithya, and yet you accept as permanent statements "*Mukhato Brahman Asrajat*" from the mouth was

created the Brahman. Thus it is a conglomeration of incompatible and contradictory injunctions and statements.

Speaking about creation by Brahma, you arrange the creatures into four grades of importance according to their sources from the Body of Brahma. Arranging the people according to four castes of lower and higher, would be meaningless when you remember that all of them are created from the very same body of Brahma. But, you cannot justify this classification on the ground that what proceeds from the head must be certainly higher than what proceeds from the feet; for a member of the body of Brahma has neither greatness nor smallness in itself. Ganga water proceeding from the feet of Vishnu is considered pure and sacred, whereas the perspiration from his head is considered impure and useless. Brahma born from Vishnu's Navel becomes the chief of the Gods; whereas Madhu and Ketaba born from his ears are not so. Hence the position of the organs higher or lower cannot be an adequate ground as to the worth of things created through them. Hence the proper thing for you is to recognise that all the four castes are equally important since all of them were born of the same body of Brahma.

Hence it is better to reject the Vêdic ritual of sacrifice based upon the cruel treatment of animals and accept worship on the principle of Ahimsa. For, animal sacrifice, even in the name of religion, must necessarily lead to the sin of killing. Even as killing, sacrificial slaughter is much more cruel than the slaughter of animals by a butcher. You maintain that sacrifice even though it involves killing of animals is not sinful,

because, the sacrifice is performed for the satisfaction of Dêvas and Pitrus ; What is done in the name of Gods and manes cannot be evil. This defence is rejected by Neelakesi. What is performed in the name of a God whether good or evil, must necessarily relate to the performer ; whether virtue or vice it is the performer of the sacrifice that must enjoy the fruit of his action. It is merely a device by which you justify your conduct. The Dêvatâs do not require this method of sacrifice for their satisfaction. For, if they are in real need of meat they need not depend on you. There are plenty of goats and other animals in the world and the Dêvâtâs can satisfy their hunger by directly killing and feeding on them. Who can prevent them from such a course ? If you say that sacrifice is offered not so much because the Dêvatâs are in need of flesh, but because you want to get rid of your own difficulties and miseries through the Dêvatâs, this defence is quite lame. If the Dêvatâs are to be pacified and pleased by offering sacrifice for your own end, it still implies that the Dêvatâs would get angry if no sacrifices were offered to them. This would make them quite human in nature and conduct, that they are pleased when gifts are offered, and that they are displeased when no such gifts are presented. This would make them equally liable to want and misery ; being subjected to wants and miseries, and waiting to be satisfied by the human agency, they can never be credited with powers of removing the difficulties and miseries of other people. This kind of defence may be put up even in favour of the butcher in slaughter house. Every butcher when he tries to kill the victim, in a way offers prayers to his God or Dêvata. Hence

it is better to give up the whole thing as impure and undesirable instead of entrenching yourself behind invented arguments of doubtful value. Worship of Gods will be equally valuable if you use flowers and fruits as offering instead of goats and cows. There is no special sanctity in using this *māmsa* as offerings to God. Hence it is wise to substitute as Yagnadravyâs, flowers and sandal. Since Dêvatâs do not express any partiality to flesh, and since animal sacrifice is chosen by the person only, because of his own selfish desire to eating meat, Dêvatâs will be quite well satisfied if they are worshipped with flowers which are the best and purest Yagnadravyas or offerings in worship. Bâthika and his disciples in the Adyayanasâla, after listening to this system of Ahimsa, were very much moved. They recognise that purity of worship is a necessary counter part of religion. They have realised the wisdom of rejecting all those statements in the Vêdas, which are in conflict with the other statements based upon Ahimsa. Then they have decided to give up this impure and erroneous form of worship, animal sacrifice in the name of Gods. Then all the wise men praise the conduct of Bâthika for this wise decision of re-establishing religion and religious worship on the principle of Ahimsa. Neelakesi is praised for this good service and Bâthika and all others accompany her, as a mark of respect, for some distance before taking leave of her. Thus ends the chapter on Vêda Vâda.

CHAPTER X.

Bhuta Vada.

Neelakesi after condemning Vêda Vâda meets on her way the teacher of the materialistic school, otherwise called Bhûta Vâda. She thinks it worth her while to expose the error and inadequacy of this materialistic school. Hence she enters into a debate with this teacher of Bhûta Vâda, named Pisâchaka. Evidently he is a teacher attached to the court of King Madanajit; hence the discussion is held in the royal assembly. Pisâchaka, the teacher of materialism, first explains his system. "We do not recognise the subtle distinction of qualities and substances. For us, the ultimate reals are the five Bhûtas; all activities in the world must be traced to these five Bhûtas. These are permanent and real; Fire, Earth, Water, Air and Space are the five ultimate elements of the universe. Out of these are evolved respectively, Eyes, Nose, Tongue, Body and Ears; and out of these five sense organs, arise respectively, Colour, Odour, Taste, Touch and Sound. Just as the intoxicating drink is obtained by a combination of five things flour, jaggery etc., so also by the combination of these five elements are obtained intelligence, feeling of pleasure and pain and so on, which characteristics increase with the increase of five elements, and disappear with the disintegration of the five elements. When the five elements thus get disintegrated, the qualities of intelligence and feeling completely disappear without leaving any residue. The fundamental reals in the

world are these five elements and every activity must be traced to the efficacy of these, but clever fellows with the gift of the gab go about prattling about the existence of the so-called Jīva and their doctrine is accepted by the ignorant masses. Except sheer verbiage there is nothing corresponding to the word Jīva in reality. There never was in existence in the past anything besides these five elements. Even at present reality consists of these five and in future also these five alone will continue to exist. To postulate an entity besides these five is the result of sheer ignorance as to the nature of the ultimate reality ; and the Lōkâyata teacher has thus expounded his system."

Neelakesi turns to examine the same. She first turns her attention to the Pramânâs recognised by the Bhûta Vâda school. She asks the teacher how he has discovered the ultimate truth according to his system. Is it obtained through sense-perception or inferential knowledge, or revealed by the Sarvagna ? Since you do not recognise anybody as the founder of the religion, there is no Āgama for you, because Āgama must necessarily imply a Sarvagna as its author. But such an Omniscient Being would imply a personality entirely free from karmas and possessed with absolute and infinite knowledge as the result of getting rid of all karmas. Since you do not recognise such an Āpta you do not recognise any Āgama. You rely entirely on Pratyaksha, sense-perception. Relying mainly on sense-perception, you believe that the human body is the result of the combination of the five elements, Bhûtas and that consciousness and other psychical elements are but the resultant effect produced by the combination of the five Bhûtas.

How is it possible for you to obtain all this information through sense-perception alone? Even in the matter of the origin of your body, it is impossible for you to have a direct perception of its origin in the mother's uterus. Do you actually perceive by penetrating into uterine existence the origin of the body by the combination of the five Bhûtas? But if you say that the uterine origin resulting from the combination of the five Bhûtas can be easily inferred, the same process of inference will enable you to accept the existence of Jîva. As a matter of fact, you do not recognise inference as a valid pramânâ, and some of the doctrines in your system cannot be established by Pratyaksha alone. If you say that it is quite easy to infer from the solidity of our human body that it must have originated from the combination of the five elements such as Earth, Water, etc., similarly from the perception of intelligence and other psychical faculties which cannot reasonably be derived from non-intelligent or achetana Bhûtas, we can infer the existence of Jîva, a chêtana principle from which alone intelligence and other conscious elements could be derived.

You not only deny the existence of Atma, but as a corollary you deny the existence of Paralôka, the other world. Since you do not recognise the existence of a higher world than this, you naturally ridicule all attempts of spiritual discipline such as performing *tapas* with the object of obtaining a higher state of existence. Maintaining that the ultimate reality is exhausted by the Pancha Bhûtas and that Āpta, Āgama, and Sanmârga, (God, Scripture and the path of Righteousness respectively) are clever fictions invented by interested people, you throw the whole lot overboard

and preach that the best thing for a man here is to live the life to the full, never caring for the morrow, for the morrow may not come. This open nullification of all principles of religion and morality, why should you be so anxious to preach? What is the good that you are going to realise by the propagation of such a perverse view? Even granting what you say were true, still it would be a wise policy to behave as if there is a God and that it is useful to walk the path of righteousness. If ultimately there is a justification for such a course, the man who walks in the path of righteousness will certainly be benefited; and if you are right he is not going to lose anything on account of his right conduct. You eagerly debate with me to establish that there is no Jīva and that consciousness is merely a sort of by-product resulting from the combination of the five Bhūtas. Am I to understand that the person with whom I am arguing is merely the combination of the five Bhūtas? If so, how is it possible for the inanimate material elements to intelligently reason and debate and discuss problems of philosophical importance?

Further, the very combination of the five elements is impossible and meaningless, because some of the elements are by nature mutually incompatible and self-contradictory. For example, Ākasa or space, is non-material while the other four are distinctly physical. How can you talk of a combination between physical and non-physical entity? Further, water and fire are mutually incompatible and self-contradictory; and how can you talk of a combination of these two? Hence to suggest that these five elements combine with one another and constitute the human body, and that out of this combination you

obtain as a by-product, intelligence, feeling and will,—all the characteristics associated with a Chêtana conscious entity, is a dogma of materialism.

Pisâchaka answers this objection. Your assumption that the five elements cannot join with one another is untenable. Have you not noticed the ordinary fact of cooking food? Do you not observe there the combination of all the five elements in the process? Hence it is not impossible to conceive the combination of five elements. But Neelakesi points out that this illustration of cooking food is as ineffective as the former analogy of producing intoxicating liquor by mixing up five elements, corn flour, jaggery, etc. Even granting for argument's sake, that the five elements can combine with one another and thus build up the body it will not prove that by their combination there originates conscious chêtana principle as a by-product. It is impossible to derive a chêtana principle,—consciousness—by combining five inanimate physical elements to constitute the body. Further, is the by-product consciousness which is the result of the combination of the five physical elements which are non-intelligent in themselves, the direct effect of the cause—the mixture of five elements? Do you consider the elements, as the material cause of consciousness or merely instrumental cause? Do they constitute the Upâdâna Kârana of Jîva, or merely the Nimitha Kârâna? If the five elements constitute the material cause, or the Upâdâna Kârana for the production of life and consciousness, then the latter must be established to be the physical effect just as the intoxicating liquor distilled out of the mixture of flour and molasses, etc., is but the liquid essence obtained from

the combining of the physical things. Similarly, if the material or physical elements are able to produce a consciousness, then it must also be a physical fact perceived by the senses. In any way, you cannot maintain logically the birth of intelligence from the combination of physical elements. You maintain that it is implicitly present in the elements, and by the combination of the elements, it emerges out in explicit form and you compare the appearance of consciousness to the appearance of fire from fuel. Fire grows with the increase of fuel, burns as long as there is available fuel for sustaining it, decreases with the decrease of fuel, and disappears when the fuel is exhausted. Similarly intelligence appears with the appearance of the body, grows with its growth, diminishes when the body decays, and disappears with the disintegration of the body. This account of parallelism between consciousness and body, is not quite accurate. It cannot be maintained, with any amount of reason, that there is such an intimate relation between the growth of consciousness and growth of body. The size and strength of body may have absolutely nothing to do with the nature and capacity of intelligence. It is a matter of common experience that a person with a small body may be equipped with enormous intelligence and capacious consciousness, and a man with a large body, may be after all an idiot. Hence to postulate a causal relation between physical entity and consciousness, may not be quite accurate. Physical objects are easily accessible to sense-perception, whereas consciousness or life cannot be so apprehended. The two appear to be entirely distinct in nature, and hence to connect the two as

cause and effect, may not be sound logic. To suggest that consciousness will appear as the effect of the combination of the five Bhûtas is as intelligent a statement as that a figure made of straw, mud, and other rubbish, covered with leather coating certainly turns out to be a crystal figure beautiful in form, and pleasing to the eye. If this is not possible, certainly much more impossible is it to think of deriving consciousness from the combination of the five inanimate Bhûtas. Your statement is so absurd and impossible that it need not even be controverted. You try to derive the human body and personality from the five Bhûtas. But how can you explain the difference, moral and intellectual, that is found among individual human beings? Such moral and intellectual difference cannot be proved to be the effect of the five Bhûtas, because there is no possible physical condition which may be taken as the cause for such moral and intellectual differences. If they cannot be derived as effect from the body, you have necessarily to postulate another category, which would sufficiently explain such personal differences.

Next, you try to derive from the five Bhûtas the five sense organs, and from these five sense-organs, the five sense qualities. If you strictly adhere to your own doctrine, then you are confronted with a great difficulty. If each sensation is obtained from its appropriate sense organ, then what becomes of your statement that intelligence is born of the combination of five Bhûtas? Each element creates its own sense organ and produces its own appropriate sensation is a proposition which is incompatible with the other proposition that the five elements if combined together produce intelligence; if

each physical element is capable of producing its own appropriate sensation through its own sense organ, the objection against the five Bhûtas operating together and producing consciousness, is equally applicable to each of the five physical elements separately. Because sense perception is a fact of consciousness it cannot be accounted for by the activity of physical elements. If each element is thus credited with the capacity to produce its own appropriate sense organ and to experience the appropriate sensation, then any other physical body made of that element must have a similar sense experience. A pot which is the modification of clay, must be able to behave in identically the same intelligent way as earth element in human body. Further, lower animals which may not have all the five sense organs, must be considered to be made of lesser Bhûtas and not by all the five together. Similarly, even a human being who is born defective in senses, must be devoid of that particular element in his body. A man, born blind cannot have that element in his body which is the basis of vision. A man born deaf, must be similarly devoid of that element from which sound is derived. Further, in the case of these persons defective in their senses, there could possibly be no chance of intelligence appearing. For, according to your own contention, intelligence is the product of the combination of all the five elements, which means that, if one or two elements are absent, the remaining elements by themselves cannot produce intelligence as their by-product. If you answer this objection by saying that it is possible to obtain intelligence and other conscious elements even through the operation of a single Bhûta and single sense organ,

then your argument, that all the Bhûtas with the five sense organs, by combination, produce Jnâna falls to the ground. If you maintain that there is something beyond the five Bhûtas which is responsible for the appearance of Jnâna and other conscious facts, then call that thing, Atma, and give up your doctrine of materialism.

Again if the five Bhûtas respectively produces the five sense organs, and through these, the five sensations, how do you account for Manas? You cannot say that it is also due to another kind of Bhûta, because there is no sixth Bhûta in existence. Animals and human beings, who are supposed to be constituted by the five Bhûtas, exhibit in their behaviour, a capacity to recognise facts previously experienced such as, "This is the thing which I saw formerly, This is the thing which I ate formerly." This memory-experience, and recognition, how do you explain? Certainly, you cannot derive memory and recognition from the five Bhûtas. For, in this case, there is no direct stimulation of sense organs by any external stimulus. Hence memory and recognition cannot be derived from the five Bhûtas through their sense organs. Not only appearance of intelligence, memory and recognition, are incapable of being explained by reference to physical entities; even animal appetites and wants cannot be sufficiently accounted for by tracing them to physical conditions. Even appetites like hunger and thirst cannot be explained as the effects of the Pancha Bhûtas. Appetites and instincts in animals also exhibit a certain amount of intelligence though latent and these lead the animals to their appropriate food from the very beginning of their birth. Such instinctive behaviour in animals and

children could be explained only by postulating a Jiva as the basis of life.

If you do not recognise the reality of Jiva, and if you explain all organisms as resulting from combinations of physical elements, then your theory has to confront with difficulties based upon animal instincts. How do you explain the variety of procreative tendencies among animals? Some animals like dogs and pigs, give birth to a number of young ones, whereas animals like elephant and cow, give birth to only one calf. If both are the result of identically the same physical constituent elements, how could this difference in habit be explained satisfactorily? You cannot get over the difficulty by saying that it is the work of nature. If it is nature then you cannot think of variation in it. But, it is found sometimes, as in the case of the same she-goat which had brought forth two young ones on one occasion yields on another occasion only one kid. Natural causes are generally without variations. Hence there cannot be any to explain such differences. Again, all animals and insects have bodies; and according to your belief their body must be the result of the combination of the five Bhûtas. But insects and animals are not all of them in possession of all the sense organs. There are gradations of animals according to the presence of sense organs in them. Some are equipped with two senses, others have three senses, and some others have four senses. What about these animals and insects which are not equipped completely with five sense organs? Is it to be inferred that their bodies are constituted by less than five Bhûtas? Insects like snails have only two

sense organs, touch and taste. Is it to be inferred that their bodies are constituted by only air, and water, which are supposed to be the basis of touch and taste. If you say that earth and other elements are also perceived therein, how do you account for the absence of the sense organ nose and the corresponding sensation thereof? Since these have the appetite for food they must also be in possession of the internal fire responsible for digestion. And if fire is present as an element in the body, why are they devoid of eyes and incapable of vision? There must be inside the body of such insects the passage for food and therefore Ākāśa also is involved in it. If space is present also in the body you must have correspondingly the sense organ of ears and their function of sound sensation. On the other hand, if you maintain that organisms having only one sense, have their bodies constituted by one Bhûta, and those with the two senses have their bodies constituted by two Bhûtas, and so on, you have further difficulties to explain. In the evolution and development of animals, according to the developement of sense organ, you observe an order and uniformity. The single-sensed animals have only the sense of touch or contact. The animals with two senses have besides touch, taste and the corresponding sense organ for taste. The next higher grade of animals has nose in addition to the other two senses. This orderly appearance of one sense after another, in the course of evolution of sense organs in animals, must necessarily imply the orderly and uniform appearance of additional Bhûta in the constitution of the body, which necessarily means a selective process of developement. Such selective intelligence cannot be

present in the Bhûtas which are inanimate and physical. You have to postulate therefore some sort of intelligence as the basis for such selective developement among animals.

In the case of organisms though they differ from one another, according to the principles of sense organs present in their body, all are capable of experiencing the general instincts characteristic of animals. They express some sort of intelligence and awareness of the environment, they are able to re-act to these environmental facts and as a result of re-action they are able to experience pleasure or pain. But all these facts of consciousness, according to your own position, will be possible only when all the five physical elements as an aggregate constitute the body. Since each physical element is incapable of producing by itself any such experience of pleasure or pain you are constrained to postulate an intelligent category like Life. If it is maintained that the five Bhûtas separately are capable of producing five different kinds of sense awareness, then each physical element is endowed with a corresponding life and the capacity to have corresponding sensation. It simply means that while attempting to reject one life principle, you are prepared to accept five Bhûtas, each a living entity. You maintain that consciousness which is the by-product of the combination of the five physical elements, continuously exist as long as the physical basis is continued, and disappears when there is disintegration of the five Bhûtas. But it is a common experience that persons fall into a swoon and unconsciousness, on account of several reasons. How do you explain the disappearance

of conscious awareness in such cases while body is intact and no physical disintegration sets in. If you postulate some other entities besides the five Bhûtas, by whose contact consciousness is revived in such cases, then your doctrine that life and consciousness result from the combination of the five Bhûtas is cast to the winds. Life and consciousness must be associated with this new category which is postulated in addition to, and beyond the five Bhûtas. You might as well call it Jîva or life.

The continuity of human personality, and the capacity to remember things experienced in youth by an old person, would naturally imply a permanent entity conscious and intelligent as the basis of human personality.

But you may say that this only requires such an entity to be present during the short period from the birth to the death of the individual, and it is not necessary to postulate such an entity beyond the limits of birth and death. Hence it is not necessary to think of a Jîva or Ātma before the birth or after the death. Further, there is no evidence for the existence of such an Ātma before the birth or after death. Neelakesi points out that this argument is practically a double-edged sword which will cut both ways. It may be argued as well that the Pancha Bhûtas which are considered permanent entities by you relying on sense perception alone cannot be proved to have existed in the past, or to exist in the future. Even in this case, past existence and future existence, must be based upon some sort of inference resting upon the experience of the person. What is admissible in the case of

physical entities must be equally admissible in the case of Jiva; life principle, though directly known to us only in the present stage, still may be inferred, as having continued to exist in the past, and that it will continue to exist in the future also.

There is another difficulty which you have to face. All persons have bodies constituted by the same five kinds of Bhûtas. But we find enormous difference from man to man, one is ignorant, and the other is very intelligent, one is happy, and the other is awfully miserable. How do you explain the presence of such diversity in life and experience when you give all of them identically the same body constituted by the same five physical elements? If experience in a waking life is considered by you as a by-product resulting from the combination of the five Bhûtas, how do you explain such psychic experiences as dreams and hallucinations? If these are also the effects of the combination of the same Bhûtas, why should there be any such fundamental difference between ordinary waking experience, and dream experience? Sometimes we find such interesting facts in life. A person who owned a large treasure and kept it in secret may die suddenly without communicating to his sons and heirs. But later on, the information may be communicated by the dead person through some medium to his sons. Similarly, dead persons in the form of dis-embodied spirits may communicate to the living, some information relating to their own experience when they were alive, and this piece of information may be true and may be corroborated by indubitable evidence. All such abnormal facts of experience cannot be explained by

you according to your doctrine of Pancha Bhûtas. The only intelligible and straight course in the matter of dealing with such experience is to postulate an independent entity called Jîva, besides the physical body, which is capable of surviving death and continuing his experience even in the disembodied stage of its existence.

At this stage the Chârvâka teacher laughed out the whole argument. "What is the use of your talking about disembodied persons and ghosts? Who has seen them, and who can perceive their reality? Why bring in such absurd fictions into the field of philosophy?" In answer Neelakesi tells him point blank that she will make him see such a disembodied spirit. If he sees such a ghost then at least he will believe in its reality. Then the Chârvâka teacher agrees to this arrangement. "If you make me directly perceive such a ghost then certainly I must believe in its reality. Go ahead, let me see the thing." Neelakesi by her own powers as a Goddess, produces before him the figure of a terrible appearance, that of a disembodied spirit, a Pisâcha. Not to frighten him she produces only the face and mouth before him, and not the whole figure of the ghost. Perceiving this horrid figure, the Chârvâka teacher gets frightened and collapses into unconsciousness. Neelakesi comforts him saying, "Don't be frightened at the figure. After all she is your own mother, now in the form of a ghost. That is why you are also called Pisâchaka." Since you have directly experienced the existence of a disembodied spirit now at least you must give up your own doctrine of materialism. You must realise that it is not possible to explain everything in life by the five physical elements. You

must at least realise now that "there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy." Remember that there are Ātmas, living Jīvas, besides the five Bhûtas in existence. When once you admit the existence of Life besides the physical entities you have to admit of the corollaries thereof. You must recognise the importance of moral value, the reality of the distinction between good and evil, the usefulness of accepting the former, and rejecting the latter, the purpose of spiritual discipline in life, and the existence of ultimate goal for human personality. All these eternal values which have had no significance to you till now, must be admitted to be the guiding principles of your future and will completely transform you and your mode of life, hereafter.

The Chârvâka teacher, as a result of this experience, completely surrenders himself to Neelakesi, accepts the true Dharma, and praises her as his true Guru and teacher. Thereafter, Pisâchaka, the Charvaka teacher, gives up his own Darsana of Bhûtha Vâda, and adorns himself with the three great jewels of, "Right Knowledge, Right Faith, and Right Conduct" presented to him by Neelakesi. Thus ends the Bhûta Vada.

A Note on Bhuta Vada.

There is a difference between the account given here and other accounts relating to this school of materialism. Here, in Neelakesi, the author refers to the doctrine of Pancha Bhûtas as constituent elements of human body as well as other organic bodies. Where as in other books such as Sarvadarsana Sangraha of Madhavacharya, Sarvasiddhanta Sangraha of

Sankaracharya, the reference is only to four Bhûtas, *Prathvi, Ap, Thejas* and *Vayu* (Earth, Water, Fire and Air) and the commentator on Sarvadarsana Sangraha mentions the reason why Ākāśa or space is left out. "Since the Chârvâka school recognised sense perception or Pratyaksha as the only pramâna, and since Akâśa is not so perceived by sense perception it is left out of account by Chârvâkas." Hence only the other four Bhûtas are recognised as the constituent elements of living beings and by the combination of which originates consciousness. Traditionally the system is associated with Brihaspati, the reputed teacher of the Devas, hence it is sometimes known as Bârhaspatya system of philosophy. His disciple is known by the name of Chârvâka, pleasing in speech, hence the system is also known by the disciple's name, the Chârvâka system. It is also known by the third name Lôkâyata. Ordinarily people of the world are guided by ideals in Nîti Sâstra and Kâma Sâstra, hence have the pursuit of wealth and happiness which are considered to be the ultimate aim of life by the Chârvâka philosophers. Since these ideals are the common ideals of the people in general, since the system is based upon the natural behaviour and experience of people, the system is called Lôkâyata. But the author of Neelakesi introduces as the teacher of this Bhûta Vâda one Pisâchaka. Probably this is a fictitious name. But why should he introduce the five Bhûtas instead of the four? It is really a problem to be investigated. Does it mean that there was a special branch of this Chârvâka school which recognised the five Bhûtas as the fundamental elements instead of four. We have no clue except what is given

in Mahābhārata, in Anusāsana Parva, Chapter 173. There is a conversation between Brihaspati and Yudhishtira. Here Brihaspati gives an account as to the nature of living beings and speaks of the five Bhūtas including Ākāśa as the constituent elements of the body of living beings. But it cannot be maintained that in this chapter Brihaspati teaches this particular system known as Chārvāka philosophy. All that we can infer from this is, that at a period in the history of thought there must have been a belief that all the five elements combined to form the organic bodies. But later on, to make the system consistent with the logical foundations, Ākāśa must have been dropped out since it is not within the direct reach of sense perception.

There is another point worth mentioning in this connection. The author of Sarvadarsana Sangraha quotes at the end of the chapter some couplets purporting to be uttered by Brihaspati beginning with "*Na Swarga Na Apavarga, Naivātma Paralokika, etc.*" ending with "*Māmsānam Kaganam Tatvat Nisachara Samiditam, etc.*" there is neither heaven, nor Moksha, nor Ātma, nor the other world; nor the discipline according to the Varnāshrama is capable of yielding any fruit. Fire sacrifice, three Vedas, three Dandas, smearing the body with ashes, these have been invented by stupid people with the object of making a livelihood. If the animals slaughtered in Jothishtoma sacrifice goes to Swarga, how is it that the master of the sacrifice does not sacrifice his own father with the object of sending him to Swarga? After quoting these verses the chapter is closed with the following:—"Therefore with the object of showing mercy to a number of animals it is necessary

to follow the teachings of the Chârvâka system." According to this author, therefore one of the objects which the promoters of the Chârvâka philosophy had in their mind was to protest against the animal sacrifice involved in Vêdic rituals. But this is not borne out by the description of Chârvâka school given by other writers. For example, in the chapter on Chârvâka school in Haribadrâ Suri's *Shad Darsana Samuchchaya* the commentator clearly makes out that the followers of Chârvâka system preach the complete enjoyment of life here including sexual intercourse, intoxicating drinks, flesh eating etc., the Panchamakaras constitute their ideals according to this writer. In fact, to indicate the ideal of happiness, the *summum bonum* of life, here available to man the Chârvâka writers generally mention the example of pleasure derived during sexual intercourse. Hence, most probably some of them were not very particular about showing mercy to animal life though they protested against the animal sacrifice contained in the Vêdas. Anyhow we cannot dogmatise on this matter. Probably some writers who are opposed to animal sacrifice of Vedic ritualism might have adopted consistently reasonable view about the sanctity of animal life. The commentator on Sarvadarsana Sangraha quotes lines from Vishnu Purana containing the same sentiments relating to animal sacrifice. "*Nihatasya Pasor Yagna Swargapraptir Ye Dishyatai Swapitha Yajamanena Thatha Kimna Nihanyatha Naitath Yukti Saham Vakyam Himsa Darmaya Naeshyatai Havimshi Yanaladharmavani Palayeth Yarba Kodhitham.*" (Vishnu Purana, 3, 18, 63, 65).

From these sentiments from diverse sources it is

plain that there must have been a strong opposition to animal sacrifice from different quarters which differed from one another in their own positive teachings. Hence it is not improbable, as the author of *Sarva-darsana Sangraha* suggests, that the teachers of the Chârvâka school were also actuated by the negative attitude towards animal sacrifice.



BIBLIOGRAPHY.

SANSKRIT.

1. The Buddhavamsa and the Cariya Pitaka by the Rev. Richard Morris, M.A., LL.D.
2. The Cariya Pitaka in Devanāgarī characters with English introduction by Bimala Charan Law.
3. Vinaya Texts Parts I to III—translated from Pali by T. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg.
4. Vinaya Pitakam Vols. I to V Ed. by Hermann Oldenberg.
5. Vaisēshika Sūtras of Kanada with the commentary of Sankara Misra Ed. by Nandalal Sinha.
6. Udānavarga from Buddhist Canon by W. W. Rockhill (Trubners Oriental Series).
7. The Dhammapada from Buddhist Canon by S. Beal (Trubners Oriental Series).
8. Buddhist Records of the Western World Vol. I, by S. Beal (Trubners Oriental Series).
9. Buddhist Records of the Western World Vol. II, by S. Beal (Trubners Oriental Series).
10. Sāṅkhya Kārika of Iswara Krishna, Translation by Henry Thomas Colebrook and H. H. Wilson.
11. Mahābhārata by T. R. Krishnamacharya (Kumbakonam Edition) Vols. I to V.
12. Sacred Books of the Jainas Vol. II :—Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra by Sri Umāswāmi Achārya.
13. Buddhist Legends Parts I to III by Burlingame. (Harvard Oriental Series).
14. The Jātaka Ed. by V. Fausboll Vols. II to VI.
15. Jātaka or Stories of Buddha's former births Vols. I to VI.
16. The Jātakamāla or Bōdhisatvadhanamala by Arya Cura Ed. by Dr. H. Hern (Harvard Oriental Series Vol. I.)


17. Ratnakaranda SravakAchāra of Sri Samanta Bhadra Acharya by C. R. Jain.
18. Sarvadarsanasangraha of Sayana Madhava, edited by Abhyankar.
19. Life of Buddha by Rockhill.
20. Brihaspati Sutra by F. W. Thomas.
21. Kavyamala Part VII. Ed. by K. P. Parab (Kavyamala series).
22. Sarvasiddhantasangraha of Sankaracharya by M. Rangacharya M.A.
23. Prameyakamalamārthanda by Prabachandracharya.
24. Syadvādaratnākara.
25. Syadvādamanjari, Mallesena's commentary.
26. The Psalms of the Early Buddhists The Brethren by Mrs. Rhys Davids.
27. Do. The Sisters.
28. Childers' Pali English Dictionary.

GENERAL AND REFERENCE BOOKS.

29. Tirupparuttikunram and its temples by T. N. Ramachandran.
30. South Indian Inscriptions Vol. I. (Sanskrit and Tamil) Ed. by E. Hultzsch.
31. Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics Vol. I. by James Hastings.
32. Cunningham's Ancient Geography of India Ed. by S. N. Mazumdar.
33. South Indian Buddhist Antiquities by Alexander Rea Vol. VI.
34. A History of Kanarese literature by Rice.
35. Mysore and Coorg by Rice.
36. History of Sri Vaishnavism by T. A. Gopinatha Rao.
37. Rangacharya. Topographical Inscriptions of the Madras Presidency Vols. I to III.

TAMIL.

38. Aranerichcharam by T. Chelvakesavaraya Mudaliar.
39. Brihat Jatakam. by Kadalangudi Natesa Sattrigal.
40. Thirunavukkarasuswamigal by Sadasiva Chettiar.
41. Tirugnanasambandaswamigal (Thevarappathigangal) by Sadasiva Chettiar.
42. Sundaramurti Swamigal Do. do.
43. Sekkizaraswamigal charitram (Periyapuram) by Subrahmanian Pillai.
44. Sivagnanasiddhiyar Parapaksham Moolam with Tattva-prakasar Urai.
45. Virasoliyam by C. V. Damodaram Pillai.
46. Yapparungalam by Bavanandam Pillai.
47. Yapparungala Karikai by A. Kumaraswami Pulavar.
48. Do. do. with Gunasakarar Urai.
49. Yapparungala Vritti Part II.
50. Tholcappiam (Nachchinarkiniar Urai) by R. Raghava Ayyangar.



ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL LIBRARY

Title *Neelakesi ; ed. by*
A. Chakravarti.

Class No. *181.4* Book No. *N 378 C*

Date of Issue	Issued to	Date of Return

